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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THE MODERN STATE AND THE RE-CREATION OF THE INDIGENOUS OTHER:
THE CASE OF THE AUTHENTIC SÁMI IN SWEDEN AND THE WHITE MAN’S
INDIAN IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
by
Luca Zini
Florida International University, 2015
Miami, Florida
Professor John F. Stack, Major Professor
The present study comparatively examined the socio-political and economic
transformation of the indigenous Sámi in Sweden and the Indian American in the United
States of America occurring first as a consequence of colonization and later as a product
of interaction with the modern territorial and industrial state, from approximately 1500 to
1900.
The first colonial encounters of the Europeans with these autochthonous
populations ultimately created an imagery of the exotic Other and of the noble savage.
Despite these disparaging representations, the cross-cultural settings in which these
interactions took place also produced the hybrid communities and syncretic life that
allowed levels of cultural accommodation, autonomous space, and indigenous agency to
emerge. By the nineteenth century, however, the modern territorial and industrial state
rearranges the dynamics and reaches of power across a redefined territorial sovereign
space, consequently, remapping belongingness and identity. In this context, the status of
indigenous peoples, as in the case of Sámi and of Indian Americans, began to change at
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par with industrialization and with modernity. At this point in time, indigenous
populations became a hindrance to be dealt with the legal re-codification of
Indigenousness into a vacuumed limbo of disenfranchisement. It is, thus, the modern
territorial and industrial state that re-creates the exotic into an indigenous Other.
The present research showed how the initial interaction between indigenous and
Europeans changed with the emergence of the modern state, demonstrating that the
nineteenth century, with its fundamental impulses of industrialism and modernity, not
only excluded and marginalized indigenous populations because they were considered
unfit to join modern society, it also re-conceptualized indigenous identity into a
constructed authenticity.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The history of indigenous peoples, as we understand it, begins with the history of
European exploration, settlement, and colonization. The events that brought the white
man to the shores, or territorial boundaries, of these new lands transformed the
inhabitants into natives, into tribes with new proper names, into noble and ignoble
savages, and eventually into indigenous Others.1 Prior to these events the populations
that inhabited these lands did not see themselves as Indios, Natives, Aborigines,
Indigenous, and not even as Lapps, Olmec, Pueblo Indians, or Coeur d’Alene Indians.
Their realities were not touched by such categorizations and limitations.
These social constructions, write Augie Fleras and Jean Leonard Elliott, “appears
to be a White man’s creation of convenience for talking about Indians, negotiating with
them, administering them … Thus tribes are largely the result of the colonization process
and relations with politically organized states [For instance] from 1797 through 1803 the
treaties use only ‘nation’ without reference to ‘tribes’. Thereafter, until at least the 1830s,
‘tribe’ and ‘nation’ are used interchangeably, often in the same treaty.”2 Such concepts

1

Carina Green adds, “Furthermore, the idea of the Indigenous taps in to a long standing pattern of thought
that has been, and still is, very common in Western society and that in many ways is parallel to the idea of
the Noble Savage. Simply put, there seem to be a need for the exotic Other in the Western mind, and today
this thought feeds above all from the idea of the Indigenous.” (Carina Green, Indigeniety – Idea and
Political Reality (In Sköld, Peter (Ed.). Människor i norr: samisk forskning på nya vägar. Centrum för
samisk forskning – Miscellaneous publications, Umeå: Umeå University, 2008, No. 11), 29).
2

Augie Fleras and Jean Leonard Elliott, The “Nations Within”: Aboriginal-State Relations in Canada, the
United States, and New Zealand (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992), 130-131.
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are “political ideas that arise from the underlying economic and political structures.”3 It is
this “dynamic interplay” of economic and political structures, played out within the
confines of modernity, that changes the attitudes of the emerging modern industrial state
towards indigenous peoples.
Following the first encounters the autochthons’ sense of self and identity is
repositioned, as did the white man’s. In the course of these interactions, cohabitation, and
competition the genesis of the indigenous peoples begins. The experiences, histories, and
identities of indigenous peoples are re-written on the basis of the white man’s “idea,
invention, and perpetuation;” an image that consciously or unconsciously fulfilled a
purpose.

4

Consequently, the legitimation of centuries of human and territorial

ostracization blends exclusion and marginalization into habitual mental processes of
perception, memory, and judgment.
In this context of interactions, cohabitation, and competition, the state becomes
the focus. The unfolding of the modern state broadly changes the power structures and
postulates a sense of belongingness and identity based on the modern nation, sovereignty,
legitimacy, and territoriality. It is the modern industrial state, however, that completes the
“metamorphosis” and turns the indigenous into an invented Other. Industrialization,
mixed with modernity, forces the state to break from tradition and becomes the
epitomical antithesis of the uncivilized savage; meaning, in opposition to the Other or

3

Fleras and Elliott, The “Nations Within”, x-xi.

4

Robert F. Berkhofer, The White Man’s Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the
Present (New York: Knopf, 1978), 29. Similarly, the notion of the “Wild West” seen as a construction, or
invention, crafted out of an almost mythological perception of the western frontier. See Bridger, Bobby.
Buffalo Bill and Sitting Bull: Inventing the Wild West. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002.
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what it considers extraneous to itself. The indigenous, at this point, is pulled out from its
autonomous space and re-created into a white man’s creation. In the course of these
transformations, indigenous identity is altered and at times its connection to primordial
ties of kinship and ancestral lands vanishes into a nebulous stasis, not fully belonging to
either modern or autochthonous worlds. Indigenous peoples, and indigenous identity,
become thus products of a process that began with European colonization and reached its
peak with the consolidation of the modern industrial state in the nineteenth century.
The nineteenth century brings two paradigmatic changes, industrialism and
modernity. Industrialism changes the economic means of production, capital
accumulation, and exchanges. Modernity, on the other hand, calls for the eradication of
tradition, and the politics, space, and the fabric of societies are transformed. In this new
environment those outside the modern state-project, like indigenous people, are
assimilated from the margins into mainstream society, resulting in their dislocation into
an unfamiliar landscape. Through the long and arduous journey from “discovery” to
modernity indigenous identity changed and adapted to these new socio-political and
economic environments, which would eventually result in centuries of despaired
subjugation. Consequently, indigenous peoples were now seen askew within that same
project, and could no longer be precluded to nature’s landscape nor allowed to hinder the
“manifest destiny” of the nation-state. Indigenous peoples had to either be eliminated or
assimilated into the greater society.
The modern territorial state becomes pivotal in this assimilation and it re-creates
and restructures the dynamics and reaches of power across the newly redefined territorial
sovereign space. During the pre-modern and also colonial periods unclaimed or

3

autonomous spaces were often the results of diffused power or the lack of reach of the
central government. These spaces were often overlooked or tolerated where groups like
indigenous peoples could live at the margins. These encounters, between the state or
colonial governments and native populations were, by-and-large, characterized by mutual
indifference, cross-cultural cohabitation, or a reluctant symbiotic relationship.
Deborah J. Yashar’s defines autonomous space as: “Relatively unmonitored local
spaces were created where indigenous people could sustain their local indigenous
identities and forms of governance. So too they gained … mechanisms to access the state
and its resources. As such, many indigenous communities survived and grew beyond the
de facto reach of the state.”5 Richard White also contends that colonial rule, created more
limited forms of governance, allowing for a degree of “accommodation and common
meanings” to exist. 6 For Greg Poelzer the emergence of the modern state drastically
changed indigenous political life. Under absolutist and colonial regimes, indigenous
peoples could occupy these autonomous spaces and coexist as political communities. For
instance, writes Poelzer:
In contrast to colonial and absolutist regimes, the modem state has taken exceptional
measures – intentional and unintentional – to destroy indigenous ways of life … Colonial
and absolutist states, moreover, pursued a paternalistic policy of protecting indigenous
peoples from the increasingly dominant European settlers. In Russia, for example, the
‘yasak people’ were to be ‘protected from Russian ‘thievery’ (violation of the tsar's
decrees) and corrupting vices.’7

5

Deborah J. Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the
Postliberal Challenge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 60.
6

Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 16501815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), x.
7

Greg Poelzer, “Politics of the Indigenous in Canada and Russia: The Struggle for Native SelfGovernment Compared,” The Northern Review No. 15 (1995): 83, 94. Poelzer adds, “aboriginal peoples
largely remained self-determining. In fact, during the century prior to modern state-building … indigenous

4

Poelzer’s argument that “indigenous peoples could coexist as autonomous, political
communities” should be understood in terms of power and autonomy. In the case of
power, in absolutist and colonial regimes power distribution and exertion came with
limitations. For instance, under these conditions the nobility often attempted to limit or
curtail the power of the king, or geographical and logistic limitations prevented the full
reach of governmental power over and across colonial possessions. With the advent of
modernity and the modern state, power was monopolized through a central and
autonomous bureaucracy and therefore its distribution and exertion was more uniform
and far reaching. In the case of autonomy, the hierarchical structure of absolutist and
colonial regimes allowed for the creation of autonomous spaces where indigenous
peoples could pursue independent identities, and in some instances, independent forms of
governance. Compared to absolutist and colonial regimes, argues Poelzer, modern states
were more centralized, bureaucratic and autonomously powerful and “possessed a
universalizing political logic” that transformed the territorial, spiritual, cultural, and
subsistence realities of indigenous peoples.8
Since first contact indigenous people suffered the “Loss of population, loss of
territoriality, extensive intermarriages, and the creation of multiple ties of actual and
symbolic kinship between neighboring peoples heavily modified actual [native]

peoples in Canada were entirely self-determining: ‘in the period in which the British imperial government
was responsible for Indian Affairs, from 1763 to 1860 when that responsibility was transferred to the
government of the United Canadas, Indian tribes were de facto, self-[determining].’” (Ibid., 95-96). Similar
in Sweden the Sámi were protected through royal decree and in the early years of United States policies
were enforced to protect the natives’ ways of life from white infiltration.
8

Greg Poelzer, “Politics of the Indigenous,” 96.
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organization.”9 These changes, coupled with the gradual loss of hybridity, and the power
of the native to steer the white man’s actions led, writes White, to “the breakdown of
accommodation and common meanings [resulted in] the re-creation of the Indians as
aliens, as exotic, as other.”10
Yet, transformations and constructions rarely happen in a vacuum. On the
contrary, a series of multidirectional dialogical dynamics, understood using Karl
Polanyi’s double movement, occurred in cross-cultural settings and, as Russell explained:
produced boundaries and frontiers. These are spaces, both physical and intellectual,
which are never neutrally positioned, but are assertive, contested and dialogical.
Boundaries and frontiers are sometimes negotiated, sometimes violent and often are
structured by convention and protocol that are not immediately obvious to those standing
on either one side or the other. 11

Understanding the current status of indigenous people is to understand the production,
mitigation, and interconnectedness of these boundaries and frontiers, which have shaped
state-indigenous relations in a “double-ended process.” It is the end of this “double
movement” that leads to the re-creation of the indigenous Other.
Purpose and Significance of the Study
Conventional research on indigenous peoples has, for decades, greatly enriched our
knowledge and understanding of the conditions and generational struggles that have
9

Richard White, The Middle Ground, 18.

10

Richard White, The Middle Ground, x.

11

The term dialogical is taken from Charles Taylor meaning “We define our identity always in a dialogue
with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us … the conversation
with them continues within us as long as we live.” (Charles Taylor and Amy Gutmann, Multiculturalism:
Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 32-33); Karl
Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston, MA:
Beacon Press, 2001), 136; Lynette Russell, Colonial Frontiers: Indigenous-European Encounters in Settler
Societies (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 1.
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characterized indigenous histories around the world. Although valuable in its own right,
this existing research has seldom looked at the state, in particular the modern and
industrial state, and at the processes through which the indigenous was created, and later
re-created to fit into a state’s meaning and design.
The theoretical significance of the present study looks into whether the exclusion
and marginalization of indigenous peoples is only about race, ethnicity, and schisms of
subordinated worth and values, or whether exclusion and marginalization must be reconceptualized within the emergence of the modern state, industrialism, and modernity.
In other words, by investigating the processes of modern state functions, especially that
of the modern industrial state, it would be possible to outline the role of the state in remapping indigenous territoriality, space, and identity. Consequently, what will become
clearer are the processes that led to the re-creation of indigenous “otherness” and the
mechanisms through which the indigenous was catapulted into a socio-political and
economic limbo.
Research Questions and Theory
The present research attempts to address the following question: what changes did the
modern era bring to the structure, power, sovereignty, intention, and discourses of the
state that altered indigenous space and identity and in the process re-created indigenous
Otherness?
It is theorized that the emergence of the modern state, and in particular the
modern industrial state, altered the levels and extent of interaction between the state and
indigenous communities. Here, the ensuing dialogical processes were dictated by

7

transformed structures, newfound power, and a higher state’s purpose, which in turn
altered indigenous Otherness, including indigenous space and identity. More specifically,
the unfolding of the modern state broadly postulates a raison d’état focused on nation,
sovereignty, legitimacy, and territoriality, which is in direct opposition to a raison
indigène, or indigenous raison d'être. Consequently, indigenous identity is understood as
an antithesis to state identity and indigenous space becomes incongruous within the
frameworks of the new state. Indigenous peoples thus become a problem to be dealt with
through the codification of Indigenousness into a vacuumed limbo of disenfranchisement.
It is also further theorized that the end of a preexisting bi-directional and
reciprocal dialogical process, or using Karl Polanyi’s principle of double movement, and
therefore of hybridity deprives the indigenous the “power to force whites onto the middle
ground,” and allows for the re-creation of the indigenous Other. At this point, the
indigenous is re-mapped to fit into the wider state’s project.12
Limitations, Delimitations, and Methodology
It is not the purpose of this dissertation to provide an exhaustive and complete
ethnological history of indigenous peoples in Sweden, Scandinavia, or in North America.
My approach has been deliberately selective and my design is intended to provide a
glimpse to a very complex, and relatively unexplored, body of research. In short, it is
aimed at sparking a conversation into further and more multifaceted look into the role of
exogenous forces like state-projects, capitalism, economics, settler’s societies, and
frontiersmen’s colonialism.
12

Richard White, The Middle Ground, xv.
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Limitations and Delimitations
The limitations of this study are dictated by its purpose. Special focus will be given to
modern state formation, its interactions with indigenous populations, and the ensuing
changes brought upon the latter. Therefore, this study will not delve into the normative
conceptualization of the evolution of the modern state, what constitutes identity,
indigenous or otherwise, nor is this study focusing on the indigenous plight or providing
a “forum for indigenous voices.” These, and other similar topics, may be dealt
tangentially during the course of this study and should not be taken as the main focus of
the research.
Supportive examples are drawn from Sweden and the United States of America,
with their respective indigenous populations covering approximately between the
fifteenth through the nineteenth centuries. Particular attention, however, will be given to
the nineteenth century. The reasons for choosing these two seemingly incoherent
examples were to show that despite clear differences in the process of state formation,
power consolidation, and regime-type, there are undisputable underlying similarities of
comparative value in the experiences, interactions, and handling of indigenous
populations. Both countries can be categorized as having similar state infrastructures and
can both be described as bureaucratic constitutionalism.13 Finally, both countries share

13

See Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern
Europe, for a discussion on the categorization of state infrastructures and political regimes in early modern
Europe, including Scandinavia. Ertman, defines “bureaucratic constitutionalism” as a system characterized
by the emergence of a state infrastructure dominated by expert personnel (or administrators) and by a
political regime constituted by national representative bodies or assemblies, such as parliaments or similar
assemblies (Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan, 10, 25, 27, 29).

9

similar outcomes where each state re-creates the indigenous Other to fit into its larger
state-project.
Another reason for deciding to compare Sweden and the United States is because
of the interest in comparing the United States with a non-English (meaning not Spanish
or French), western colonial power with a domestic indigenous population. In Europe, the
only feasible option was Scandinavia with its native Sámi populations. The Sámi were
thus chosen because of their unique status in Europe, being the only viable indigenous
population in Western Europe. In other words, despite the existence of other indigenous
populations in some parts of Russia (including a small Sámi population in the Kola
Peninsula) the Sámi remain the only indigenous group currently occupying a number of
western European countries (Norway, Sweden, and Finland).
Among these three options, Sweden made for the best candidate because of its
extensive experience as a colonial power compared to Denmark-Norway, while Finland,
having been a dominion of first Sweden and then Imperial Russia, could not be used
within the same periodization. In addition, Sweden was the obvious choice because
having lived in Sweden for more than a decade my knowledge of Swedish gave me
access to materials, which would otherwise be difficult to study.
In the case of the United States of America, this country was chosen in part out of
curiosity and in part because of the easily available source materials and local expertise.
One point worth mentioning here, which is further developed and explained in the second
chapter, is that Native populations in the United States were intentionally generalized
under the umbrella of Indians, or Indian Americans, despite the presence of distinctive
groups with specific historical, cultural, ethnic, and linguistic difference and experiences.

10

The reason behind this choice was that the modern state ultimately lumps them together
as one indigenous Other seldom differentiating between them in its discursive
conceptualization of Indians, Native Americans, or savages.
Design and Instrumentation
In the present study, the level and unit of analysis is the modern state and the mechanisms
through which its process of formation, growth, and transformation, shaped and
determined current indigenous realities with particular focus on the dialogical discourses
that re-created indigenous space and identity.
The nature of the study calls for a qualitative research method meant to evaluate
existing literature and historical records, for the purpose of discovering underlying
meanings and patterns of modern state formation and dialogical discourses and processes
among the state and indigenous peoples. Following the example of Gunlög Fur, I have
adopted “a methodology of reading anomalies in the materials as windows into the
workings” of the state and state apparatuses.14 To achieve this goal, a historical research
design is used to collect, evaluate, synthesize, analyze, and interpret relevant primary and
secondary source materials where, through inductive logical reasoning, conclusions are
formulated to build the theoretical foundations of the study.
Data Collection and Analysis
The extent of data gathering was limited to specific sets of materials taken from a variety
of sources that helped tracing a historical reconstruction of the processes defining the

14

Gunlög Fur, Colonialism in the Margins: Cultural Encounters in New Sweden and Lapland (Leiden:
Brill, 2006), 13.
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evolution of the modern state and its relation to indigenous space and identity primarily
by means of textual analysis. Research was conducted through the local university library
catalog, other regional libraries, and the Library of Congress. Extensive research on the
Sámi, however, was conducted in the summer of 2012 at the Kungliga biblioteket, or the
National Library of Sweden, in Stockholm.15
Note on the Literature
The existing seminal, and multidisciplinary, literature on indigenous peoples have greatly
enriched our knowledge and understanding of the conditions and generational struggles
that have characterized indigenous histories since the beginning of European Exploration.
In the course of my research, however, which began years before the start of this
dissertation, I noticed a distinctive and pervasive quality in the literature, one that would
assert the victimization of the indigenous peoples and vilification of the white man and
his state apparatuses, seen above all, as tools of subjugation.
In its stead, what became more stimulating and intriguing for me was to look for
i) the systematic series of actions and mental processes that created the exotic Other, and
thus the indigenous, and ii) the mechanisms responsible for the re-creation of the
indigenous into an indigenous Other. The focus of the present study is on the latter
though because, on the one hand, it helps clarify the mechanisms of transformation, and
in turn understand, the conditions that led the indigenous into a socio-political, cultural,
and economic limbo. On the other hand, looking at the process of re-creation helps to

15

The National Library has been collecting and preserving all domestic printed and audio-visual materials
since 1661.
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identify the state as an agent, which is often overlooked from the analysis. In fact, the
role played by the state, and the degree of involvement of the state in re-creating the
indigenous Other, offers new analytical avenues in the study of indigenous populations.
The state, or more accurately, the raison d’état, became the focus of this study.
First, focusing on the state gave me the opportunity to avoid the analytical monotony
found in other works, and afforded me the opportunity of a fresh look at the
historiographical tradition of indigenous studies. Second, looking at the state posed a
series of analytical challenges worth pursuing. For instance, what sort of state was
responsible for these transformations? What conditions were necessary for the state to
push for such transformations to take place?
A few of the works used in the present study have dealt with the state and its
relations to indigenous peoples. For instance, we have important seminal work being
performed by Bertil Bengtsson, Duane Champagne et al., Augie Fleras and Jean Leonard
Elliott, Gunlög Fur, Gertrude Hanes, Bradley Reed Howard, Lennart Lundmark, David
Maybury-Lewis, Greg Poelzer, Steinar Pedersen Richard John Perry, and Rudolph C.
Rÿser. Perhaps aside from Poelzer, and to a certain extent Champagne et al. and Howard,
the exposition of the state, in particular of the modern industrial state, as a “conceptual
variable” is largely absent. Instead, the most common elements emerging from these
works fall into the typical culprit-victims dichotomization of the state-indigenous
relations. More specifically, these authors approached the topic from a victimization
perspective. Indigenous peoples were taken as victims and indigenous peoples’ struggles
against state’s actions, and non-actions, were the centerpiece. In addition, these authors
tended to focus on the effects rather than the processes and mechanisms that shaped and

13

reshaped indigenous peoples. Ultimately, the literature fell short of providing the
analytical prowess to deal with the state. For instance, how are we to understand what
made the state systematically to subjugate, marginalize, and eradicate indigenous
populations? At what point and under which circumstances did indigenous people enter
into the visual focus of the state, hence requiring a state’s reaction that would forever
change their “status” and future? Consequentially, what is making indigenous peoples
different from other minorities? Why have the latter managed to gain recognition,
political space, and political capital in relation to the state, while many indigenous groups
have made limited gains? The answers to these questions, I believe, cannot be found in
the consequences; rather, they need to be sought in the processes.
The conceptual nature of this study required the conceptualization of several
complex, and often dynamic, abstractions. Chapter two is dedicated exclusively to
conceptualize these abstractions. For the conceptualization of this chapter I made use of
literature that dealt with the concept at hand. It is important to note, though, that chapter
two does not survey or evaluate the existing literature on the concepts used. The works
cited were essentially used as lexical resources from which these conceptualizations were
extrapolated.
Conclusively, the nature of the literature and the way it was employed made a
typical, or conventional, “Literature Review” impractical. This being said, however, does
not mean that the dissertation does not survey and evaluate existing seminal works within
the field of indigenous studies. On the contrary, this exercise is infused in the
dissertation.

14

Organization of the Dissertation
The organization of this dissertation was governed by the scope and design of the
research. Therefore, the conceptual nature of the study determined the sequence of the
chapters, ultimately to allow the reader to assimilate the several abstractions used
throughout the dissertation before entering into the magnitude of the study per se.
Chapter One covers the preliminaries and introduces the topic of the research, its
significance, goals and limitations. Chapter Two, on the other hand, establishes the
conceptual framework of the research and comprises a large portion of the study. The
decision to dedicate an entire chapter to the examination of ideas and abstractions was
dictated by the number of complex, and extensive, concepts used in this study, in an
attempt to give validity to my theoretical postulations.
Chapter Three looks at the experiences of Sweden and the United States in their
handling of indigenous populations. This chapter has several functions. First, the chapter
is meant to provide the historical background of the sample countries. Second, this
chapter is meant to give ample room to the extrapolation of state-led processes and
mechanisms. Third, it is meant to present illustrations denoting the creation and recreation of the indigenous Other.
Chapter Four has two functions. First, this chapter is meant to engage the reader
in a theoretical discussion, analyzing the research questions and summarizing the central
points of the dissertation. Second, the chapter will also function as the analytical
conclusion of the dissertation. Finally, Chapter Five represents a sort of “holistic”
conclusion to this dissertation where I briefly consider devolution of native lands,
decentralization of native affairs, and progress in indigenous research. In this section, I
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argue that, overall, indigenous peoples are better off today than they have been
previously. My contention is that although progress has occurred, much still needs to be
done not only within government bureaucracies, but also in the academia. Therefore, in
this chapter I will explore possible implications and future research.
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CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUALIZATIONS
The purpose here is not to list sets of definitions because to define is to limit the
malleability of analysis, especially in a study such as this where the analytical boundaries
require a good amount of elasticity. This chapter, on the other hand, is meant to provide
ample room to the conceptualization of ideas, where through the comprehension of
mechanisms and processes, concepts are formed thus resulting in the formulation of
general ideas or notions.
Sweden – The Sámi
In Europe, the Sámi are the largest indigenous group with an estimated population
between 80,000 – 100,000 spread over four countries: approximately 20,000 – 40,000 in
Sweden, 50,000 - 65,000 in Norway, about 8,000 in Finland, and about 2,000 in Russia
(predominantly populating the Kola Peninsula; see Figure 1).16
Archeologists and anthropologists have had some difficulties identifying the
origins of the Sámi people and the period of their arrival and their settlement of northern
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http://www.samer.se/4075 (accessed June 15, 2014).
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FIGURE 1: MAP OF SÁPMI IN SCANDINAVIA AND THE KOLA PENINSULA
(RUSSIA).17
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peoples in search of recognition (Talybont, Ceredigion: Y Lolfa, 2011). Reproduced with permission.

18

Europe. Carbon dating points to the late Neolithic period (9,000 – 7,000 BCE), which
was characterized by mass migrations and the beginning of sedentary life and the
domestication of animals and crops. Historically, and traditionally, the Sámi livelihood
has been set apart by a nomadic existence dependent on hunting, fishing, and reindeer
herding; with traces of agricultural activities.
Anthropological and genetic research into the origin of the Sámi has demonstrated
that their origin is not unique and is difficult to pinpoint with accuracy. Beckman, who
has conducted one of the most extensive researches on the subject, argues, “The origin of
the Lapps remains a mystery which has given rise to many speculations. One theory is
that they are of Mongolian-Asiatic descent and another that they represent a remnant of
an ancient Westeuropean [sic] stock … As a third explanation the theory has been
discussed that the Lapps represent the descendants of a population that has survived the
glacial period on the coastal area of North Scandinavia.” 18 Beckman’s studies have
shown that Sámi gene-frequency sometimes shows similarities with European
populations, sometimes with Asian-Mongoloid populations, and sometimes with
unknown populations. He also found that twenty percent of Finnish share genetic
similarities with the Sámi. Higher frequencies of Sámi that represent all the three Sámi
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gene-markers are mostly present in the northern territories or Jukkasjärvi and
Karesuando.19
The first accounts of Sámi presence in the Nordic countries have been recorded
since Roman times. By the turn of the first millennium of the current era accounts of
Sámi-Viking trade relations have also been recorded in Icelandic sagas, and in the twelfth
century the Arab historian Muhammad al-Idrisi, while visiting Finland, recorded the
encounters with what seems to have been Sámi people. It was not, however, until the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that the first written accounts of Sámi’s manners
begin to appear.
Modern, or enlightened, accounts of the Sámi in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and
eighteenth centuries rewrote much of the historical narratives of the Sámi; redefining
their existence as exotic, pagan, uncivilized, and as romanticized beings. Some of the
most prominent accounts, which eventually provided the language and scope of state’s
action, are found in Historia de Gentibus Septentrionalibus (written by Olaus Magnus
published in Latin in 1555), Relatio tentatae missionis Lappicae anno 1659 et 1660
(written by Körningh, Johannes Ferdinand and published in Latin in 1660), Lapponia
(written by Schefferus Johannes and published in Latin in 1673), and Iter Lapponicum
Dei gratia institutum (written by Swedish botanist, physician, and zoologist Carl
Linnaeus (Carl von Linné), in 1732).20
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These narratives were often based on second hand accounts and fictitious writing: “Schefferus’s Lapland
monograph is the first comprehensive depiction of the Sámi people. But in contrast to many other
topographic and ethnographic descriptions of the early modern era, the thirty-five chapters of Lapponia are
built upon a number of contemporary reports, which were forwarded to the author by clergymen living in
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A look into these accounts show for instance that Olaus Magnus placed a lot of
emphasis on notions such as the “Realm of the Cold,” and his book had a profound effect
on the perception of the Sámi as beings in possession of magical powers, of practicing a
pagan religion, and of worshiping the devil: “Olaus Magnus’s great opus … records
several features of the religion of the Lapps, such as adoration of the sun and moon, some
magical techniques, and aspects of shamanism.”21 The German-Swedish theologian and
catholic priest Johannes Ferdinand Körningh in his 1660 travel journal writes that the
Sámi are characteristically “short, peaceful, and mild … with hardly any quarrels and
brawls … missing all warlike disposition … with short hair and beardless.” 22 While
Linnaeus in his travel journal described the “people, flora, and fauna [of Lapland] under
the streak,” blending the Sámi together with the natural landscape as to insinuate no
taxonomic difference in ranking the human and animal inhabitants of the northern
territories.23
The view and exotization of the Sámi in Sweden proper was primarily derived
from these accounts, or “similar ‘construction’ of images and conceptions … found in the

Swedish Lapland. These letters were known as ‘clergy correspondence’. The chapters cover topics as
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raising, pagan religion and additional chapters on metals, flora and animal life in northern Sweden.”
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Swedish state’s, and its representatives’, view of the Lappmarks inhabitants.”24 Yet, by
the 1600s, writes Gunlög Fur, it is mainly cultural differences (kulturella brister) that lie
between Swedes and Sámi.25 In addition, some criticized the stereotyping of the Sámi and
one of the first protests seems to have come from Nicolaus Lundius, son of Andreas Petri
Lundius, the first Sámi priest in Arvidsjaur, in 1640. From his parish Nicolaus Lundius
wrote repeatedly against the conventionalization of the Sámi and he insisted in pointing
out that they were no different from other Swedes: “Sámi are rich, poor, dark-haired,
blond, selfish and generous, and beliefs and customs can vary between men and
women.”26 This attitude was to change by the 1800s, where race slowly replaced culture
and the perception of the Sámi, and of the Indian Americans, changed with it.
Briefly, the development of nineteenth century biological racism was a complex
interplay of scientific and social approaches to race: “Racial concepts did not move tidily
from a shallow Enlightenment environmentalism to a deep biology; nor were the two
positions mutually exclusive. Nurture and nature intertwined.” 27 Although neither
Sweden nor the United States were initially the centers of scientific or pseudo-scientific
research on race (England took the lead) a century later they both became leaders and
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hard proponents of both race biology and eugenics. What this meant was that by the late
nineteenth century race biology redefined race, and consequently, constructed a socially
and historically defined notion of race that was to reclassify what it meant to be Sámi, or
Indian American. 28 In other words, what this meant was that in Sweden race was
constructed on parameters that defined what meant to be a Swede, as opposed to anything
not Swedish. In the United States, on the other hand, race was being constructed along a
binary dichotomy of blackness against whiteness; although, the construct eventually
came to represent whiteness vis-à-vis the rest.29
A word of caution in categorizing the Sámi is needed. As with other
heterogeneous indigenous groups, like those in the Americas, the Sámi are not a
homogeneous group and as such should not be “clumped” together, or treated as a
collective.30 Lars Thomasson argues that “to speak of and represent the Sámi as an entity
constitutes therefore a gross simplification and implies the wrongful existence of a
homogeneous and common Sámi culture.”31 Yet, as it is the case in the United States and
in other national contexts, the state re-categorized indigenous groups and lump them
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together for the purpose of administrating the various groups. For this reason, and for the
purpose and scope of this research, the Sámi are treated as a collective.
The United States of America – The Indian Americans
Labeling and categorizing the native populations in the United States of America is a
controversial exercise no matter the approach. Native populations’ perceptions of who
they are and how they see themselves should be pivotal in this exercise. Once again,
however, the state’s perception is what counts. With this notion in mind, and without
being unsympathetic to Natives’ sentiments, I felt the need to look for a definition that
would fit the scope of this research and one that would represent the Indians within the
continental United States as a collective.
The notion of Indian, as expressed by Robert F. Berkhofer, and others, is a “White
conception.” Berkhofer argues that while the existence of Native Americans cannot be
denied, “the Indian was a White invention and still remains largely a White image, if not
stereotype.” 32 For Berkhofer, “The first residents of the Americas were by modern
estimates divided into at least two thousand cultures and more societies, practiced a
multiplicity of customs and lifestyles, held an enormous variety of values and beliefs,
spoke numerous languages mutually unintelligible to the many speakers, and did not
conceive of themselves as a single people – if they knew about each other at all.”33
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We often hear of Indians, American Indians, Native Americans, Nations, North
American Nations, Indigenous Peoples, etc. It comes as no surprise then that scholars,
like Berkhofer, view some of these categorizations as downplaying the
variety of cultures and societies as a single entity for the purpose of description and
analysis, thereby neglecting … the social and cultural diversity of Native Americans then
– and now – for the convenience of simplified understanding. To the extent that this
conception denies or misrepresents the social, linguistic, cultural, and other differences
among the people so labeled.34

In addition to these terminologies or categorizations, writes David E. Wilkins,
“Indigenous communities expect to be referred to by their own names – Navajo or Diné,
Ojibwe or Anishinabe, Sioux or Lakota, Suquamish, or Tohono O’odham – since they
constitute separate political, legal, and cultural entities.”35
In spite of the existence of these very distinct “Indian communities constituting
separate political, legal, and cultural entities,” we also need to take into consideration the
existence of an operating conceptual categorization that has created a collective image in
both legal and political parlance, as well as, in popular culture, Natives have become
Indians, Noble and Ignoble Savages, and Heathens.36 Most importantly, the state whether
national or regional has often dealt with Native populations as Indians; specifically
during encounters such as treaty signage or bellicose confrontations, but often referring to
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FIGURE 2: 25 LARGEST TRIBAL GROUPING IN THE UNITED STATES AS
REFLECTED IN THE 2010 CENSUS DATA.37
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these populations simply as Indian; as in dealing with the Indian Question, in formulating
an Indian Policy, or in handling Indian Country.38
Scholars have deplored the perils of homogenizing indigenous experiences into an
overarching whole. 39 They deplore the homogenization essentially to avoid denying
indigenous peoples not only an identity but also a voice in the course of historical
evolution, which could result in the formulation of misleading and incomplete analysis.
At times, however, a certain level of generalization is justified, write Augie Fleras and
Jean Leonard Elliott, quoting Stephen Cornell (1988), “argues that ‘critical
commonalities’ remain within the Indian experience that increasingly link native
Americans with each other and to a common political trajectory.”40 By the same token,
one can assume that indigenous peoples everywhere have had similar experiences in their
relations to the state and that in turn, states in general found answers to their individual
“Indian problem” in common discourses and practices. For instance, Canada’s experience
could very well be the experience of several other countries where initial cooperation
was, by the mid-1800s (and in some instances even earlier), to be replaced by
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segregation, assimilation, and paternalistic protection, then to be replaced by post-WWII
integration and formal equality, since the 1970s limited autonomy.41
We can all agree with Berkhofer, Wilkins, and others, that no matter the labeling
these are all “imposed and invented categories – an ethnic gloss,” which tend to
amalgamate “character and culture … united into one summary.”42 With this in mind the
next logical question would be why not using the “legal definition” provided by the
federal government, through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)? The answer is quite
simple, as in the case of the Sámi, state definitions have a tendency of redefining identity
and in the process exclude those who fail to fit into the political and legal mold of the
moment. The federal government definition then, wrote Joseph E. Trimble, and Robin A.
LaDue, “has undergone numerous revisions in the past 100 years or so, but currently the
BIA defines an American Indian as a person whose American Indian blood quantum is at
least one fourth and who is a registered and enrolled member of one of the 600 or so
recognized tribes. The hard-and-fast criteria eliminated many people of American Indian
background.”43
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While the collective categorization of Native communities must be an acceptable
anathema, the categorization of what constitutes these communities living within the
geographical areas of what came to be known as the United States of America needs
revisiting. It is hence important to diminish the level of ambiguity and the lack of
specificity found in terms such as American Indians, Native Americans, North American
Nations, etc. These terms, in one way or another, lack a sense of specificity necessary to
describe solely the autochthonous populations that inhabited what came to be the
continental United States. Taking the cue from Colin Calloway I have opted to use the
term Indian American when referring to individuals, peoples, and populations belonging
to Native Nations and communities residing first within British North America and
following the 1783 Peace of Paris, the United States of America. Similarly, Indian
America would be referring to Indian Country or that portion of what was to become the
continental United States.
Why not use the already established term of American Indian? Although this term
is widely used across disciplines, discourses, and narratives, it is a term that is far too
ambiguous. The notion of an American Indian seems to protrude a notion of possession
as Indians whom belong to America, meaning the United States. In its stead, the term
Indian American connotes an Indian whose geographic location is America, which in this
sense is more appropriate. By the same token the notion of the North American Indian is
also too vague and ambiguous. North America includes several modern-day countries
along with the United States and as such it would not be accurate to use the term.
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The Modern State: Formation, Evolution, and Power Consolidation
As mentioned earlier, the modern state is the focus of this analysis, and as such,
understanding its formation, evolution, and power consolidation is important if one wants
to demonstrate the structural and functional differences between the pre-modern and
modern state and the mechanisms that led to the exclusion and marginalization of the
indigenous.
What we now call the modern state emerged gradually over the course of several
centuries and not in a uniform or standard fashion. The causes, motivations, and overall
processes behind this shift varied very much from country to country. Favorable
conditions, whether voluntarily triggered or not, had to exist in order for the shift, from
pre-modern to modern, to occur.
If we take England, Sweden, and France as examples we notice that the
transformations were sparked at different points in time and by different causes and with
different results. For instance, the developments that took England out of feudalism were
not present in Sweden mainly because Sweden did not experience the full system of
feudalism as the rest of Europe did. While, in the case of France, the process of
transformation took relatively longer primarily because of the level of socio-cultural,
political, and also economic fragmentation. As such, the process that began in England
around the 1200s with the unrest that led to the signing of the Magna Carta, only began
in Sweden, following the Swedish War of Liberation (1521-1523) led by Gustav Vasa
and with the ensuing consolidation of Vasa’s reign. France, on the other hand, had a more
complex and fragmented process of transformation that began in the aftermath of the
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Hundred Years' War (1337-1453), which instilled French nationalism and territorial
unity, and matured only later in the 1700s.
These changes did not occur in a vacuum. On the contrary a series of centrifugal
forces and events, such as cultural and intellectual movements coupled by plagues, wars,
and waves of global exploration, influenced the course of development; at times speeding
up the process, while in other instances slowing it down. By the seventeenth century
Europe exited the Post-Classical Age and it was well into the modern period where the
modern state completely replaced the feudal state, consolidating its power during
Absolutism finally reaching maturity by the nineteenth century. At this point the modern
state was a fait accompli fueled by the dramatic changes brought about by the French
Revolution, the Napoleonic Era, and the Industrial Revolution; in other words, by
modernity.
The “new” state eventually comes into conflict with native or aboriginal
communities, and the interaction between the state and indigenous peoples was also
affected. In fact, the homogenizing and standardizing dynamism of the modern state
eventually changed the natural landscape in which indigenous peoples blended; the
frontier “was steadily eroded until each country swallowed it up in the name of its own
national destiny.”44 For instance, in the United States and in Argentina, the new national
conscience saw indigenous peoples as hindrances to the achievement of their “manifest
destiny” and the realization of a modern state and society. In these and other countries
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around the world indigenous people were seen as subordinated and inferior Others
marginalized by their very nature and by the new state claiming sovereignty, power, and
jurisdiction not only over their lands, which they occupied since time immemorial, but
eventually also over their lives and identities as policies and legislations would regulate
who or what indigenous is; i.e., identity and livelihood.45
Modern State Formation and Evolution
For the purpose of the current study, a conceptualization of the modern state could not be
found in normative theories. In its stead, a more suitable conceptualization must be
sought in the histories and sociologies that have made up the modern state proper. For
instance, Max Weber and Gianfranco Poggi define the modern state as being constructed
on a human association, with a monopoly of power, a specific territoriality, and as being
driven by a functionally specific institutional machinery, but one that cannot, ultimately,
operate without its intrinsic nation.
Max Weber’s influential definition of the state is “a human community that
(successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of the legitimate physical violence within a
particular territory.”46 Weber’s definition of the state is, for Charles Tilly, “of little help
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[because] every single key word begs the historical question of when, at what particular
date, the ‘state’ can be said to have emerged.”47 For Tilly, the modern, or contemporary
state emerges where a process of consolidated territoriality and differentiated
functionality replaces differentiated territoriality and consolidated functionality; an
argument also found by Joseph R. Strayer, Thomas Ertman, and Hendrik Spruyt.48
Gianfranco Poggi looks into the structural complexity of the modern state and
finds the emergence of social processes patterned by certain rules that are the distinctive
characteristics between the modern vis-à-vis the pre-modern. More specifically:
the institutional profile of the modern state … emphasizes, by and large its ‘modernity’,
since its patterns appear to be the products of an advanced and sophisticated process of
social differentiation … the modern state appears as an artificial, engineered institutional
complex rather than as one that has developed spontaneously by accretion. It is a
deliberately erected framework … it is a made reality.49

Poggi continues by questioning one of his assumptions regarding the artificiality of the
nature of the state. Quoting Weber, Poggi argues that:
‘When one says that the state is the highest and ultimate thing in the world, that is
entirely correct once it is properly understood. For the state is the highest power
organization on earth, it has power over life and death … A mistake comes in, however,
when one speaks of the state alone and not of the nation.’ In this argument, the state is a
purposefully constructed, functionally specific machine, but one appealing to and
mobilizing deeper and more demanding feelings and emotions to the extent that it serves
a more inclusive and less artificial reality.50
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As such, as the modern state emerges it soon comes to represent not only the state per se
but it comes to signify the expression of the nation as a whole.
Joseph R. Strayer goes beyond what he calls “unsatisfactory definitions” and
looks instead for “some of the signs which show us that a state is coming into
existence.”51 Strayer provides a viable blue print of state formation by focusing on the
series of changes taking place during medieval Europe, which culminated by the
seventeenth century in the rise of the modern state from the ashes of the feudal body
politic.52 Strayer denotes five signs which are concerned with the “origins and not the
final form of the states:”53 i) human community: the emergence of a human community
must persist in space and time if it is to become a state; ii) geography: there must be a
core area within which the group can build its political system; iii) political institutions:
the formation of impersonal, relatively permanent, political institution. If the community
is to persist in time and retain its hold on a geographical area, however, there must be
institutions which can survive changes in leadership; iv) authority (sovereignty): the
recognition of the need for a final authority, not the possession of a “monopoly of
power;” and finally, v) moral authority: a shift in loyalty from family, local community,
or religious organization to the state and the acquisition by the state of a moral authority
to back-up its instructional structure and its theoretical legal supremacy.54
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Strayer’s work is relevant here for several reasons, but most importantly for its
discussion of sovereignty. For the final authority over the realm “requires independence
from any outside power and final authority over men who live within certain
boundaries.” 55 The emergence of the modern state could not have taken place with
multiple authorities, or contesting powers. As such the emergence of the state in Sweden
and the United States had to contend with initial axial power-struggles such as that posed
by the nobility or the states, respectively. In addition, both countries were also presented
with another source of contesting power, or rather tangential power-struggle such as that
posed by native populations. In Sweden, the Crown could not afford a contesting Sámi
population during the years of foreign conquests because this would have meant limiting
the Crown’s usufructuary rights over silver and other mineral mines and a steady source
of consumables for the war effort. Similarly, in the United States, American westward
expansion, and national growth, would not have been possible with a legally at par native
population.
Beginning in the medieval state, Strayer argues, England and France developed
the most influential models of the European state particularly in the crucial period of the
late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries where notions of sovereignty appeared (not
the term itself), showing a major shift of loyalty from Church and family to the state.56 In
England, for instance, the king by the 1300s, not only knew he had sovereign power,
making laws formally and deliberately binding all in the kingdom, he also regulated all
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justice and taxation. In France, on the other hand, state formation was more fragmented
and the reach of state’s suzerainty only occurred through provincial governments and
bureaucracy: “the French had increased the size of their bureaucracy enough to make the
government more complicated but not enough to make it capable of dealing directly with
the people. Many taxes were collected by tax-farmers and in the case of the gabelle (salt
tax), by merchants.”57
The maturation of sovereignty, in both theory and practice, was central to the
consolidation of power of kings vis-à-vis the nobility, the church, and other political
interests. Hobbes’ conceptualization often takes a central role in theorizing sovereignty.
For Hobbes: “One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude … this Person, is called is
called SOVERAIGNE and said to have Soveraigne Power; and every one besides, his
SUBJECT.”58 Although Hobbes’ approach to sovereignty has often been criticized, it still
provides a plausible insight into the psychology of not only kings but of the state in
general in terms of power consolidation and retention.
James R. Hurtgen looks at Hobbes’ theory of sovereignty in the Leviathan and
concludes that although Hobbes’ theory “is a purely analytical concept” that fails in its
attempt of deductive science, and thus “is not logically dependent upon arguments
deduced from the discussion of man, it is nonetheless a correct one.” 59 Hurtgen’s
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assessment makes Hobbes worth considering, especially for his analysis on the
indivisibility of sovereignty: “a Kingdome divided in it selfe cannot stand … This great
Authority being Indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the Sovereignty.” 60 As such,
sovereignty resides in one locus and cannot be divided or shared: “In plain, sovereignty
cannot be divided. As Samuel Johnson said, ‘In sovereignty there are no gradations.’”61
Johnson’s conclusion means that “Sovereignty signifies an authority beyond which there
is no appeal; in this sense it is and must be absolute … Either it is unitary and absolute, or
it is not at all. Sovereigns are limited only by themselves.”62
Because “sovereignty has no gradations” the modern territorial and industrial state
could not afford to share power and jurisdiction over the administering of its authority.
Sovereignty, thus limits, if not eliminates, alternative loci and foci of power-claims. In
the case of the Sámi, for instance, this entailed that during the border treaty negotiation
with Denmark-Norway (the Treaty of Strömstad of 1751) the Sámi could be allowed to
take part, as this would entail a shared power to delineate their pastoral rights in the
treaty. In its stead, the Crown defined what were Sámi rights and how, and to which
extent, these were to be protected. Similarly, in the United States the general attitude
towards Indian Americans and treaty signing began to change in the 1780s and calls for
an end of treating Indians as “nations of equal standing” if the Revolution is to survive.63
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At this junction, the establishment of the modern state entails the replacement of
the family, local attachments, and feudal mechanics. The state and its hold on all
sovereign power, especially when this is unitary, becomes a life-necessity and its
protection and survival becomes a matter of “life or death:” “To weaken or to destroy the
state was to threaten the future of the human race. Therefore a state was entitled to take
any steps to ensure its own survival, even if those steps seems unjust or cruel.”64
The modern state must also be understood in terms of regime type, or of the
political and infrastructural developments. Thomas Ertman sets out to explain the
variations in political regimes, which determined whether a ruler was “relatively
constrained (constitutionalism) or unconstrained (absolutism) in his behavior.”65 Ertman
suggests that one needs to look into Hintze’s contention that “territorially based
assemblies or parliaments were structurally stronger [for instance, the English
Parliament], and hence better able to resist the blandishments of ambitious rulers, than
were status-group-based assemblies or Estates [for instance, those of Latin Europe].”66
Territoriality, therefore, from the very beginning, came to represent not only an important
variable for the definition of power, but also for the administration of power.
For example, by the 1700s Sweden was an established bureaucratic constitutional
monarchy and maintained strong representative institutions as the one found in England.
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Sweden, however, did go through long and intensive periods of absolutism and it is often
characterized as oscillating “between a bureaucratic constitutionalism close to that of
Britain and a bureaucratic absolutism similar to that of its southern neighbor.”67 Still, the
parliament, or Riksdag, managed to develop into a strong institutional structure capable
of maintaining its powers of co-legislation and co-taxation through most of the early
modern period.68 Having these “shared” powers made the Riksdag “a hybrid institution, a
crucial body with an important territorial element rooted in participatory units of local
government. It was the assembly’s hybrid character which rendered it stronger than the
Estates of Germany or Latin Europe but weaker than the parliaments of England,
Hungary and Poland.”69 As such, territorially based assemblies supported by powerful
representative institutions (what Charles Tilly calls “decentralized but relatively uniform
political structure”) created the conditions for the development, in broad terms, of a
bureaucratic constitutionalism similar to that found in England and Sweden.70
The dawn of the Modern Age dispossessed feudalism and brought changes in the
way power and authority were being understood, which eventually affected and changed
the structure and function of the state into a territorially defined, centralizing, and
homogenizing entity moving away from tradition and the political, military, economic,
and social system of the Middle Ages. As a result of these changes:
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the international system went through a dramatic transformation in which the crosscutting
jurisdictions of feudal lords, emperors, kings, and popes started to give way to
territorially defined authorities. The feudal order was gradually replaced by a system of
sovereign states [Most importantly] the concept of sovereignty … altered the structure of
the international system by basing political authority on the principle of territorial
exclusivity.71

By 1648 a new system of sovereign states claiming territorial exclusivity redefined not
only the international system but also the source of “internal and external violence and
who may exercise such violence [here the] state claims a domestic and external
monopoly of force.”72 As sovereignty was redefining the monopoly of power, jurisdiction
was also being relocated to the center, dislocating and eventually eliminating other actors
claiming authority and power.73 The traditional foci and loci of power, authority, and of
legitimacy, were shifting from being fluid and abstract as found in feudalism to being
more concrete and fixed claiming privileged sovereignty over a specific territory.
What follows are three complementary points worth considering to help us
characterize the modern state: i) like vs. dislike units, and how compatible interacting
actors must be; ii) state sovereignty and its competitors, specifically how some of those
competitors shaped not only the nature of the modern state but also how many were
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dislocated and eventually absorbed by the modern state (e.g., national minorities like the
Breton and Gallo speaking peoples in France); and finally, iii) the misfortunes of those
contenders who resisted the modern state.
State’s Power Consolidation
The Treaty of Westphalia essentially rewrote the rules of membership and of engagement
between what became acceptable state-actors. Here, local, material, or economic power
(as in the case of the Hanseatic League) no longer mattered.
New statist bureaucracy, full political and material control, and a shared culture
were the defining traits of the modern state. Free cities (e.g., Hamburg and Lübeck),
traditional empires (e.g., Ottoman Empire), and by extension, Native Nations (e.g., the
Cherokee Nation or the Sámi) were incompatible with the emerging “standard European
pattern.”74 A certain level of compatibility became the norm as it delineated acceptable
behavior of like units and their interactions within the system (i.e., the redefinition of the
international system). Difference in the conception of power, authority, territoriality,
organization, values, norms, and eventually historical heritage all turned out to play a
pivotal role in the way Europe developed and in the way it looked upon the rest of the
world.
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The state became more and more unique in its organizational make-up and on its
claim of sovereignty and territoriality: “It is sovereign in that it claims final authority and
recognizes no higher source of jurisdiction. It is territorial in that rule is defined as
exclusive authority over a fixed territorial space.”75 The reorganizational makeover did
not, however, happen in a vacuum and the spillover effects were seen in both the internal
structure of the state and in the external structure of the system. Most significantly,
domestically the new state redefined “human collectivity … by spatial markers,
regardless of kin, tribal affiliation, or religious beliefs. Individuals are … amorphous and
undifferentiated entities who are given an identity simply by their location in a particular
area.” 76 Externally, in Weber’s terms, the state was claiming final jurisdiction over a
demarcated territory with internal sovereignty.77
Hendrik Spruyt suggests that the emergence of the modern state was a result not
of the inevitable, but as a response to “particular conjuncture of social and political
interests in Europe.” 78 For Spruyt the evolution of the modern state is found in the
reaction to exogenous forces (e.g., non-territorial or non-sovereign types of
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organizations), which were consequently either displaced and/or absorbed into the larger
state organization. Exogenous forces can be understood not only in terms of external
pressures threatening the emerging state, but also as internal pressures contending for the
same power. At these junctures we find shock-like events (e.g., Reformation, the Thirty
Year War, Treaty of Westphalia, etc.) that lead to “political and social realignments …
creating institutions that meet [new] material interests and ideological perspectives.”79 By
extension, intra-exogenous forces, such as indigenous claims, may have also pressed
upon the state to move towards protecting its ideological and material interests; i.e., white
civility and territoriality.80 In the case of the Sweden, these exogenous forces were found
in the geopolitical threats posed by Denmark-Norway and Russia in the northern
territories. The Sámi, on the other hand, posed very little to no internal pressures. The
Sámi’s special status, that guaranteed direct royal protection, assured the mitigation of
disputes through direct royal appeal. In the case of the United States, the situation was
different. Here, the country had to contend with both domestic and international forces.
Domestically, the states did pose, at least in the beginning, a certain level of power
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contention. Similarly, Indian Americans without the national borders often posed
sovereignty issues, like in the case of the Cherokee Nation. The Cherokees, however, also
constituted an international pressure as they were considered, at least up to the 1830s, a
foreign nation. In addition, the United States was pressured outside its national borders
by foreign European and non-European nations, which included native indigenous
populations. In both instances, the Crown and the Federal Government saw the need to
concretize national borders and extend their sovereign reach to guarantee the protection
and existence of the kingdom or the nation.
In general, during the course of its evolution the modern state had to contend and
defend its power and authority against these non-territorial and non-sovereign
organizations. To be successful it required a shift from tradition and the modernization of
existing belief-systems, identities, and values. By the end of the 1800s the contention was
over and the modern state came out victorious, displacing, or eliminating altogether,
alternative foci and loci of power and authority; hence forming a system of like-minded
territorially sovereign states dislocating all other types of organizations; i.e., the “dislike
unit of actors,” as in the case of indigenous peoples.
The nineteenth century was characterized by standardization, which according to
James C. Scott, was also synonymous with state-led social engineering:
The first element is the administrative ordering of nature and society … The second
element is high-modernist ideology. It is best conceived as … the rational design of
social order [which] commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws. The
third element is an authoritarian state that is willing and able to use the full weight of its
coercive power to bring these high-modernist designs into being. The fourth element is
… a prostrate civil society that lacks the capacity to resist these plans.81
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The early 1800s became thence a formative period in which the state established itself
and redefines its purpose, existence, and raison d’état. A sense of state “purpose” begins
to appear, at which point the emergence of the modern state also entailed the abstraction
of what the state, and its intrinsic power, had become. Louis XIV’s axiom “l'état, c'est
moi” was eventually replaced by “l'état, c'est l'état.”
It comes with no surprise then to see the rise of a governed entity independent
from any particular ruler, regime type or institutional structure, or temporal political
affinities. Over the course of its development, the state becomes an abstraction defined by
the outcome of power exercised by individuals and groups. John Peter Nettl
conceptualizes the state as representing the following:
an autonomous collectivity as well as a summating concept of high societal generality. It
is thus in a functional sense a distinct sector or arena of society … Further, the autonomy
of the state is reflected by areas of exclusivity as well as primacy in all societies that have
a well-internalized concept of state … the state is essentially a sociocultural phenomenon.
This follows from the liberation of the concept from exclusive association with particular
structures, and from the emphasis on autonomy.82

Together with Spruyt’s concept of like-units we find a plausible definition of the modern
state, as being a reflection of like-unit-individual’s self-identification onto a higher plane,
hence excluding all that is dissimilar onto a lower plane of existence; as was the case with
traditional indigenous societies. 83 Nettl Spruyt’s conceptualizations tie into Poggi
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contention that the state cannot be taken by itself. On the contrary, it must be understood
in conjunction with its nation, where in turn the state comes to signify the expression of
the nation as a whole.
Spruyt’s work can also be used in tandem with Scott’s, where both authors point
out the centralizing and homogenizing effect of the modern state, eliminating competitors
and alternatives to the state. In other words, space had to be re-ordered, power and
authority could not be ambiguous or shared, and the state’s role changed to provide
collective goods and to control freeriding. What colonization may have tolerated out of
necessity or habit, the modern state could not afford and indigenous people became
incompatible.
Part of the modern state’s project was to monopolize and centralize power and
extend its full control over its territory and to make “society legible, to arrange the
population in ways that simplified the classic state functions of taxation, conscription,
and prevention of rebellion.” 84 To achieve this goal, nomads and other “unreadable”
groups, such as minority nations or indigenous peoples, needed to be translated (i.e.,
converted) into the common language of the modern state in order to fit within the state’s
mold and purpose, while the rest of the population needed to be redirected, towards
extensive processes of standardizations such as “weights and measures, the establishment
of cadastral surveys and population registers, the invention of freehold tenure, the
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standardization of language and legal discourse, the design of cities, and the organization
of transportation seemed comprehensible as attempts as legibility and simplification.”85
In the cases of the Sámi and the Indian Americans this meant that both
populations needed to be brought into the greater society. Before this could be
accomplished, however, both populations needed to be made “legible”, which entailed
their assimilation and reeducation.86
With this intentionally “myopic” view the state transformed not only nature but
also the socio-political and economic fabric of the nation and its territory. It became a
“bureaucratizing logic and archetype where commercial exploitation and social
manipulations became the standards.”87 Anything or anyone upsetting the mechanism, or
any “unauthorized disturbance,” were seen as threatening and could no longer be
allowed. Hence, the once perhaps tolerated pockets of power contention and competition
(e.g., as found in France where taxes were collected by tax-farmers and in the case of the
gabelle (salt tax), by merchants, or in the Sweden where up to around early 1700s
territorial courts were often made up by Sámi jurors and where traditional legal customs
were applied to court proceedings or sentencing) or pockets of autonomous space (as in
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colonial times as found in Richard White’s Middle Ground) were now resisted and
homogenized.88
Homogenization also entails rationalization, which translates into centralization
and most importantly “the schematized process of abstraction and simplification” of
social norms and practices.89 We cannot forget that these regulating processes also came
at a cost. For Scott, the “hegemonic planning mentality is the loss of local knowledge and
know-how.”90 In other words, whatever cannot be translated or converted into a language
legible by the modern state is automatically discarded as unusable; almost like a
computer discards unreadable data from computation routines and processes. Within this
illegible material we find groups of peoples whom, for one reason or another, are
unwilling or unable to convert into the new state parameters and therefore are thrown in a
state of limbo, or stasis.
Indigenous peoples, in particular, become this set of unreadable data with their
histories, their contentions, their norms, their beliefs, their languages, their knowledge,
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and their traditions. For the state indigenous peoples were unreadable data because they
opposed, and therefore failed, to embrace the rationalizing power of the modernist
ideology, falling outside the “rational citizenry” and they were therefore left in this limbo
of existence.91
Custom and tradition were things of the past relegated to the nature’s landscape
pushed out from the logic and practices of the modern state because of their unscientific,
non-schematic, and unpredictable nature would run counter to state cohesion and
uniformity.92 Eventually the “unintentional myopia” of the early modern state becomes a
systemized form of control reshaping reality into concrete and abstract spatial and
temporal terms of nation-state, nationhood, common good, territoriality, patriotism,
cadastral maps, city maps, patronyms, etc. For Scott, “Much of the statecraft of the late
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was devoted to this project … states generally
worked to homogenize their populations and break down their segmentation by imposing
common languages, religions, currencies, and legal systems.”93 It is here that legibility
and standard units of measurement become a precondition for state manipulation and
formation of the new modern society.94
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The level of a state’s success depends on whether the state’s goals are minimal or
whether they are ambitious.95 For example, Scott talks about pre-colonial and colonial
state space and non-state spaces and he lists three features of non-state spaces, they: i)
can be impenetrable; ii) can have a dispersed or migratory population; and finally, iii) can
be unpromising sites (i.e., lacking a usufructuary utility).96 Scott’s argument can easily be
applied when looking at colonial and post-colonial state systems and apparatuses; after all
what changes is the degree of power consolidation and extension (e.g., Colonial British
America vs. United States of America, or Swedish domestic colonization of the northern
territories vs. the unified, territorially integral constitutional monarchy of the nineteenth
century). In all these circumstances we often find a limited level or extent of state
penetration, where state control may be precarious and often may rely on “outsourced”
state-agents (e.g., traders/merchants collecting taxes), and lacking a comparable level of
standardization seen in the late modern and post-colonial statecraft. In general, with the
end of colonialism stateless zones (often found in remote areas where the government
could not reach or could not in full enforce its power) provided an autonomous space
where a certain level of autonomy could be exercised. For instance, the hierarchical
structure of absolutist and colonial regimes allowed for the creation of autonomous, and
in some instances non-state, spaces where indigenous peoples could pursue independent
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identities and forms of governance; what Deborah J. Yashar calls “autonomous, and
relatively unmonitored local spaces.”97
The emergence of a modern state, with its permeating tendency, either neutralizes
or completely absorbs into its realm these autonomous pockets of non-state spaces,
reconfiguring “the society and economy of those who are to be ‘developed’” and brought
inline with the state’s new raisons d'être. Scott uses the Indonesian state’s handling of the
Meratus hill peoples as a case in point. Quoting Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing’s account, Scott
shows how the Meratus peoples managed to “elude the clarity and visibility required for
model development schemes,” in other words, managing to elude the reach of the state at
least until they were “Cast in a discourse of development, progress, and civilization, the
plans of the Indonesian state for the Meratus peoples are at the same time a synoptic
project of legibility and concentration.”98 Once the “elusive” Meratus peoples fell within
the grasp of the state they were brought within a more acceptable level of state’s vision.
The cases of the Indian Americans and the Sámi show similar predicaments. The
degree of extension of their respective spaces varied depending on the “maturation” of
the state. For instance, in the case of the United States, Indian Americans, I believe,
enjoyed a great degree of “native-space” during the Colonial and Confederate periods
and, to a certain extent, during the years of the Early Republic. As the state grew,
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however, so did its need for material and intangible, meaning socio-political and
economic, space. 99 An example of this is the forced removal on Indian Americans,
through the use of a network of reservations, meant not only to remove them from the
public sphere and eye, but also, as found in Scott, these were meant to create a
“concentrated state space” to control Natives’ lives.100 In the case of Sweden, the advent
of a unified and independent Sweden beginning with the reign of Gustav Vasa in 1523 set
off a series of changes that would alter the autonomous nature of the Sámi. Although
Sweden did not implement any type of reservation system, the displacing of the Sámi was
achieved through extensive, generational, state-sponsored assimilationist policies, which,
as we will see later on, were generally more successful than those of the United States.
By the 1800s most new republics practiced some form of constitutionalism, which
represented “whenever we speak with propriety and exactness, that assemblage of laws,
institutions and customs, derived from certain fixed principles of reasons, directed to
certain fixed objects of public good, that compose the general system according to which
the community hath agreed to be governed.”101 Yet, with notions of “community” and
“common good” cultural minorities, and therefore cultural diversity, we can deduce that
according to Tully, are excluded a priori.

99

Meaning that as the young nation grew it required not only more “lebensraum”, but also a new
rationalization of space of national belonging.
100

James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State, 188.

101

Quoting Bolingkroke (1733) in Philip P. Wiener, Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected
Pivotal Ideas (New York: Scribner, 1973), 486.

52

The struggle between the Macthstaat and Rechtsstaat was at the forefront of
modern constitutionalism.102 This struggle sparked a set of political changes, which were
to lie the foundations of modern constitutionalism;103 hence, a system governed by law
and not tradition. Politics are said to be the reflection of the society in which they occur
and of the culture with which they are stirred. By the same token, then, modern
constitutionalism was framed in the very spirit of domestic cultural realities where unity,
and not diversity was sought, and a community of like-minded, and therefore exclusion,
was the norm. 104 Quoting Thomas Paine, McIlwain points out that “the only true
constitution is one consciously constructed, and that a nation’s government is only the
creature of this constitution.”105 An example of this homogeneity and conformity can be
found in Federalist No. 2 where John Jay states:
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With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence has been pleased to give
this one connected country to one united people – a people descended from the same
ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same
principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their
joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war,
have nobly established general liberty and independence.106

The state becomes therefore the symbol of national cohesion and like-units, and
constitutionalism becomes the framework within which limits are placed on arbitrary
rule.107 The modern state was to monopolize power within this constitutional framework,
which in turn, represented the domestic community’s cultural realities, beliefs, needs, and
wishes. It is fair to assume, then, that indigenous peoples, like the Sámi and Indian
Americans, fell outside the boundaries of the domestic, of common cultural realities and
customs, of the modern state and of the nation.108
Finally, the language of modern constitutionalism fails to provide the necessary
political space to accommodate indigenous political goals. This lacuna emerges because
the very language of modern constitutionalism, according to Tully, it “[thwarts] the forms
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of self government appropriate to the recognition of cultural diversity. The sovereignty of
the people is in some way denied and suppressed, rather than affirmed and expressed, in
the existing constitutional forms, thereby rendering unfair the daily politics that the
constitution enframes.”109 Constitutionalism, in general, fails to create a space for cultural
diversity to exist. As in the case of indigenous peoples, constitutionalism excludes them
from entering (on equal bases) the political realm. This failure consequently turned into
policies of exclusion, assimilation, and in more extreme examples, extermination meant
to bring diversity “in line with the norm of one nation, one state.”110
Modernization and Modernity
In the present study modernization and modernity are broadly seen as products of the
modern period. Not all historians would agree, however, with the unilinear periodization
of history and many have warned against the elusive spells of periodization.111 For the
purpose of the present study, though, the periodization of historical events will make it
easier to visualize certain historical narratives.
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Furthermore, in the present study the term modernization is not associated with
post-WWII social evolutionism advocated by scholars like American sociologist Talcott
Parsons; and therefore with the Parsonian model of development, which became
dominant in the modernization theory of the 1960s advocating for politics of
development and nation building. Modernization is, instead, used to describe a historical
dynamic understood as “the process of becoming modern,” or, as explained below,
leaving tradition and entering modernity.112
Modernization
What are the defining characteristics of the modern period and why are they so important
to this study? The simple answer to this question is: modernization had a profound impact
on the course and quality of the transformation from feudal to modern. As such, and in
very broad terms, one can summarize the events that defined this period beginning with
European Exploration and Colonization of the “new world” and the creation of a world
system of communication and exchange across the globe, from the Atlantic to the Indian
and Pacific Oceans. Here, we see important shifts in demographic growth, new
technologies, and in the politics and economics of European societies.
The introduction of new food crops from the Americas to Europe, Africa, and
Asia improved diets and impacted population growth. New technological development,
such as the microscope, the telescope, and the thermometer, coupled with the so-called
Scientific Revolution, began to spread the seed of discontent, in Europe, which fueled by
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the Enlightenment brought about religious and political discord depicted by the
Reformation and the ensuing Religious Wars of the 1600s. From the ashes of the ThirtyYear Wars came the territorial state with its inviolable sovereignty. At this point there
was a redistribution of power and the dislocation of the “Ancien Régime,” with its feudal
vestiges, whereby power was moving from the periphery to the center. Kings legitimized,
consolidated, and centralized their rule, initiating a period of absolutism in Europe and
with it the bureaucratization of their domains. One of the most evident examples of these
changes was the increased power of the King to tax his subjects; something that in
constitutional England led to a civil war and the decapitation of Charles I in 1649. While,
in Sweden, beginning with the reign of Gustav Vasa (1523) the Sámi came under direct
taxation of the crown, removing the Birkarls’ taxation privileges.113
Transoceanic trade and the emergence of maritime empires built on international
trade also changed domestic and international economics. Mercantilism became the
economic and political system in which the power of the state was maximized and
allowed rulers to control their domestic economies. The opening up of the world’s oceans
also introduced a newfound wealth in the commercialization of commodities and the
capitalization of wealth through investments and ventures; that is, proto-capitalism.
Following the proto-industrialism of the late 1700s, the Industrial Revolution may
be seen as the final act of the modern age bringing with it drastic and radical changes
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represented by what is sometimes referred to as modernity. Not since the so-called
Agricultural Revolution of the latter part of the prehistory period had there been such
profound changes in society. The dramatic revolutionary changes that began in England
in the 1780s, by the 1830s had pervasive socio-political and economic repercussions,
following the Napoleonic Wars, across Europe proper too.
From the mid-1800s onwards, classical liberalism was largely becoming a viable
answer to the current state of affairs and England was at the forefront with its push
towards free trade under the auspices of a Pax Britannica; replacing the Mercantilism of
earlier centuries. The forcefulness of these changes introduced a new attitude of
individualism, curiosity, and a drive for personal achievement that set the nineteenth
century apart; here liberalism became generally the driving force broadly advocating “the
primacy of the freedom of the individual and, relatedly, individual choice.”114 Liberalism,
did not, however, emerge as a natural substitute or replacement of the Ancien Régime. On
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which the modern state and indigenous peoples were operating and the way liberalism may have fallen
short of meeting indigenous needs.
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the contrary, together with nationalism and socialism, liberalism had to contend and fight
the post-Napoleonic conservatism of Metternich for its survival and eventually winning
the ideological battle by the late 1800s; and in some instance well into the 1900s.
Modernization thus provides the environment in which the intellectual
boundaries, societies, politics, communication, economies and means of exchange, and
identities underwent innovative transformations. Defining modernization is, according to
Cyril Edwin Black, a difficult and complex task. Nonetheless Black provides a general
definition of modernization that he describes as
the process of rapid change in human affairs since the scientific revolution …
‘modernization’ may be defined as the process by which historically evolved institutions
are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in
man’s knowledge, permitting control over his environment, that accompanied the
scientific revolution.115

Alberto Martinelli’s definition of modernization may span somewhat beyond the scope of
this study, and perhaps it may even come close to Parsonian modernization theory, yet it
fits well within Black’s definition and together they represent a plausible working
definition for this study: “The process of modernization connotes, in other words, the
sum of interconnected changes from which emerges a distinctive type of social
organization and civilization – the ‘modern society’.” 116
So modernization helps to describe the “process of rapid change,” which
transformed the human environment allowing for the emergence of the modern state,
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modern society, and the modern economic system; slowly consolidating their position
over more traditional institutions. As such, the modern state and all that it implied did not
emerge in isolation. On the contrary, the modern state ought to be seen as a dynamic
development taking shaping in an equally dynamic and permutable system.
Modernity
Although there is a certain level of intellectual overlapping between modernization and
modernity, I believe the former “refers [more] to the transitional process of moving from
‘traditional’ or ‘primitive’ communities to modern societies,” while the latter, refers to
“the underlying institutional processes such as a capitalist market economy, a
bureaucratized state, a technologically advanced economy, and a mass communication
media, but which is also associated with certain forms of consciousness, one of which is
the idea of technical rationality as the sole form of rationality.”117
Modernity, or the modern, for Marx brought the “onslaught of capitalism,” where
Weber saw the modern world as imposing an “ever-increasing rationalization,” and
where Durkheim saw the challenges of “the anomic conditions of liberal
individualism.”118 In other words, modernity had a cultural disaggregating effect, placing
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the new modern society in a state of atomized homogeneity. Similarly, for Anthony
Giddens modernity is seen as:
roughly equivalent to ‘the industrialised world’, so long as it be recognised that
industrialism is not its only institutional dimension. I take industrialism to refer to the
social relations implied in the widespread use of material power and machinery in
production processes. As such, it is one institutional axis of modernity. A second
dimension is captialism [sic], where this term means a system of commodity production
involving both competitive product markets and the commodification of labour power.
Each of these can be distinguished analytically from the institutions of surveillance, the
basis of the massive increase in organisational power associated with the emergence of
modern social life. Surveillance refers to the supervisory control of subject populations,
whether this control takes the form of ‘visible’ supervision in Foucault’s sense, or the use
of information to coordinate social activities.119

Putting it differently, modernity is the transformation of “institutions and modes of
behavior” based on the emergence of industrialism stirred by a capitalist economy
composed by nation-states ruled by a modern centralized and bureaucratized surveillance
state where all social activities are controlled and homogenized in accordance to a
mechanized rationality.
John Gerard Ruggie associated modernity with “what Andreas Huyssen [labeled],
a ‘slowly emerging cultural transformation in Western societies.’ By transformation it is
meant the changes brought about by modernity, or what Jürgen Habermas, quoted in
Ruggie, calls the ‘project’ of modernity … i.e., systematic efforts ‘to develop objective
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science, universal morality and law, and autonomous art, according to their inner
logic.’”120
Here modernity is taken as a process of change and transformation for the
betterment of the human condition. “Demystifying and secularizing” both nature and
society, and in the process breaking away from tradition, was seen as a necessary
condition for the success of this paradigm shift.121
The paradigm shift, however, occurs only when tradition is forfeited. Ted Benton
writes that modernity is marked by “its restless dynamism, and its ruthless undermining
of tradition [seen as a] paradigmatically modern shift away from localised, face-to-face
forms of organisation of social life.” 122 It is in these “paradigmatic” processes that
“societies are made and remade by reflexive agents, the relationship between the social
and the natural and the formation and maintenance of identities;” in other words, the
restructuring of individualism, identity, society, but also nature.123
In modernity traditions and traditional practices are “re-grooved”, according to
Martin O’Brien quoting Giddens, to fit new modern expectations: “In the plastic world of
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modernity, social conduct is the bending or ‘regrooving’ of practice and tradition, internal
and external nature, identity and environment in the recursive reproduction of
institutional and everyday life.”124
In the process of de-traditionalization, writes Nicos Mouzelis, traditional societies
with their inherent certainties “were replaced, at least in part, by the collective certainties
of class, party, and nation, and to some extent such configurations were able to provide
non-traditional, extrinsic mechanisms of self-regulation and identity formation.”125 In the
new socio-cultural and emotional landscape indigenous peoples were being caught
between two cultures; their vanishing traditional culture and the emerging modern
culture.126
Modernity removes diversity and imposes standardizations and homogeneity.
According to Tully, quoting Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, most commonly known as the
Abbé Sieyès, modernity is marked by the emergence of a “one-dimensional order” where
the “particular wills of constituents must be submitted to the general will of the nation, or
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no unity will emerge;” where linguistic or diverse regional customs were being swept
away (intentionally or not) by historical development (steered by modernity); where
policies were put forward “to break down the anachronistic customs of backward citizens
and immigrants and reform them so that they acquired the manners and policy of a
civilised and enlightened age, meaning ‘sociability’.”127 This reformation, however, goes
beyond “sociability,” the homogenization of difference also entailed assimilation,
whether encouraged or forced, which, in the nineteenth century, meant “the complete
eradication of cultural distinctions.”128
The new modern subject, according to Tully, is the product of policies of remaking, where “the broader policies by every modern nation [was] to manufacture a
homogeneous national identity.129 Modernity, thus, meant the parting from tradition and
the extirpation of diversity from the social fabric leading to modern societies
characterized by “modern men,” later by “modern citizens,” defined by a “modern
identity.”
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Identity thus changes with modernity and eventually becomes the exact
antithetical equivalent to traditional identity, and in turn, to the identity of indigenous
peoples everywhere. Floya Anthias believes that “In post-traditional society this [change]
is linked to the breakdown of solid social bonds such as kinship, property and place,
which also relate to the minimisation of stable stages of life progression, such as
childhood, marriage, children, and the traditional life cycle.” 130 Modernity, therefore,
transforms the individual’s perception of the self, which in turn affects the norms and
values that (re)defined (modern) society.
The “modernization” of society meant a restructuring of differentiation and
stratification in the modern social order.131 Floya Anthias makes a striking point where
differentiation is not necessarily equal to inequality and exclusion: “The recognition of
difference and diversity, both at the theoretical and political levels is not equivalent,
however, to the concern with inequality, disadvantage, and exclusion – key features of
social divisions in society.”132 Difference seems to be a by-product of the homogenizing
effect of modern “stateness.” Perhaps the emergence of this “atypical” form of suzerainty
(i.e., the modern state) with its infiltrating and colonizing nature compelled the
emergence of difference and stratification pushed to the fore by individual needs of self-
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identification. Categories of differentiation and stratification, often taking the form of
exclusionary mechanisms, defined the discourses and outcomes of social relations. 133
Anthias describes these categorizations as: i) the principle of hierarchization; ii) the
principle of unequal resource allocation; and iii) the principle of inferiorization.134
Although Anthias believes that differentiation and stratification do not necessarily
need to be associated with inequality, disadvantage, and exclusion, these same processes
can explain the nature of what is normal and what is abnormal. In other words, civil and
uncivil, or cultured and savage, or as expressed in Anthias:
At the same time … normality and pathology become ascribed to individuals with these
categories in two way. One is that the ‘Other’ becomes pathologised. The second is that
individuals who do not perform the ascribed roles in a satisfactory way also become
pathologised. In the first way pathology is seen as endemic to particular categories
(Blacks, ethnic outsiders, women). In the second way, pathology is derived from failing
to perform adequately the appropriate roles imputed to a particular positionality.135

Performance, however, is prejudicated by the dissonance between tradition and
modernity. Indigenous people are caught in-between, which determine their
“positionality” in the greater society. At this point indigenous peoples find themselves
more and more at odds with the emerging modern social landscape. A landscape, that is
eradicating tradition and replacing it with a synthetic, or compounded, social web
processed by mechanized human agency.
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Territoriality, Space, and the Politics of Geography
The constitution of a mutually exclusive territorial state redrew the maps of Europe and
much of the rest of world. Territoriality is, however, much more than just a delineated
piece of land. In fact, there has been a historical and dialectical shift from land or
possessions, meaning territory, to progressively entailing territoriality, which, according
to Robert D. Sack, is seen as “an often indispensable means to power at all levels: from
the personal to the international.”136 Territoriality, continues Sack, works within a sociopolitical context: “on how space in general is used and conceived as well as on who is
controlling whom and for what purposes. This means that the history of territoriality is
closely bound to the history of space, time, and social organization.”137
In this fluxing environment, political geography is a central theme. Although, the
politics of geography were not novel to the emerging modern state, with the advent of the
territorially bound state, geography, and the politics within, comes to play a more central
role. In fact, if prior to 1648 geography did not necessarily influence the survival of the
state, post-1648 geography came to define the state proper.
As such political geography, or by the late 1800s geo-politics, defined “the
geographical distribution of power, how it concentrates in some hands and some places,
the human and environmental consequences of such concentration, and how it shifts
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between places over time … how geography is informed by politics.”138 These “politics
of geography” in practice translated into enforcing border divisions, protecting borders,
and in policies stirred by notions of “manifest destiny.”
On the other hand, territory and territoriality, write John Agnew and Stuart
Corbridge, do not necessarily need to be territorial or territorially fixed, meaning: “need
not be either territorial, where geographical boundaries define the scope of membership
in a polity a priori (for example, in kinship or clan systems space is occupied as an
extension of group membership rather than residence within a territory defining group
membership as in territorial states), or fixed territorially (as with nomads).”139 Social or
political organization, according to Agnew and Corbridge, has existed aside and beyond
territory and this should not be forgotten. On the other hand, we should not either forget
that despite the validity of this argument the prevailing post-1648 trend was universally
to make territory and territoriality the defining characteristic of the modern state and was
also seen as the primary source of legitimacy of the state. In such a context, kinship, clan
belongingness, and nomadic practices no longer presumed the occupation of a particular
space, and were no longer feasible alternatives within the new system of fixed territory.
In the case of the Sámi or the Indian Americans it meant that a sparse sense of
territoriality or non-territorially bound spaces were incongruent within the new
territorially bound landscape.
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Understanding the relation between, and the implications of, political geography,
territoriality, and space (that is, its production, maintenance, and reproduction) is vital in
explaining two mutually opposing entities: the emergence of the modern territorial state
and the transformation of the indigenous (occupying predominantly nature’s landscape),
into an indigenous Other inhabiting a socio-political and economic limbo.
The common denominator here, according to John Agnew and Luca Muscarà, is
politics, which “‘concretely organizes the spaces of liberty, citizenship, law enforcement,
and institutional efficacy. Politics extends the spaces of domination, traces lines of
exclusion, designs internal and external borders, determines the centers and peripheries,
the ‘highs’ and the ‘lows’, and articulates the spaces of production and consumption.”140
According to John Gerard Ruggie “The central attribute of modernity in
international politics has been a peculiar and historically unique configuration of
territorial space.”141 We must first acknowledge this “unique configuration of territorial
space” before talking about an indigenous conception of territory and space. It is this
“unique configuration” (meaning the territory-bound state) that changes the domestic and
international system in which modern states were evolving and interacting with each
other. It was thence within these same conceptual frameworks that notions of indigenous
territory and space were translated, interpreted, and applied to the territorially bound
international system.
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The translation and interpretation of indigenous territory and space must also be
understood within the emerging competitive, risk-taking, entrepreneurial classes: 142
“transformation in capitalist production relations is merely one specific expression of a
reconfiguration in social space-time experiences to a degree not witnessed since the
Renaissance.” 143 In other words, the emergence of a political economy that would
transform and reorganize not only the existing political space, but redraw the system of
territorial states.144
In the past, politics may “need not be territorial at all … need not be territorially
fixed [nor these needed to] entail mutual exclusion.” 145 For instance, in Strayer and
Munro we find that in medieval Europe power or jurisdiction was non-exclusive and was
characterized by a “patchwork of overlapping and incomplete rights of government
[where] One vassal might have jurisdiction over a road, but not over fields through which
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it ran;” as found in Ruggie, “inextricably superimposed and tangled.”146 Exclusivity and
homogenization of power and legitimacy, within a specified territorial, and by extension
political, space redefined the structure and purpose of the state. Consequently, “the
modern system of territorial rule,” where the restructuring of the “territorial space is the
familiar world of territorially disjoint, mutually exclusive, functionally similar, sovereign
states,” meant the “consolidation of all parcelized and personalized authority into one
public realm” with two “spatial demarcations: between public and private realms and
between internal and external realms.”147
Consequently, indigenous peoples’ current status needs to be seen through a series
of complex processes where territory turned into territoriality, where a once fixed or
static space, turned into a dynamic and state-controlled realm. Meaning, politics was the
catalyzing agent that redefined membership and socio-political, economic, and cultural
ties.
Territoriality
These new modern forms of spatial differentiation came at odds with existing indigenous
spatial and territorial realities. It does not really matter whether one looks at notions like
terra nullis, non-territorial spatial extension, or as found in Ruggie, at the “sovereign
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importance of movement.” 148 As dismally as this may sound, indigenous spatial and
territorial realities were being reinterpreted in light of the crystallization of the modern
state and of the ensuing aggregation of territorially-based political and economic power
augmented by an even greater material and technological power.
As it happened in the case of the Sámi where “Ten thousand years of human
habitation is thus erased [and] the land is devoid of signification.”149 In these contexts
territorial politics were redefined to fit modern-state narratives, while the dialectical
system in which these narratives occurred was dichotomized between notions of static
versus shifting territoriality. An example of such narrative is particularly evident with the
onset of colonialism where indigenous lands were recognized to be no more than virgin,
uninhabited, uncharted, unclaimed lands (meaning: not delineated by a political
boundary) open to conquest and civilization.150
The question then should be asked whether in pre-colonial times one could talk of
an indigenous territory. Kristiina Karppi looks at the Sámi and their conceptualization of
territoriality and of territory and argues that such a question cannot be tackled from a
mono-dimensional perspective. The conceptualization of territory and territoriality is far
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too complex and varied that a multi-dimensional approach is needed. She starts with a
working definition of territoriality and of territory: “[Territoriality] is an attempt by an
individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships,
by eliminating and asserting control over a geographic area [while a territory is] the
realization or image of this strategy.”151 This realization means that when attempting to
define what constituted, for instance, Sámi territory one cannot make use of a colonial, or
modern, classification; that is, a mono-dimensional approach. In its stead, what is needed
is a reconceptualization, one that takes into account the Sámi notion of territoriality and
that of territory; meaning, a multi-dimensional approach. In this sense Karppi sees Sámi
territoriality as:
The Sami territoriality was historically based on the siida (or Lapp village) system, which
was more flexible, diffuse and negotiable than the fixed territoriality of the states … The
Sami area was divided into siida territories with their won resources, administration,
social system and customary rules for resource use … Siida social structure was flexible
concerning group membership, and the nuclear unit of the siida was a family … studies
have shown that these families within a siida had their own rights to a certain land, i.e.,
the Sami system combined private and collective ownership to the land … the fact that
this territoriality has collided with the exclusive fixed state territoriality has subjected the
Sami to assimilation during different periods of time.152

Indigenous notions of territoriality are thus affected by western interpretation of what
territoriality ought to be. On the one hand, we have the presumption that the Sámi did not
have a concept of land-ownership, and on the other hand, we are convinced that the
absence of land-ownership prejudicates the existence of Sámi territoriality. We now
know, however, that this is a false assumption. The Sámi, as well as in the case of the
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Indian Americans, were not mere nomads without any sense of land rights, on the
contrary, the reclaiming of seasonal pastures and the existence of localized sedentary life
show that a concept of territoriality and of territory did exist.
Similarly, Sack looks at the conceptualization of territory and of territoriality in
North America by using the example of the Chippewa Indians (Ojibwe or Ojibwa, one of
the largest group of Native Americans or First Nations in North America). Sack makes an
interesting point in his analysis of territorial uses by this Native American group. The
Chippewa were primarily hunter-gatherers with some limited agricultural practices
(maize and squash) covering a large extent of territory stretching from modern day Lake
Eire and Ontario across the Great Lakes regions all the way into the northern parts of
Minnesota, Wisconsin, North Dakota, and from Quebec through Ontario, Manitoba, and
Saskatchewan. The social composition, or unit, of the Chippewa, according to Sack, not
counting the family, changed seasonally. During the warmer season, the bands
reconstituted villages and the normal social, cultural, and economic activities began
again. Although membership within the band was voluntary, and the Chippewa occupied
a vast area, their habitation was never clearly bounded and fluctuated from year to year;
being doubtful that they would posses a map of their collective domain.153 Put differently,
because of its fluid and unbounded conceptualization of territory and of territoriality, the
Chippewa land (i.e., territory) was not used to primarily define who they were. For Sack,
“At the time of European contact … these people were hardly territorial as a ‘nation’,
although they may have been occasionally territorial as individual bands or as families
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within bands [asserting] control over an area was often imprecise, seasonal, and
strategic.” 154 So, for the Chippewa, the relationship between territory and social
organization was not necessarily derived from a mono-directional process. Here,
Chippewa territoriality may have ad hoc altered the social organization of bands or
nations. Their social organization, however, might have at times also redefined their
understanding of territoriality.
Arguments for or against indigenous territorial rights have been, for the most part,
built upon similar reasoning and currently proponents of these rights argue that the right
is founded on such ascribed and primordial foundations given at birth and traced back to
pre-colonial times. Russel L. Barsh, looks at indigenous territorial rights in international
law as being derived from “historical continuity” meaning “having historical continuity
with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies … Culture, language, ancestry and
occupation of the land all constitute evidence of [this] continuity.”155 In the case of the
Sámi, for instance, the evidence shows that prior to the formation of Sweden the Sámi did
inhabit the contested territories and did have a common (or more communal)
understanding of both land-occupation/rights and of territoriality; hence, ascribed by
“historical continuity.”156
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Nonetheless, seen from a state centric perspective this ascribed historical
continuity presented, and to a large extent still presents today, a puzzling problem; that of
territorial and power fragmentation. The modern use of territory is, for Sack, “based most
of all upon a sufficient political authority or power to match the dynamics of capitalism:
to help repeatedly move, mold, and control human spatial organization at vast scales.”157
While territoriality is for Sack defined in human terms as “a spatial strategy to affect,
influence, or control resources and people, by controlling area … Territoriality is
intimately related to how people use the land, how they organize themselves in space, and
how they give meaning to place.”158 Territoriality for Sack represents a historical social
construction to reshape space and redefying place in terms of the power relations.159
So, by referring back to Strayer, the modern state could not afford the puzzled
non-exclusive territorial rule of the medieval period with its “overlapping rights.” The
goal of the new state was the establishment of a “public realm” (more so in the 1800s
than in earlier periods) that would transcend tradition and localism. This goal became a
state’s enterprise during the formative years of modernity. Here, pervading state
apparatuses were infiltrating all aspects of society redefining public and private spaces.
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Once again, indigenous claims to land, identity, and other “vexing” demands were seen
as preventing the state to achieve its “manifest destiny.”
Space
Talking about space is more than just looking at a place in either geometrical or
geographical terms. To political geographers, for instance, place is about space, and space
is about politics.160 As such, if space is about politics then one needs to understand how
political units are formed, directed, and administered through sets of discourses that stir
the actions and non-actions of the state. This process is, in other words, the act of
creating, exerting, and recreating certain levels of power, or power relations. An example
of this is found in the United States of America during the 1820s where the sentiments of
the time began to question the various treaty obligations of the United States with Indian
American Nations and were calling to reconsider the place of the Indian American within
the greater American Republic.
Space can thus be understood in geographical, political, economic, and social
terms. Foucault, for instance, looks at space in terms of power. Space is the realm where
“economic-political” relations materialize, and where power relations are created and recreated.161
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Henri Lefebvre, on the other hand, recognizes that space can be a socially
constructed phenomenon. 162 Lefebvre’s work is pivotal in mapping the processes of
state’s colonization of social space. The latter ought to be taken in tandem with the
process of territoriality whereby once the state has secured its territorial integrity it
moved onto consolidating its power structure by conquering the domestic spatial
practices of society; meaning tradition and localism. For John Agnew and Stuart
Corbridge: “only the state could guarantee the harmonization of society … This in turn
gave rise to the distinction between places inside the borders of the territorial state in
which ‘authentic politics’ – the pursuit of justice and virtue – was possible, and the space
outside where it was not.”163 By extension, only the state and its spatial representation
could represent civility, justice, and virtues. Hence, everything or everyone outside the
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homogeneity of the territorial space (such as incongruous indigenous nations) represented
the antithesis of what was civilized, just, and virtuous.164
This spatial conquest can only occur, according to Scott, by making society
“legible,” thus converting it into a language readable by the modern state and one that fits
within the state’s project. For Lefebvre, this so-called translation occurs through the
“dialectical character of codes” where “Codes will be seen as part of a practical
relationship, as part of an interaction between ‘subjects’ and their space and
surroundings.” 165 Within the modern state power relations are recodified, and hence
reproduced, where the actions of individuals and the collective create and support the
space in which they occur.
An example of such recodification is found in the remapping of indigenous
culture and identity through extensive re-educational programs. A point in case is the
Sámi, where the emergence of Sámi schools in the 1700s, coupled with often-futile
attempts of Christianization, was revamped in the 1800s with better success than earlier
attempts. Another example is found in the legal re-codification, through various Reindeer
Acts, of Sámi identity. The importance of this legal re-codification is two-fold. On the
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one hand, it allowed for a diminution of individual who could claim indigenous status.
On the other hand, it allowed for an aggressive assimilation of those who fell outside the
new legal definition of Sáminess. In the case of the United States, attempts to
Americanize the Indian American led to similar results as in Sweden; although these
results were less promising than in Sweden. In both instances, though, the reconstructed
“dialectical codes” were to emphasize, the nation, modernity, and the greater society,
while downplaying, or outright discouraging, the group, the tribe, tradition, and
indigenous society.
The emergence of capitalism as a dominant economic system remapped social
space and reassigns places to three levels of reproduction, namely: “The advent of
capitalism, and more particularly ‘modern’ neocapitalism has this state of affairs
considerably more complex. Here three interrelated levels must be taken into account: (1)
biological reproduction (the family); (2) the reproduction of labour power (the working
class per se); and (3) the reproduction of the social relations of production – that is, of
those relations which are constitutive of capitalism and which are increasingly (and
increasingly effectively) sought and imposed as such.” 166 In tandem with modernity,
capitalism not only disrupts traditional Sámi and Indian American means of production,
but also redefines the reproduction of social relations to fit the modernization of society,
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and consequently attempts to reproduce indigenous identity to fit the capitalist
economy.167
A final connection worth mentioning, one that has already been argued for and it
is also supported in Agnew and Corbridge, is the connection between space and security.
For the new territorial and sovereign state, space is closely connected with the concept of
security, particularly in the field of international relations, where, according to Agnew
and Corbridge, it comes to signify “the integrity of the state’s territorial space.”168 For the
authors, the connection between “security and spatial sovereignty has four consequences
in international relation theory:” i) it has led to the definition of political identity in
exclusively state-territorial terms; ii) it has led to a spatially exclusive definition of
political identity, which resulted in a rigid separation between those people within the
territorial space pursuing ‘universal’ values (politics) and those outside practicing
different, and nominally inferior values; iii) it has led to view the actual ‘content’ of state
territoriality, the security-spatial sovereignty nexus involves viewing the territorial state
‘not in its historical particularity, but abstractly, as an idealised decision-making subject’;
and iv) the principle of state sovereignty ‘denies alternative possibilities because it fixes
our understanding of future opportunities in relation to a distinction between history and
progress within statist communities and mere contingency outside them.169
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The birth of the territorial state and the creation of a spatial sovereignty did not
allow anything outside the meaning of state-space to exist at par with the state itself. As
such, the Sámi and the Indian Americans came to be more and more at odds with the
modern territorial state. The Sámi and the Indian American’s landscapes were
transformed to fit the emergence of the modern state, and their contention to native lands
and rightful status could no longer be upheld. Similarly, power and legitimacy shifted
from the indigenous to the state. Indigenous peoples’ way of life and very existence,
useless to the modern state, was left to decay or it wither away into assimilationist
policies and institutions.170
The Politics of Geography
In these transformative times geo-politics become an important dimension that deeply
affected state-indigenous relations. In other words, to what extent was geography a
determining factor in the formation of state-politics toward indigenous people? The short
answer would be substantially, where politics are no longer the sole agent shaping the
world around us. Agnew and Muscarà’s work looks into the “mediating effects of
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geography on politics,” and the way politics are being “shaped by forces such as the
environment or the economy.”171
The topic of geo-politics will be dealt with in more details in the following
chapters, but suffice to say that in both Sweden and the United States of America
geography played an important role in the politics of indigenous policy-making: “Politics
extends [sic] the spaces of domination, traces lines of exclusion, designs internal and
external borders, determines the centers and peripheries, the ‘highs’ and the ‘lows’, and
articulates the spaces of production and consumption.”172 For instance, the Lapp Codicil
of 1751, the Indian Removal Act of 1830, or even The Cherokee Nation vs. The State of
Georgia, (30 US 1 – Supreme Court 1831), all show, to varying degrees, how geography
was translated into territoriality and how geopolitics and territorial integrity redrew not
only “internal and external borders,” clearly delineating what was within and what was
without, but also the level of inclusion and exclusion of groups or individuals within the
state project.
It is thus plausible to include geopolitics within the spectrum of analysis because,
whether directly or indirectly, the territorial integrity of the state came to play a pivotal
role in the formulation of domestic and international politics; especially from the
eighteenth century onward. The sort of “organic conception of the state,” one defined by
a “Darwinian struggle” and, by extension, one that justified the (Western) state
superiority over all other forms of political, cultural, and ethnic entities depicts the sort of
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environment in which the modern state of the mid-1800s onwards set its state-centric
project in motion.173
* * *
In conclusion, territory, territoriality, space, and place, form a distinct and yet
conceptually bound realm where society, culture, politics, economics, and identity are all
produced and reproduced. Territoriality and space, in particular, become key to
understand the processes of centuries of subjugation and pushed marginalization of
indigenous peoples to the edge of society. The territorial state becomes the “container of
society,” and society becomes the image of normalcy and the space where ‘authentic
politics’ take place. Anything outside the “contours” of this social space, and outside “the
territory of a state” (both representing a “totalizing and primal force”) is different in
nature or kind, meaning the other.174 Exclusion and marginalization, as processes, began
at the outset of the European colonial enterprise, manipulated through settlers societies
and interests (more so in the United States than in Sweden), and concluded during the
nineteenth century with the “codification” of the indigenous Other into a socio-political
and economic limbo.
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Characterizing Indigenous Identity
The discussion on what may characterize indigenous identity is drawn from the
international legal language that has come to represent a sort of norm in the field; this
albeit the lack of an agreed-upon standard international definition.
There is no doubt that, within the international context and for indigenous people
in general, self-identification ought to be considered integral to the formulation of an
indigenous identity. It is, however, equally paramount to acknowledge that the myriads of
interactions, since the start of colonization, have altered the identity of indigenous people.
As such, centuries of assimilation and ethnic-racial dilution ought to be included in the
conceptualization of indigenous identity.
This approach is also echoed in the existing scholarly literature, where, for
instance, Champagne et al. rethink native identity and native relations within the
contemporary modern state. The authors do not doubt that indigenous identities “predate
the formation of nation-states, and many aspects of these pre-state identities continue to
persist and make their weight felt in everyday life.”175 The emergence of the modern
state, however, has somehow influenced, or shaped, the development of what we
currently call indigenous identities, Indianness, or indigeneity, because “native identity is
largely defined in relation to colonizing cultures and state governments.”
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Consequently, the degree with which one characterizes indigenous identity should
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include not only self-identification but also the surrounding “colonizing cultures and state
governments.”
Before I begin discussing indigenous identity per se, it would be useful to briefly
conceptualize what may constitute identity, the self, and ethnicity. A word of caution: this
brief “compilation” is in no way exhaustive and it is not meant to circumvent a very
complex and rich interdisciplinary field of study.
Identity, the Self, and Ethnicity
Identity and ethnicity have been characterized as i) “primordial affinities and attachments
[where] identity [is] made up of a what a person is born with or acquires at birth,”177 ii) as
“cultural elements and symbols [are] an absurdity [and] are purely arbitrary [where]
ethnicity can only be understood in terms of a dynamic and contextual view of group
allegiances,” or iii) as a product of group identification and macro-social trends.178
These three theoretical approaches, although rich in their own right, they are
limited by their conceptual boundaries, and as such, in my opinion, they fail to identify
the multilayered essence of both identity and ethnicity. A better approach would be to
take identity and ethnicity as an amalgam of cross-boundary perceptions born through
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spatial-temporal historical experiences, formed by dialogical interactions, influenced by
actor’s agency and social pressures, and at times, perceived through ancestral ties.
Identity, in the present study, is seen as a dynamic notion, always in a state of flux
and never static. It is interpreted as a malleable sense of self, or a changing and evolving
sense of “sameness” and “cohesion” in personality over time. It is characterized by
difference and as an instance or point of unlikeness, dissimilarity, or distinguishing
characteristic, and in opposition to the unknown or to what one is not; i.e., the Other.
Identity is understood as a combination of cross-boundary perceptions shaped by
ancestral ties, by dynamic social, communal, and family environs. Identity also belongs
to “human agency,” it is adaptive and transitional: “identity is something that one ought
to be true to, can fail to uphold, can surrender when one ought to.” 179 The latter is
important as a point in case showing the dynamism of identity. In fact, if we can
surrender our identity, by definition, identity cannot be static. On the contrary, if we
surrender it, then it implies that we replace it. This exchange is, in other words, a
transaction, and at times a negotiation, making identity dynamic and even fluid.
Identity, however, is also a matter of self, meaning what makes an individual
unique and different from others, or as found by Charles Taylor, a “sense of self.”180 This
reflexive exercise that defines who I am is not only a blend of constructed “frames or
horizons,” it is also an exercise of “reflective awareness,” meaning that “human beings
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… care that their image matches up to certain standards, generally socially induced.”181
Reflexively, for instance, my sense of self, and therefore my identity, is shaped not only
by the way I see myself as an individual, or shaped by particular socio-cultural norms that
dictate what is true-false, good-evil, common-uncommon, or proper-improper; context
also plays a role. Consequently, context such as location (say northern or southern Italy,
northern or southern Europe, or Europe and the United States), social positioning (class,
immigrant, citizen, assimilated, enfranchised, accepted, segregated, excluded), and at
times gender, ethnicity, and race (whether prescribed or ascribed), may determine who I
feel or think I am. Furthermore, an additional component of my identity is my “reflective
awareness” where social expectations become integral in constructing who I am.
Ethnicity too can be construed as an amalgam of relative factors rather than a
primordial condition. Ethnicity, thus, may be taken as a quality or affiliation where
people are categorized according to common racial, national, tribal, religious, linguistic,
or cultural origins. Walker Connor conceptualizes ethnicity as an emotional,
psychological, and irrational element experienced by individuals seeking common
identifiers and belongingness, and represented by those mystical senses that create a state
of mind, which in turns shapes a sense of “common descent.”182 In line with Connor,
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Daniele Conversi interprets ethnicity as “normally [referring] to a belief in putative
descent: that is, a belief in something which may or may not be real. It is a perception of
commonality and belonging supported by a myth of common ancestry.”183
Indigenous Identity: A Brief Characterization of Sámi and Indian American identity.
Hilary N. Weaver is correct in assuming that to ascertain what really constitutes
indigenous identity, or to “measure [and to know] who truly has it” is not so simple. For
decades, indigenous groups, scholars, researcher, and state bureaucracies have taken up
this task, with mixed results. 184 A sort of common ground has often hinged on selfidentification as a criterion of recognizing who or what an indigenous person is.185

i) International Characterization
Martínez-Cobo’s study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations
(1986/87) and the International Labour Organization Convention 169 (ILO C169) are
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often taken as the standard in characterizing indigenous peoples. In particular, MartínezCobo identifies indigenous peoples as:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories,
consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those
territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are
determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral
territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal system [while an
indigenous person is] one who belongs to these indigenous populations through selfidentification as indigenous (group consciousness) and is recognized and accepted by
these populations as one of its members (acceptance by the group). This preserves for
these communities the sovereign right and power to decide who belongs to them, without
external interference.186

As we can see, Martínez-Cobo’s working definition highlights not only self-identification
or group consciousness, but also connectivity to historical continuity predating invasion
and colonization.
The ILO C169 follows in Martínez-Cobo’s footsteps and is often used by several
national, international, and intranational institutions (such as the Inter-American
Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Organization of American States,
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights) as a working definition
identifying indigenous peoples as:
indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country,
or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or
colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of
their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political
institutions [where] Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a
fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this
Convention apply.187
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Here, the Convention goes further and creates a sort of “supranational space” within
which a person can find belongingness as indigenous or tribal based on full or partial
customary or traditional characteristics or quality “irrespective of the legal status.”
Martínez-Cobo’s study and ILO C169 were groundbreaking in their scope
principally because they both stressed self-identification or group consciousness in
identifying indigenous peoples.188 Both were also moving away from the more traditional
interpretation of indigenous belongingness often determined by a sort of “jus sanguinis,”
where “ancestry, [as in the case of] ‘Maori blood’, has always been the legal criterion for
considering a person as a Maori in New Zealand.”189
Self-identification and group consciousness is not, however, the product of
exogenous conceptualizations attempting to overlay a synthetic definition upon
indigenous populations. On the contrary, “it should be pointed out that indigenous
populations themselves have claimed the right to [self-identification or group
consciousness] as an exclusive right on their part.”190 For instance, The World Council of
Indigenous Peoples has adopted the following definition: “the right to define what is an
indigenous person be reserved for the indigenous people themselves. Under no
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circumstances should we let artificial definitions such as the Indian Act in Canada, the
Queensland Aboriginal Act 1971 in Australia, etc. tell us who we are.” Further, the
Fourth Russell Tribunal has stated, with regards to the Indian peoples of the Americas,
that “The Indian peoples of the Americas must be recognised according to their own
understanding of themselves, rather than being defined by the perception of the valuesystems of alien dominant societies.”191
This being said, the existence, or acceptance, of a formal and internationally
recognized definition of what constitutes an indigenous person does not exist. Indigenous
peoples have generally opposed such standardization and have “argued against the
adoption of a formal definition at the international level, stressing the need for flexibility
and for respecting the desire and the right of each indigenous people to define
themselves.”192
Erica-Irene Daes, the Chairperson and Rapporteur of the Working Group on
Indigenous Populations, outlined the concept of indigenous peoples in her 1996 report
listing a series of determinant factors relevant to the conceptualization of indigenous,
namely: (a) Priority in time, with respect to the occupation and use of a specific territory;
(b) The voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, which may include the aspects
of language, social organization, religion and spiritual values, modes of production, laws
and institutions; (c) Self-identification, as well as recognition by other groups, or by State
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authorities, as a distinct collectivity; and (d) An experience of subjugation,
marginalization, dispossession, exclusion or discrimination, whether or not these
conditions persist.”193 Daes’ approach is typical of the time where in a post-Cold War
environment more emphasis is placed on territoriality, the notion of a distinctive
collectivity, and a common experience of subjugation, marginalization, dispossession,
exclusion, and discrimination of indigenous peoples.
Daes’ approach, that subjugation, marginalization, dispossession, exclusion, and
discrimination have redefined indigenous experiences, in my opinion, ought to be taken
as evidence of an altered sense of identity in light of a self that has been influenced by the
interaction with the state and white society and by the totality of these experiences.

ii) Characterizing Sámi and Indian American Identity
Attempting to define what constitutes Sámi and Indian American identity is a futile
exercise because ultimately what really constitutes a Sámi or an Indian American, is for a
Sámi and an Indian American to decide. What ought to be discussed instead are events
that may characterize, perhaps subconsciously, today’s Sámi and Indian Americans.
Centuries of assimilation, racial reclassification, and ethnic displacement have, in fact,
resulted in the dilution of indigenous cultural traits and consequently of identity.
Today’s Sámi, for instance, are still contending with the past’s subtle eradiation of
their language, culture, and ethnic identity caused by centuries of systematic state-
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sponsored policies and legislations. According to Eva-Britt Nilsson the state has, in fact,
been responsible for the loss of ethnic identity of many non-reindeer herding Sámi: “there
is a strong connection between the reindeer law designs and the possibility of the nonreindeer-herding Sámi to exist as an independent ethnic group.” 194 Andrea Amft,
indirectly, made a similar point. His argument shows how the introduction of legislations,
beginning with the 1886 Reindeer Herding Act, initiated a process of differentiation
among reindeer and non-reindeer herding Sámi. The legislation provided the legal
framework fracturing Sámi identity and their sense of belongingness and in the process
creating, what Amft calls, an “Authentic Sámi minority.”
In this new legal context, only those Sámi defined by the state as “authentic” or
“living up to the shared standards” were considered part of the Sámi minority, and their
rights were recognised based on ancient tradition and time immemorial. On the other
hand, those that after 1886 suddenly fell outside of what the state considered an
“authentic” Sámi, were deprived of their ethnic origins: the state “institutionalized a
homogenous Sami identity deviant from the Swedish, maintaining a hierarchical order, at
the same time as it explains and justifies an exclusion of the majority of people of Sami
origins.”195 Hence, those Sámi who did not practice reindeer husbandry were “forced”
into becoming sedentary farmers and were generally marginalized and deprived of their
ethnic belonging.
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Another example showing the effects of legislation on the ethnic identity of the
Sámi population is found in the Reindeer Grazing Act of 1928 (SFS 1928-309 Lag om de
svenska lapparnes rätt till renbete i Sverige). The Act, starting with Article 1 §1,
introduces a blood quantum that determined the acquisition or loss of the legal ethnic
belonging, and with it, the right to reindeer husbandry. In addition, to the introduction of
a blood quantum, a gender qualifier was also introduced, which consequently affected
women more than men. This gender disparity is easily visible from the table below
adapted from Amft’s work:
TABLE 1: ACQUISITION AND LOSS OF RIGHT TO REINDEER
HUSBANDRY BEFORE AND AFTER MARRIAGE
Legend: + entitled to reindeer herding;

Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Case 4
Case 5
Case 6
Case 7
Case 8

– not entitled to reindeer herding

Before the wedding

After the wedding

Sámi man + / Sámi woman +
Sámi man + / Sámi woman –
Sámi man – / Sámi woman +
Sámi man – / Sámi woman –
Sámi man + / non-Sámi woman –
Sámi man – / non-Sámi woman –
non-Sámi man – / Sámi woman +
non-Sámi man – / Sámi woman –

Sámi man + / Sámi woman +
Sámi man + / Sámi woman +
Sámi man – / Sámi woman –
Sámi man – / Sámi woman –
Sámi man + / non-Sámi woman +
Sámi man – / non-Sámi woman –
non-Sámi man – / Sámi woman –
non-Sámi man – / Sámi woman –

Source: Adapted from Andrea Amft, “Att skapa en ‘autentisk’ minoritet - om maktrelationen
mellan svenskar och samer från slutet av 1800-talet till 1970-talet,” Historisk tidskrift No. 118
(1998): 605, figure 2.

Education was seen as one of the most important tool in the assimilation of the Sámi
population. Now that the bulk of the Sámi were stripped of their ethnic identity through a
reclassification of what constituted a Sámi, the remainder was to be settled, reeducated,
and prepared for full assimilation into the great Swedish society. The education of the
Sámi was nothing new. In fact, the first attempts date back to the seventeenth century
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through Church’s missions and missionaries. The issue of education will be dealt with in
more details in the following chapter, suffice to say, however, is that centuries of
reeducation diluted the Sámi identity by forcing children to learn a “proper language,”
Swedish, and resulted in loss of their language and consequently of their identity. Lester
Wikström, for instance, talks about students being hit for speaking Sámi at school.
Consequently, many of these children, once grown up, never taught Sámi to their
children.
The nineteenth century also brought race-biology to the forefront. With the
introduction of the cephalic index, by Anders Retzius in the 1840s, the early twentieth
century was marked by the study and categorization of the Sámi as a subordinate specie.
Racial ranking was eventually institutionalized in 1921 with the establishment of the first
official institution, The State Institute for Race Biology (Statens institut för rasbiologi),
with its seat at the Dekanhuset at Uppsala University. The Sámi, at this point in time,
were seen as physically and culturally inferior and were nothing more than “lazy and
dumb.”196 As such, the Sámi needed to be “told” what was right for them, consequently
influencing the state’s paternalistic policies towards them.
In the case of Indian American identity the characterization is more complex due
to the fact that there are hundreds of identities to contend with. For Robert James Muckle
“many Indigenous people have their feet in multiple worlds, including that of their
specific Indigenous nation; the larger national, continental, or global Indigenous
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movement; and their country of citizenship, with its own distinctive culture.”197 In the
case of Indian Americans, Muckle adds, “four different ways of defining Indianness:
legal, biological, cultural, and personal [where] ‘Indian’ is defined in almost three dozen
different ways in the United States federal legislation, and there is no standard for the
blood quantum that allows recognition as a tribal member among the various groups.”198
Yet, the federal government in the United States has established a quantifiable degree of
Indianness found in Indian blood. The federal bureaucracy, writes David E. Wilkins,
“still uses ethnological data, including varying fractions of blood quantum [like] an
official chart developed by the BIA describing the fractionalization of Indian identity.”199
So, for instance, according to the table if one parent is 4/4 Indian and the other parent is
1/16 Indian, the child will be categorized as 17/32 Indian.200
A comparison of blood quantum shows that Indian Americans were able to retain
more of their ethnic identity than their Sámi counterparts. In addition, ethnic belonging in
the case of the Indian Americans was not determined by a specific livelihood as in the
case of the Sámi. Perhaps this may be a reason why the United States fractionalization of
Indian American ethnic identity was more permissible than the Swedish.
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Indian Americans, in general, had to contend with similar historical developments
as the one experienced by the Sámi. A categorical difference between the two groups,
however, is the effects of the Indian Policy on the Indian Americans. In fact, United
States Indian policies (in reality various versions of the same policy), which were meant
to solve the Indian Question, had more macabre consequences and less successful results
in the United States.
In Sweden assimilation was, in fact, much less inhumane and was more rapid and
successful than it was in the United States. The reasons for these differences are many.
Government type and lack of an armed conflict as in the case of the Sámi could have
facilitated the assimilation process. The racial deviation between white Americans and
Indian Americans could also have been a factor. The Sámi, are considered racially closer
to the Swedes than Indian Americans are to white Americans. Sámi fall, in fact, within
the Europoid and, in some instances, even Caucasian races.
These differences not withstanding, the impact of United States assimilation
policies on the identity of Indian Americans, their sense of self, and their sense of ethnic
belonging need to contend with such nearly genocidal policies; such as the Wounded
Knee Massacre of 1890. Consequently, an Indian American in search of who he/she is
may be confronted with the brutality of United States policies, the loss of land and of
sovereignty, inhumane treatment, and racial marginalization; examples of which are
epitomized in the occupation of Alcatraz in 1969 and the occupation of Wounded Knee in
1973.
* * *
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In conclusion, although indigenous “identity is often complex and confusing,”201 when
looking at group cohesion then self-identification contributes to a collective sense of
belongingness and it is being used by indigenous communities and nations across the
world to describe “those who claim ancestry from a self-governing society that inhabited
a region before the invasion, conquest, settlement, or other form of occupation by people
of different cultures who then became dominant.”202
On the other hand, when looking at the identity, say of a Sámi or of an Indian
American, then the characterization may become even more intricate and multifaceted.
Cultures, and thus identity, argues Tully, overlap geographically and are “densely
interdependent in their formation and identity [exists] in complex historical processes of
interaction with other cultures.”203 This implies that when studying, say, Sámi or Indian
American and white cultures one ought to also look at interdependence, hybridity, and
syncretism emerging from various processes of interaction. No single culture, and thus
identity, today can claim to be the product of a process that either occurred in a vacuum
or exist in isolation of other cultures or identities.
Therefore, what makes different cultures or identities different is not their
different existence, but rather the “experience of otherness internal to our own identity.”
We, in other words, experience other cultures because we see our own difference in
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relation to other cultures (i.e., our own otherness). Without this “difference with itself,”
explains Tully, there would not be “culture or cultural identity.”204 This makes culture
and identity internally heterogeneous, or as found in Tully, “not internally homogeneous.
They are continuously contested, imagined and reimagined, transformed and negotiated,
both by their members and through their interaction with others. The identity, and so the
meaning, of any culture is thus aspectival [meaning fragmented and multifaceted] rather
than essential.”205
In this sense, the identity of indigenous people ought to be understood in relation
to itself, to cultural diffusion and amalgamation, and also to what is not indigenous; i.e.,
the modern state and its modern society.
Nationalism and Ethnonationalism
Nationalism, and by extension ethnonationalism, is purposely not covered in this study.
Nonetheless, their close proximity to identity and ethnicity warrants at least some
coverage. In addition, these doctrines, or aspirations, seem to be marginally important in
the historiography of the cases studied. This particularity is especially true for Sweden.
In Sweden power consolidation and territorial integration was a product of
enduring domestic and international pressures. Gustafsson, quoting Smith, argues that the
push to homogenize was motivated by “‘the need of rulers and factions of the ruling
classes to preserve their positions against rivals, internal and external, and to provide a
loyal base in the mass of the population.’ As a ‘by-product’ of this, the territorial integrity
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of the state was strengthened, and ‘the base for the modern nations and nationalism
emerged.’”206 I subscribe to the belief that nations, and as such nationalism, is a modern
phenomenon, even a product of modernity, that had little bearing on the actions of states
before the 1800s; at least in the way we understand nationalism today. Smith, for
instance, quoting Elie Kedourie, argues that nationalism is a “doctrine invented in Europe
at the beginning of the nineteenth century.”207 Smith sees nationalism as “an ideology of
the nation and not of the state.” 208 As such, nationalism would be misplaced in the
Swedish context.
In the case of the United States, on the other hand, nationalism may be prudently
added as a variable although it should be understood as a “consciousness of belonging to
the nation, together with sentiments and aspirations for its security and prosperity.”209
This being said, the idea of “belonging to a nation” needs to be understood within the
historical progression of the country, from confederation to federal republic, and
Jackson’s “modern” presidency. In this context, U.S. territorial consolidation can be seen
in light of a “manifest destiny” that matures from the experiences of a young republic that
in 1789 was still facing the shadow of the British Empire, a fading Spain and France, a
seemingly emerging Mexico, while simultaneously was forced to be dealing with the
more urging threat of Native American Nations. Nationalism, in terms of “consciousness,
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aspirations, security and prosperity” was always present in varying degrees; the naivety
of the 1810s (e.g., The Barbary War and The War of 1812) was quickly replaced by a
firmer foreign policy by the 1820s (e.g., Monroe Doctrine of 1823), where by the 1850s
the United States was successful in strengthening its de facto power across what was to
become the 48 contiguous United States of America, while at the same time, it began
stretching its wings onto the Pacific Rim.
Nationalism in this study is understood as “an emotional attachment to one’s
people – one’s ethnonational group.”210 The stress here is on attachment, rather than, on
loyalty. As such, adds Connor, we cannot equate “nationalism with loyalty to the
state.” 211 This improper usage of the term is, for Connor, “conducive to dangerously
underestimating the magnetism and the staying power of ethnic identity, for those terms
simply do not convey the aura of deeply felt, emotional commitment that nationalism
does.”212 Nationalism is thus axiomatic to the emotional attachment to one’s nation. In
turn, this is seen in Connor as deriving from the Greek word Ethnos, meaning nation.213
Thus, nation and ethnicity are conceptually connected, where the nation is seen as a
group’s emotional attachment to a common descent, or “a group of people who believe
they are ancestrally related.”214
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Yael Tamir revisits the notion of nationalism and attempts to separate it from its
derogative portrayals. Tamir achieves this by simply shifting the focus of what has often
characterized nationalism, to what instead should really be characterizing it. In other
words, she places “a cultural claim rather than a political one at the heart of
nationalism.” 215 This characterization is justified against accusations of depoliticizing
nationalism by stating that: i) the core of nationalism is cultural rather than political,
where the primary objective of national movements is a desire to assure the existence and
flourishing of a particular community to preserve its culture, tradition and language,
rather than seizing state power; and ii) nationalism should not be seen as a mere striving
to control state power and institutions; political power is the means, while the end is
cultural.216
Before continuing onto ethnonationalism it is important to remember that the
present study does not deal, at all, with ethnonationalism. First, it is considered a more
recent expression and falls outside the study’s scope. Second, the present study is not
about

ethnic

political

mobilization,

but

rather

about

ethnic

neutralization,

disenfranchisement, and stagnation. Third, ethnonationalism, writes Nina Caspersen,
represents a “specific form of nationalism—a form of nationalism that is associated with

social scientists … Ernest Gellner’s tone is typical when he writes that nationalism ‘is not the awakening of
nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist. Such deconstructing sentiments are
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an ethnic group that does not presently have its own state, but is politically mobilized to
pursue this goal.” 217 Donna Lee Van Cott argues that the political mobilization of
indigenous peoples occurs through a process called framing: “the conscious strategic
efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of
themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.”218
To varying degrees, ethnonationalism emerges after World War II where, in the
wake of self-determination, indigenous groups began to politicize and to exert political
pressure on states for more recognition, rights, and protection. In Sweden this
materialized in the founding of the National Association of Swedish Sami (Svenska
Samernas Riksförbund, SSR) in 1950. In the United States the mobilization occurs a few
years earlier in response to the assimilation and termination policies of the 1940s with the
founding of the National Congress of American Indians in 1944.
With the end of the Cold War, ethnicity and indigenism, took front stage in
several domestic political settings. In some instance, like in Latin America, but not in the
United States or in Sweden, ethnonationalism has manifested itself in the dawn of
ethnicity-based parties.219 Raúl L. Madrid clarifies this development in the following
way. On the one hand, “the emergence of major indigenous parties in Latin America may
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actually help deepen democracy in the region [improving] the representativeness of the
party system in the countries where they arise.”220 On the other hand, the radicalization of
ethnonationalism has also shown destabilizing properties where “radical ethnonationalist
parties are unlikely to win the allegiance of numerous voters, even within their own
ethnic group; and as a result, they should have a limited impact on the national political
environment.”221 In some cases, such as in Bolivia and Ecuador, ethnicity-based parties
have also picked up on conventional political trends bringing about the consolidation of
ethnopopulism. These movements, writes Madrid are “inclusive ethnically based parties
that adopt classical populist electoral strategies. Whereas exclusionary ethnic parties have
registered little electoral success, ethnopopulist parties have won significant legislative or
presidential victories in the Andean nations.”222
Ethnonationalism has its limits. Aside from the limitations found by Madrid, there
are occurrences where national apathy also poses limitations on indigenous recognition
and mobilization; cultural, political, or otherwise. In the case of Sweden, for instance,
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writes Carina Green, indigenism will have difficulties to materialize because the “visual
stimuli” of being seen as indigenous are largely absent: “Indigenism as ideology is
uncomplicated, and politically correct to approve of.” 223 Yet, indigenism, she argues,
does always materialize as intended: “It is always easier to be Sami in Brussels than it is
in Jokkmokk … politicians within the European Union in Brussels, would listen and
express support and sympathy and see him as a Sami and as also as [sic] someone who
was part of the international indigenous family, whereas in his local community the
claims he made on the basis of his ethnic belonging was not recognized and respected in
the same way … claiming an indigenous identity locally [is seen] as being a bit
exaggerated, almost pretentious.”224
In conclusion, whereas nationalism ought to be interpreted in terms of
“attachment to one’s nation” and ethnonationalism as “attachment to one’s ethnic group”
within a larger national context, neither should be taken as expressions of loyalty. A word
of caution, however, is expressed by Green, quoting Adam Kuper’s controversial article,
The Return of the Native (Current Anthropology, June 2003), and wonders whether “the
indigenous movement on the whole, of being dangerously close to Nationalism, in its
ugliest form.”225 Green also adds that despite the “massive criticisms” of his article “we
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should be cautious not to totally dismiss Kuper. It is important to bring up the problems
with large pan-identities, like the indigenous … and also to see to our own role in the
making and re-making of portrayals of indigenous peoples and their aims.”226
Double Movement
The notion of “double movement” as applied to state-indigenous relations is in no way an
original connection and several authors, as mentioned sporadically in this study, have
alluded to its importance. The importance of “double movement” lie in exposing a
relation that was not mono-directional and thus indigenous peoples ought not to be seen
as mere receivers of change, or “object.” On the contrary, they also held the agency and
cultural capital to induce change in the white man’s world. For instance, Fleras and
Elliott see the “aboriginal-state relations as an interplay between structure and agency”
where indigenous peoples are not merely at the receiving end of history, but rather they
are also shapers of history acting within the boundaries set down by society or by the
state.227 To this end it is important to reiterate the dialogical and discursive affinities that
exist in state-indigenous relations and Karl Polanyi’s concept of “double movement,” as
described in this section, can provide the framework in which this process occurs.
The importance of arguing for a multi-directional sets of interactions occurring
between the state the indigenous population is that interactions, dialogical or otherwise,
rarely happen in a vacuum and as such these evolving causal processes need to be seen
and understood in a reciprocal and dynamic environ where the interplay of two identities,
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the emerging state and the reacting Other, occur. Omitting this realization would entail
treating indigenous populations as a mere object at the mercy of the state. On the
contrary, indigenous populations withheld a certain level of agency, whether social,
political, and even economic, where their own dynamics also influenced the structural
development of the state. Reciprocity, thus, redefines the interconnectedness of
boundaries and frontiers showing “linkage and interdependency;” or for Polanyi, these
were “embedded.”228 It would also mean that the indigenous person had no influence on
the development of Sweden, or colonial or American identity. For instance, James Axtell
writes, “All peoples define themselves partly by contrast with other peoples, but the
English colonists forged their particular American identity on an Indian anvil more than
on a (non-English) European or African one.”229 This colonial reality was later passed
onto the new republic and it deeply marked some of the structural development of the
modern American Republic.
Karl Polanyi’s work deals primarily with economic history and social theory, and
the economic and social changes brought by the Industrial Revolution. His
conceptualizations

must

be

understood

in

terms

of

“embeddedness”

vs.

“disembeddedness” and the resulting process of double movement. Embeddedness thus
“expresses the idea that the economy is not autonomous … but subordinated to politics,
religion, and social relations.”230 By the same token Polanyi rejects the separation of the
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two by arguing that disembedding the processes: i) “a moral argument that it is simply
wrong to treat nature and human beings as objects whose price will be determined
entirely by the market.” 231 ii) “Even though the economy is supposed to be selfregulating, the state must play the ongoing role of adjusting the supply of money and
credit to avoid the twin dangers of inflation and deflation.”232 The interaction between
these two opposing forces creates double movement, defined by Polanyi as:
extreme skepticism about disembedding the economy is also the source of his powerful
argument about the “double movement.” Because efforts to disembed the economy from
society inevitably encounter resistance, Polanyi argues that market societies are
constituted by two opposing movements – laissez-faire movement to expand the scope of
the market, and the protective countermovement that emerges to resist the disembedding
of the economy.233

Karl Polanyi’s concept of double movement is used in this study to describe the level of
hybridity and syncretism that existed in state-indigenous relations. Whether this state-ofaffairs is seen in terms of Richard White’s “middle ground,” Collin G. Calloway’s
“White Indian,” or in the working of local courts in the northern territories in Sweden, a
dialogical process influenced both indigenous lives and the structural development of the
white colonizer and the state.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE MAKING OF THE INDIGENOUS OTHER
This chapter looks at Sweden and the United States of America as instances illustrating
how the emergence of the modern state contributed to the remaking of the indigenous
Other. The primary focus will be the “study of [state] discourses and production of
categorizations and their consequences for lived [indigenous] experience.” 234 It goes
without saying that these two countries are in no way unique. Other countries, such as
Canada, Australia, India, Argentina, and several others, offer similar experiences.
Sweden and the United States, however, were chosen because they offer a comparison of
European and American contexts. The comparative value emphasizes key patterns of
similarities and differences, such as in the production of identity and in the shaping of
state stances towards indigenous questions, or in policies meant to solve the “indigenous
question.”
The historical timeframe of this chapter will stretch from approximately the
sixteenth to the end of the nineteenth centuries with sporadic mentions of earlier or later
periods. A conscious choice was made to chronicle the gradual evolution of the modern
state in an attempt to show how changes to state structures, processes, and discourses
have influenced the making of the indigenous Other. This scenario is particularity evident
in the case of Sweden where state-Sámi relations cannot be fully understood without
tracing these mechanisms as early as the sixteenth century. In the case of the United
States of America, on the other hand, beginning around the late colonial period 1750s
suffices as a contrasting image of these mechanisms. In both cases, though, the period of
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analysis will end with the nineteenth century; which is seen as pivotal for when shifts in
state-indigenous relations begin.
The “Authentic Sámi” and the Making of the Indigenous Other in Sweden
This section is divided in two parts. The first will map out a historical overview of state
development in Sweden starting with the reign of King Gustav I Vasa (r. 1523-1560).
The second part will deal with what Roger Kvist called “nearly 450 years of Swedish
Sámi policy” and the making of, what Andrea Amft labeled, the “Authentic Sámi.”235
The State and Great-Power Politics
The evolution of the modern Swedish state from the late Middle Ages to industrialization
is a story of great external and internal pressures and transformations, which in turn
altered existing power relations between the Crown and the estates, but also between the
state and the indigenous Sámi population. Historians, like Harald Gustafsson, with broad
strokes, paint a picture of centrifugal forces and pressures where the consolidation of the
state and its powers came i) as a reaction to international conflicts, and ii) as a result of
domestic power struggles.
Gustafsson starts with what he labels the conglomerate state, meaning a
“political, judicial and administrative mosaic, rather than a modern unitary state.” 236
During the early modern period, argues Gustafsson, the territorial state was a
235
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conglomerate of units characterized by a number of different parts grouped together to
form a whole but remain distinct entities. The state was a composition of socially,
politically, and culturally mixed units, and therefore heterogeneous in character rather
than homogeneous and unitary: “In this way, the two dominating states of northern
Europe in the 17th century [(i.e., Sweden and Denmark)] had been formed through a
process of territorial state formation, creating not unitary states but conglomerates. But
they were undoubtedly more closely knit than the old, personal union had been [(i.e., the
Kalmar Union)], and they were to be even more centralized and integrated during the
course of the early modern period.” 237 Gustafsson, however, reminds us “that state
formation is one of the principal processes of historical transformation in European
history. The territorial, sovereign, unitary state did not exist from time immemorial, nor is
it a product of industrialization and nationalism in the 19th century. It is a historical
artefact [sic] … a political, judicial and administrative mosaic … that was kept together
more rightly than its medieval forerunner.” 238 The unitary state, on the other hand,
emerges at a much later date and, writes Gustafsson, as a result of the Age of
Absolutism.239
In Sweden the processes of unification, and later, of centralization, integration,
and bureaucratization began with the rule of King Gustav I Vasa in 1523: “Professional
central and local administration enabled a regime to take a firmer grip over its lands than
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the medieval prince, who had his extended household (the court) and his feudal vassals as
his main instruments.”240 By the time Vasa’s reign came to an end Sweden seems to have
become a conglomerate state: “It was with the acquisition of parts of present-day Estonia
in 1561 that Sweden became a real conglomerate state. From then until 1658, Sweden
acquired new provinces in the east Baltic area, in northern Germany, and on the
Scandinavian peninsula [sic]. These provinces … were not incorporated into Sweden
proper, they did not get seats in the Diet …, and they kept their own laws, privileges and
constitutional arrangements.”241
Princes, such as Vasa, soon came under internal and external pressure to secure
their sovereignty and legitimate their claims: “In order to use the resources of his realm
as efficiently as possible, the ruler would feel forced to neglect the old privileges of his
provinces, to establish a centralized systems that covered the whole realm, to reform the
law court, and so on [eliminating all] intermediary authorities and privileges which
questioned

central

control.”

242

Beginning

with

the

eighteenth

century

the

“conglomeration of power” was no longer a feasible alternative and, as in several other
European kingdoms, a homogenization and centralization of power and the strengthening
of territorial sovereignty was seen necessary.
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Quoiting Otto Hintze’s work, Gustafsson draw our attention to the importance of
“international relations for the internal developments of states [where] external state
formation” places a certain pressure on states and hence on their internal structural
formation and power consolidation.243 In the case of Sweden, during the course of the
seventeenth century, the country experienced dramatic expansion and foreign conquests.
The intervention of Sweden in the Thirty Years' War in 1630 (1630-1635), the
establishment in 1638 of its first American colony, the acquisition of new territories as a
result of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, and the several wars with Denmark-Norway
enlarged the kingdom with lands in the Scandinavian Peninsula and the Baltics, and
catapulted the kingdom onto the international scene.244
Sweden, however, was a novice in the game of great-power politics and struggled
greatly with the constant pressures on its frontiers. For example, the young kingdom was
facing Denmark-Norway across the region in an attempt to destabilize Sweden and to
regain lost territories. In the Baltics Sweden had to keep the Hanseatic League in check,
while fighting several protracted wars against Russia on all of its eastern and northeastern
borders.245 Simultaneously, Sweden tried to compete with expert colonizers such as the
Dutch and the British and embarked on a difficult colonial adventure in the Americas.
These realities presented the realm with encompassing pressures and threats, which
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within a post-Westphalian international system of states, the centralization and
homogenization of the realm, including the “Swedification” (försvenskning) of its
subjects, was seen as a necessity for survival; this included the Sápmi and the Sámi living
within it. External pressures, thus, need to be considered in tandem with internal forces
and the way the dynamics between these influenced and stirred the state. Gustafsson
extrapolates, from a series of thematic lectures on the Swedish state, how internal
developments, influenced the consolidation of the modern state system in Sweden.246
During the Middle Ages, writes Erik Lönnroth, one cannot talk of the existence of
a state in Sweden. Following a failed attempt to establish a centralized state during the
late Middle Ages, Sweden fell back into the power-politics of various elite groups. At this
point Sweden’s power apparatus was too rudimentary to allow for the emergence of a
centralizing state. It was not until the coming to power of Gustav Vasa in 1523 that
Sweden turns into an actual princely state.247
Eva Österberg, alternatively, believes that the Swedish state developed in light of
two opposing forces during the 1500-1600s. On the one hand, the strong princely state
developed into a dynamic factor. Here the state built a bureaucracy, attempted to develop
an economy, engaged in war, and appropriated to itself the resources necessary to achieve
these goals. On the other hand, Sweden was dominated by a peasant society, where the
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elite was too small to establish a relative statist society. 248 This resulted in several
peasant-uprisings, which the strong emerging state put down, but the very nature of
Swedish society made Sweden a country stirred by consensus. In the 1600s Sweden, adds
Österberg, was “en maktstat med motmakt.” Maktstat, as in German machtstaat, may also
be understood as meaning absolute or authoritarian; although the concretization of a
short-lived absolutism in Sweden does not appear until the end of the 1600s beginning
with the reign of Karl XI (r. 1660-1697), and later continued by his son Karl XII (r. 16971718). 249 In other words, the Swedish power-state (maktstat) was kept in check by a
countervailing force (motmakt), the peasant society, which counterbalanced the power of
the state.250
For Jan Lindgren, Sweden in the seventeenth century began a process of
militarization because of its wars with Russia and its intervention in the religious wars of
the period. Furthermore, Lindgren points out is that at the end of the hostilities Sweden
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did not demilitarize and in its stead continued on a build-up of its military might that
turned the country virtually into a military state where the military took up a great portion
of resources and manpower into military service. Prolonged military campaigns and
diversion of resources and manpower toward the war-machine, however, had an impact
on trade and domestic production. By the 1720s the Swedish military state was over.251
The 1700s, according to Per-Arne Karlson, saw the development of Sweden’s
cities and local governments and with it came a so-called a “popular democratic
revolution” (folklig demokratisk revolution) where localism assumed more and more
political capital and entered the policy-making process by influencing the workings of the
Diet (Riksdagen). Korpijaakko-Labba, however, adds that the process of localism started
already in the 1600s with the emergence and consolidation of local councils, and Lapland
was not immune to this trend. In fact, in Lapland, by the end of the 1600s and well into
the 1700s, the Sámi slowly replaced local commoners in local councils resulting in Sámimajorities, or in some cases in one-hundred-percent Sámi-represented councils.252
Peter Aronsson also points to the importance of “localism” and argues that in
Sweden in order to understand the development of the Swedish state one cannot take a
state-centric approach and in its stead one must look at the local history. In other words,
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if one is to fully grasp the development of Sweden as a state, one must include the
evolution of political activism of local communities and councils and understand how
local political power influenced and shaped the central power. For Aronsson, a
hierarchical-feudal custom existed side-by-side with communalist realities rather than a
dichotomous dynamic of state-society.253
Lastly, Torkel Jansson, gives an insightful evaluation of Sweden during the
course of the nineteenth century. For Jansson, the early 1800s saw a retreating state. The
latter began to “disassociate itself” and to withdraw from interest-areas (dissociera sig,
dra sig tillbaka från tidigare intresseområden) leaving the previously occupied space to
society and consequently allowing for the emergence of a civil society filled with a
multiplicity of different associations, and a so-called private sphere (privatsfär). Most
significantly is Jansson’s account were the developments that emerged in Sweden from
approximately the 1870s. The latter period sees “the new bourgeois elites increasingly
becoming more influential in state affairs. At this point a new state began to emerge with
new ambitions in many areas of society. With the emergent capitalist society a new
balance between an active state, mass organizations, and the private sphere arise.”254
It is this last phase of state development that is of most interest for this study. In
fact, it supports the theoretical claim that the emergence of the modern industrial state (in
itself a product of industrialism, capitalism, and modernity) drastically changed state-
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indigenous relations where the latter was seen as a hindrance to economic prosperity, and
incongruous with modern society.
Although some level of proto-industrialization did exist in Sweden, the industrial
revolution brought major transformations to a predominantly agrarian society. Thorsten
Nybom and Rolf Torstedahl look into the role of the state, and that of capital, in Sweden
and try to identify the degree of influence over politics at the height of modern industrial
capitalism. To understand the state’s new roles and power over society, or Jansson’s
“active state,” writes Nybom, we need to look at the pressures initiated by modern
capitalism on the state apparatus, including politicians and bureaucrats; meaning that
politics were in the hands of, and controlled by, private industrial and financial capital
(i.e., right-wing industrial conservatives, industrihögern).255
Nybom points out that in order to understand the processes that took place one
needs to look at whom or what controlled the restructuring process; that is whether the
state or private capital (privat näringsliv) controlled the process. He continues by
outlining four points illustrating the dynamics in this relationship: i) the state apparatus
changed gradually through, and on behalf of, organized capital; ii) the economic
penetration did not see an increase in state power. State power was intended to shield and
protect private industrial capital; iii) a shift from traditional to an efficient bureaucracy
was essential and this was to be achieved through a reorganization of different social
spheres and through relevant occupational reeducation; and iv) it is doubtful to see the
rise of an interventionist state. The state did acquire more tasks but hardly any more
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power. The intervention is to be seen in terms of services and its interventionism as
passive. The new state power was never integrated into the democratic process. 256
Torstendahl concludes that for Nybom, in Sweden, the government did not govern over
the industrial and financial capital, as it was the case in Germany. On the contrary, they
let these govern the government.257
The second half of the nineteenth century (i.e., the “second industrial revolution”
of the chemical and heavy industries) brought more drastic changes where modern, or
organized, industrial capitalism took over the so-called “classical industrial capitalism”
of pre-1870s and reorganized the state’s role and authority.258 The turning point, writes
Torstendahl, came around the 1890s when organized capitalism replaced more traditional
means of industrial production with new technology, a reorganization of the labor market,
and by limiting the free market through trusts, cartels, and with a certain amount of state
control.259 Torstendahl is, however, critical of Nybom’s beliefs that in Sweden the state
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was at the “mercy” of the private industrial and financial capital, while in Germany the
inner dynamics of industrial capitalism were controlled by the state.260
For Torstendahl this state-of-affairs was not the case. He argues, instead, that the
“power constellations” changed from the sixteenth to the twentieth century. In the former,
power was concentrated in the Crown, where the king’s power was stable, centralized,
and supported. In the latter, however, the state lacked the same kind of stability and
concentration. According to Torstendahl by the 1800s new power loci, such as labour,
capital, middle class, and democratization changed the power behind, and in support of,
the state. 261 As such, the new state was not only a complex system but was also “a
dynamic force in society and within organized capitalism.”262 This shift in power meant
that parties on the left of the spectrum provided a counterbalancing weight that kept
capital in check. In Sweden the bureaucracy, writes Torstendahl, was more independent
from the politics of the moment, keeping itself aloof of private capital interests. With
these counterbalancing forces the state had assumed a new role, one of responsibility for
the whole.263 But Nybom disagrees and insists that seeing the state as interventionist not
withstanding, the expansion of the new state was characterized by an adaptation to the
organized capitalism’s own dynamic.264
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Whether the state controlled capital or capital controlled the state by reorganizing
the dynamics of state intervention in the economy and society, these new forces and
actors were reshaping society, and with it, the traditional status quo of the individual; i.e.,
modernity. This reorganization made traditional means of subsistence, such as those of
the Sámi, incompatible with the essential character, or raison d'être, of capitalism.
In the midst of these changes we find the Sámi’s social, political, and economic
environs caught in the centrifugal forces of the moment. In Sweden, the centralizing
power of the state, combined with emerging localism, capitalist goals, and various
international pressures slowly transformed the space and territory, and consequently the
lives, of the Sámi. Although in the 1700s the Sámi, according to Korpijaakko-Labba,
managed to gain local political capital this was short-lived. By the 1800s, i) territorial remapping, ii) a wave of policies and reforms directed to the northern territories and the
Sámi, iii) the emergence of an “active state,” as opposed to the state under control of the
crown, and iv) a capitalist society, stripped the Sámi of any localized autonomy and
rights placing them under the complete tutelage of the state. The next section traces this
process of transformation and explores some of those changes and how they impacted
policies of colonization and reforms in the areas of education, taxation, economics, law,
and religion. These events are believed to have been pivotal for the changing state-Sámi
relations and for the “restructuring” and recodification of their histories, identity, and
status quo.
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Swedish Sámi Policy
The making of what Amft labeled the “Authentic Sámi” is the result of a series of
systematic policies meant to bring the Sámi under the direct control of the Crown, and
later the state, which began with the reign of Gustav I Vasa. Roger Kvist has proposed a
series of periodizations outlining, what he called, “Nearly 450 years of Swedish Sámi
policy.” With a few modifications, I will borrow Kvist’s categorizations to help me place
Swedish Sámi Policy in perspective (see also Table 1): i) the infiltration period (1328 –
1635); ii) the exploitation period (1635 – 1673); iii) the colonization period (1673 –
1749); iv) the second wave of colonization (1749 – 1846); and finally v) the displacement
and assimilation period (1846 – 1930).265

i) The Infiltration Period (1328 – 1635)
Swedish infiltration of Sápmi was gradual and multifaceted. Written accounts of contact
between the Swedes and the Sámi date back to the 1300s. Korpijaakko-Labba writes that
royal jurisdiction over farmer-merchants (birkarlar) and settlers (nybyggare) in the north
had been established in 1328 through royal decree. By 1340 Lapland was officially
annexed to the Swedish legal system and judicial administration.266 At first the reach of
the state was limited and the Crown had to rely on these farmer-merchants, called
birkarlar, living along the Bothnian coast for trading and taxation. Here, the birkarlar “in
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accordance with letters of royal privilege, they formed trading families with a monopoly
on trade and taxation in the lappmarks;” making Lapland, since the Middle Ages, an
important source of trade and tax revenues for the Crown.267 During this early infiltration
period trade with the Sámi was considered a small, and yet vital, component of Swedish
trading power in the Baltics. The goods that the Swedish Crown received through these
farmer-merchants were then shipped down to Stockholm and by so doing Lapland was
incorporated into the Swedish-Hanseatic trade network, while through the taxation of the
Sámi the territory was incorporated into the Swedish feudal administration. Yet neither
the King nor the Catholic Church managed to establish a factual administration over the
region.268
With the advent of Gustav I Vasa’s reign the birkarlar’s royal privilege was
removed in 1548 and the Sámi came under direct royal control, including taxation, and
the king’s bailiffs became responsible to collect taxes from the Sámi in the northern
territories. The change in policy was taken with mixed feeling according to Peter Sköld:
“These tax officers demanded higher and higher taxes as the century progresses … But
the bailiff’s also traded with the Sámi, for their own benefit … On several occasions the
Sámi complained to the government that the bailiff’s trading methods were no better than
plunder.”269

267

Gunlög Fur, Colonialism in the Margins, 52.

268

Gertrude Hanes, Staten och lappmarken (In Vedin, Maria (Ed.). Jokkmokk: natur och kultur genom
tiderna. Jokkmokk: Jokkmokks kommun i samarbete med Áttje, Svenskt Fjäll- och Samemuseum, 1999),
112.
269

Peter Sköld, The man who came down a mountain: the Sámi in Karesuando and Roland Bonaparte (In
Hansson, Heidi, and Jan-Erik Lundström (Ed.). Looking North: representations of Sámi in visual arts and

124

Heightened rivalry between Sweden, Denmark, and Russia increased the need to
lay claim to Lapland. In 1607 Karl IX (r. 1604-1611), son of Gustav I Vasa, decreed that
in order to support the army’s need for consumables the Sámi had to pay taxes in kind in
the form of reindeer meat and dry fish.270 Consequently, by the mid of the 1600s, Sápmi
became a vital economic and strategic asset for Sweden, which saw its northern territories
as a source of taxation, trade, natural resources, and geopolitical power (i.e., the Arctic
Ocean) in relation to Denmark-Norway and Russia.271 At the time of Karl IX the Sápmi
fell under Stockholm’s focus and a policy of fiscal reforms and settlement policies, at
least in principle, were put into motion. Border and land commissioners were sent to
Lapland to map out Sweden’s taxation rights in the north and also to find suitable places
for churches and farming.272
The economic activities and subsistence practices of the Sámi did change with the
changing economy of Sweden and of the region. Indigenous Sámi economy in the Middle
Ages, writes Wheelersburg, was primarily subsistence oriented characterized by
“hunting/trapping, fishing, and primitive reindeer husbandry [and was] capable of
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producing a small surplus for trade … Around the beginning of the seventeenth century,
some Saami began to concentrate exclusively on herding [and the] indigenous [Sámi]
economies produced state revenues.”273 The Sámi, together with Swedish, Norwegian,
and Russian traders contributed to the overall prosperity of trade in the northern region
and became of vital importance, especially to Sweden during its extensive foreign wars;
for instance, from “1735 until 1840, exports from the north Bothnian port of Luleå
averaged nearly 5,000 hides per year.”274 It is doubtful to find similar economic dynamics
in the thirteen British colonies, and to a certain extent, later during the early years of the
United States. For one thing the relation between the colonial governments and the
indigenous populations in British America cannot be compared to those of the Crown and
the Sámi in Lapland. In the former case, trading between the Natives and the Europeans
were often a private enterprise with very little, if with any government regulation.
Furthermore, Native populations were, generally, not subjects of the colonial
governments and were not taxed in the same manner as the Sámi were. Finally, the
colonial governments, and that of the early United States, did not see the Indian
Americans as vital for their economies as the Sámi came to be for Sweden.
The seventeenth century was marked by constant war (with Poland, Germany,
Russia, and Denmark), and an attempt was made to modernize what was still a
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predominantly agrarian society. 275 The need to modernize was seen as a necessity if
Sweden was to earn a place among the great colonial powers of Europe. Some of the first
acts of Karl IX were to attempt to reform the legal system and rid it from its popular and
superstitious elements. According to Aalto et al., “popular elements were still blended
with theology and jurisprudence in the administration of justice … Karl IX, for instance,
declared that the popular elements in both faith and law were too large and should now be
eliminated.” 276 To this end, in 1608, Karl IX introduced “Mosaic law [which] was
appended to the national law of Sweden … The task now laid upon the learned estate was
colossal; the clergy at all levels – especially the bishops – were to raise the people from
the superstition and idolatry that they had previously practised … All false belief and
superstition – ‘which tends to be great among the common men’ – had to be eradicated,
and they would instead cling to ‘fear of God’ and show ‘obedience to the authorities’.”277
Looking at the reformation of the legal system is important because, as with the
fiscal reforms, this opens a window into the processes of transformation that not only
changed society in general, but also affected the Sámi in particular. Aalto et al., elaborate
on this point through their extensive research on the Swedish “judicial revolution” and
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the effects it had on the peasant population. Taking the example of the peasantry as a
starting point one can easily map the fairing of the Sámi during this period:
In the sixteenth and early seventeenth century the central government to a large extent
accepted the primacy of the local truth in court. Local peasants passed judgement [sic] in
the court. The institution of oath helpers meant that truths about guilt were determined by
the local community’s own members. From the seventeenth century on, it became
increasingly clear how the authorities propelled a development on two levels: first a
concrete, personal entry into the court, in the form of state officials present in the court
and exerting a growing influence; second, a large-scale expansion and systematization of
the laws. The state took over more and more of the concrete power in the judicial arena
and used this power to establish a new categorizing mentality. Corresponding to this
growth of the state, local institutions of truth – the jurors and oath helpers – disappeared.
The effect of this development was a change from peasant nominalism to a more central
categorizing truth. The truth about an action now no longer rested in the local context
where it happened, but in whether or not it fitted a centrally defined classification. This in
turn had great repercussion for the use of evidence, narrative structures, and ‘discursive
orders’ in court.278

In the Sámi context this development meant that Sámi traditional norms of guilt,
retribution, and penance (i.e., local nominalism) were being replaced not only by a
“central categorizing truth,” but also by a Swedish, rather than Sámi, “truth.” Slowly,
Sámi cultural and communal understanding of justice was eroding until by the end of the
1700s it was completely replaced by a central narrative. The authors further add that with
the transformation of the legal system the role of the court also changed. In fact, since the
reign of Gustav I Vasa in the 1520s the court was “perceived as an institution in between
two forces: the king and the people.” 279 With the evolution of the political system,
however, and with the increase of parliamentary power in the 1600s and 1700s, the role
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of the court changed into an “intermediary” between the people, through the Diet, to the
king.280
With the annexation of the northern territories in the 1300s the question of
whether the Sámi were seen as subjects (or citizen) or as aliens within the realm needs to
be raised. Centuries before Gustav Vasa’s reign, the Sámi have traditionally been seen as
subjects of the king. This perception was reciprocal and the Sámi too generally saw
themselves as subjects, rather than “citizens” of Sweden. It is doubtful, however, that the
Sámi’s understanding of “subjects” would equate to underlings or minions. In fact, from
the readings one gathers a different picture. The Sámi consented to fall under the
jurisdiction of the king, through the payment of taxes, as a practical necessity, where a
compromise of protection was established “since time immemorial.” Although the
motives of the Swedish Crown must have been other than the mere protection of the
Sámi, this compliance established a special relationship between the Crown and the Sámi
where the Sámi were given royal protection and special status and they could directly
address the king in dispute cases.
In 1551 Gustav I Vasa in an open letter addressed the Sea Finns and the Mountain
Sámi (sjöfinnar och fjäll-lappar) as “our and the Swedish Crown private
minions/subjects” which, according to Heikki Hyvärinen, meant they belonged to the
Crown and within the realm’s borders. 281 This status did not change with subsequent
monarchs. King Johan III in 1584 and Duke Karl in 1602 addressed the Sámi in Lapland
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in similar terms. Duke Karl, on the day of his coronation in 1607 as King Karl IX, added
to his title “King of the Lapps.” This addition was not, however, widely or easily
tolerated by neither Russia nor Denmark-Norway. In fact, both crowns complained and
Denmark even requested a written explanation of Sweden’s title, claim, and taxation
practices in the north. This claim seemed to have been a serious matter for Denmark and
it is shown in the Peace Treaty of Knäred, signed on 21 January 1613 ending the Kalmar
War (1611-1613) between Denmark and Sweden, where Denmark asks Sweden to
remove the title of “King of the Lapps” from the king’s name.282
For some, the very fact that the Sámi were considered, and considered
themselves, “subjects of the king” since the Middle Ages, makes the argument of
colonization, whether domestic or not, difficult. Yet, there is a general consensus that
despite this seemingly ambivalent status a policy of colonization and settlement of the
northern territories did occur. Gunlög Fur writes that Sweden’s policies towards the
northern territories were at par with the “European colonial mentality,” where Sweden’s
colonialism in Lapland was an attempt “to integrate the Saamis into the realm on Swedish
conditions and sometimes with the use of force,” and to bring civilization and culture to
the unsophisticated heathens of Finland, Sápmi, and North America.283
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Per Brahe The Younger’s travel journals, and other writings as minister of justice
(riksdrots) and governor of Finland show the need of increased state presence and
acculturation practices: “Brahe, in his program for improving the civility of [the Finnish
peasants], emphasized increasing centralization of state and church control and the
establishment of a school system … Similar views and programs would also follow from
the meeting with Saamis.”284
The Christianization of Lapland had a relatively slow start and initially with very
little success. Queen Margareta (r. 1387-1412), the Danish monarch whom ruled the
Union of Kalmar during this period, made the first (unsuccessful) attempts to Christianize
the region. It was not until the advent of King Gustav I Vasa, in 1526 that the first
concrete attempt of Christianization took place. In 1559, for instance, a series of Sámi
Lutheran priests (lappräst) began missionary work in Sápmi in an attempt to Christianize
the northern territories and its inhabitants. 285 It was, however, the full force of the
Lutheran orthodoxy and the increase administrative role and power of the Swedish
Lutheran Church in the early 1600s that finally succeeded in bringing the Sámi under
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control.286 Thus, as was the case in other colonial contexts, Sweden’s reeducation of the
Sámi began through Church missions and missionaries. The primary goal, however, was
not direct conversion, but rather the anointing of priests of Sámi origins in the hope for a
more successful conversion.287 By the 1700s, with the increase Christianization of the
Sámi, there was the establishment of schools throughout Sámi territories.
The reach of the state in the northern territories was achieved with the
establishment of a state bureaucracy controlled by the Crown and it was meant to be an
extension of royal power. This power was exercised through a series of market places.
The market place, writes Fur, becomes the space of encounters between the Sámi and the
Crown. It was here that the state exerted its control over trade and taxation through
bailiffs and the establishments of state’s institutions like courthouses (ting) and churches:
Swedish laws stipulated that the Saamis were obliged to be present at markets during
specified times of the year. Saamis appeared to view these markets as mixed blessings.
On the one hand, the opportunity for trade and social events made them attractive, while
the demands of church and court posed problems and dilemmas. Swedish officers
frequently complained about Saami absences from the markets and Saamis regularly
dissented about the market place organization.288

Already by the early 1600s the church assumed more and more of these bureaucratic
duties, which by 1686, it was given the responsibility of keeping church records
(kyrkböcker). The church, according to Sköld, became an “instrument of control” to
manage the realm and the people; which included tax and property records. Through
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church records and the workings of the Church in 1749 the first census was conducted
and by this time the state began to have better control of its population.289
The incivility of these populations was often connected with notions of mental
and racial inferiority. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, writes Fur, several
commentaries on the language and mental capacities of both Native Americans and Sámi
were widely circulated. This literature joined the bulk of accounts on the wild savage
(vilde) and depicted an image of inferiority. For instance, as found in Fur:
Consequently Peter Lindeström could write concerning the Lenape tongue “that it is a
poor language, that one word may have many meanings.” Schefferus concluded about
Saami speech that it appeared to have been construed from neighboring languages,
particularly Finnish, even though there existed certain words that were uniquely Saami.
This allegedly derivatory [sic] character of the language served as a sign of inferior
intelligence … Other Swedes, and their European contemporaries, digested reports of
cannibalism and allegations that the new peoples they encountered knew nothing about
God but worshipped the devil with loud shouting and vulgar dancing, and drew the
conclusion that these were indeed savages. They were inclined to agree with
Lindeström’s conclusion: “In short these Indians are people of various qualities and more
inclined towards bad than towards good.” In this division, Saamis and Indians became
firmly lodged on a lower and less human niche than their white Swedish neighbors.290

With this in mind the Crown made every effort to Swedify the Sámi into reliable subjects,
and at the forefront of the Swedification lie the establishment of churches and
compulsory religious education.291 Pastors, supported by the local authorities, demanded
“for presence in the churches on prayer days and holidays, their insistence that Saamis
baptize their children, take communion, marry in church and bury their dead in a
Christian manner had a direct influence on everyday life and in this way affected almost
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every individual.” 292 In addition, the church was primarily used for the cultural and
spiritual conversion of the Sámi:
Two areas where Swedish officials were determined to restructure Saami society
regarded sexual and religious practices. Representatives of the Swedish state initiated
cases dealing with sexual offences and crimes against the Church and these often led to
cultural conflict … The state and the church fought adamantly to prevent and punish
Sámi marriage practices and extra marital sexual relations.293

The discovery of silver ore in 1634 in the northern territories, bordering DenmarkNorway, at Nasafjäll, changed the importance of the lands occupied by the Sámi. The
find was compared to “the West Indies and Sweden’s financial troubles were expected to
diminish with each hammer blow.”294 The north suddenly became strategically more vital
than it was thought to be and it was hoped to provide Sweden with an opportunity to
fulfill its imperial destiny. The find also changed the Crown’s policy toward the Sámi and
toward the northern territories. In fact, a reorganization of the Lappmarks was seen
necessary to guarantee the protection of the Swedish interests in the north. The
consolidation of Swedish control over these territories was not however going to occur
through the establishment of forts and the presence of garrison. On the contrary, the first
order of business, under the auspices of Queen Christina (r. 1633 – 1654), writes Fur, was
the construction of four new churches in Pite Lappmark: Arvidjaur, Arjeplog, Silbojokk,
Nasafjäll.295
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ii) The Exploitation Period (1635 – 1673)
The discovery of silver in Pite Lappmark resulted in the opining of a mine in 1635. New
territorial policies were drafted all with the purpose of keeping both land and Sámi under
Swedish jurisdiction: “schools and churches were built, and parishes founded anew.”296
The mine did not fulfill Sweden’s financial expectations and its imperial
ambitions never completely materialized. Despite the Swedish disappointment, the mine
had a detrimental effect on the Sámi as many were hindered to pursue herding practices
and were instead forced to work in extraction and in transportation.297 As found in Fur:
Transportation had to be carried out in the wintertime and the heaviest part of the work
fell on the mountain Saamis in nearby villages belonging to the Arjeplog region who
were drafted to take the silver from the mine to the village Silbojokk, where it was
processed some forty miles away across treacherous terrain. The reindeer were the only
pack animals that could endure the climate and the loads, and the Saamis were ordered to
divide into groups that could be called upon to haul the freight. These Saamis were called
hållappar (kept men) and the villages had to maintain a rotating schedule where each
Saami was supposed to do three years in service for the mine. Compensation consisted of
freedom from taxes and some payment in kind of flour, woolen cloth, tobacco, salt, and
liquor. In spite of the payment and despite threats of harsh punishments for avoiding
service, many fled from these duties.298

Although the Nasafjäll mine did not produce the expected riches the region was further
explored in search of more silver and other metals and minerals. This exploration meant
further infiltration and the introduction of a policy of exploitation that changed the
relation between Crown and the Sámi population in Pite Lappmarks, but also in the
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remainder of the northern territories.299 The mine also caused tensions between Sweden
and Denmark-Norway and in 1659 Denmark-Norway sent a small contingent to burn
down the mine and destroy its production.
It is not, therefore, surprising to see that by the late 1630s the Crown’s efforts to
control the northern territories and the Sámi within changed dramatically. The oldest
court records of 1639 show not only that trials were now presided by a judge,300 but, as
Phebe Fjellström argues, there was an “intimate connection between the court, the
collection of taxes, and trade.”301 For instance, as found in Fur:
In this way, Tornæus described the triumvirate of bailiff, judge, and pastor who
represented the Crown of Sweden in every Lappmark. The establishment of a unified
national legal system was considered essential for state power and extending that system
formed an indispensable part of the Swedish efforts to integrate the North. The local
courts, called ting, introduced at the market places as a tool for disciplining, nonetheless
often seem to have functioned as forums for solving local conflicts. As in other parts of
the country, written law combined with local custom. In all cases where written law did
not apply, the courts were expected to rule according to local customs. Thus, Swedish
practice allowed room for legal interpretations based on the practices of the original
inhabitants of the land. At these yearly courts, a Swedish justice presided and was aided
by twelve lay assessors. The judge was Swedish but the jury came to consist almost
exclusively of Saamis in nearly all of the lappmarks [sic] … In matters concerning land
conflicts between villages, as when borders had been violated through illegal hunting, the
courts invariably ruled according to traditional Saami law.302
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In its early beginning the reach of the state was not at all adequate and it often struggled
to implement its own rules and decrees. For instance, tax payments were often made in
the form of dry reindeer meat, dry fish, reindeer hides, and other pelts and furs. These
items were also well sought after trade items. Both Sámi and Swedes engaged in
contraband and tax evasion by circumventing the trading posts to avoid either to pay
taxes, or the forced attendance of church services, or both. Fur writes, “The efforts of the
crown to control trade, partly through prohibiting all trade outside the official markets,
and partly through seeking to match villages with market places according to its own
design often proved vain.”303 This reality shows that the general state of affairs up to the
mid-1700s seems to give the Sámi a certain degree of independence from the Crown and
the Church by avoiding taxes, church attendance, and by crossing over into Norway when
the need occurred.304
The efforts of the Crown did not preclude Sámi rights, such as land rights. The
notion of territoriality has already been dealt with in the previous chapter, however, it is
important to point out that during this period, marked with intense infiltration and
exploitation, notions of Sámi territoriality did exist and were relatively respected; the
keyword being relatively. Karpijaakko-Labba writes in a similar vein as Karppi and
shows that research in court records and travel journals talk of clear territorial delineation
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among the Sámi. It is then clear that the Sámi had a concept of private property. It was
often the case that Sámi villages marked borders on stones and other landmarks. Also,
Sámi families marked their land possessions and water rights in similar fashion, and that
these practices seems to date back to the Neolithic Age.305 In this context, Fur writes,
“Swedish taxation policies and claims of sovereignty did not entail a denial of Saami land
possession. On the contrary, taxes and strategic needs ensured that Saami possession of
land was both accepted as a fact and relied upon in legal interpretation.”306 This attitude
seemed to have been practiced until at least later legislations, in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. Then a process of dispossession began, and with it, Sámi land rights
vanished from “historical memories.”
Times were changing by the mid-1600s. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 marked
the beginning of a new era in the relations among sovereign nations and this meant a
reevaluation of the Swedification of the nation. The Crown’s effort to Swedify precarious
regions of the realm (whether Skåne, Finland, or Lapland) or sections of the population
still practicing Catholic liturgy, were broadened:
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From the perspective of the Swedish state, intensified contacts during the second half of
the seventeenth century led to an increasing concern with Saamis as an “other” within the
realm. Interest in the north waxed and waned with the demands and worries of relations
with Nordic and Baltic neighbors, but increasing knowledge also led to self-criticism and
intensified efforts at altering the minds and practices of Saami subjects … With Karl IX
followed a concrete policy of integrating the Saamis, a policy which I argue meant that
Lapland’s status came to resemble that of a colony. This policy consisted mainly of three
parts: taxation, education, and conversion, all three important measures in dealing also
with other subjects, but the effort and the royal protection differed from elsewhere in the
realm. This period of intensification did not prove to be easy. For reasons of trade and
defense, the Saamis had to be kept as Swedish subjects [A few became] pastors,
schoolmasters, and farmers.307

Despite some pockets of fervent opposition to cultural integration the eighteenth century
began with the state having concretized its presence in the north, with the Sámi showing
less and less resistance.
In 1670 Johan Graan, governor of Västerbotten province, himself of Sámi origin,
pushed for an active policy toward Lapland and requested “that the Lappmarks should be
surveyed and a register be established over all the Saami taxlands in order to better plan
Swedish homesteading and colonization. Graan proposed a so called “parallel theory,”
according to which Saamis and peasants were not competitors for land in the Lappmarks
but used different resources.” 308 This “parallel theory” eventually came to dominate
Swedish-Sámi policy and began a process of differentiating between Mountain and
Forest Sámi; this approach eventually led to increased tensions in the north not only
between Sámi and Swedish settlers but also in-between Sámi:
According to [Graan], the true reindeer nomads lived in the mountainous region and were
vital for the defense of the country. However, Saamis living in villages in the forests
resembled Swedish peasants and ideally should be made into regular farmers. Their
mixed economy, he wrote, was compatible with farming. Graan suggested measures to
influence settlers to move in and he encouraged the forest Saamis to be trained in the
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farming trades … Graan’s suggestion emphasized two important contentions that became
influential for all later developments in Saami policy. First, he linked the Saami to the
reindeer so that the two, human and animal, became virtually indistinguishable. Second,
he argued that persons were defined by their subsistence activities and not by ethnic
markers.309

Following on Graan’s argument the Crown soon understood that the only way to control
and assimilate the Sámi was to “curb their itinerant habits.” As mentioned above in
chapter two, nomads and other “unreadable” groups, such as minority nations or
indigenous peoples, needed to be translated (i.e., converted) into the common language of
the state in order to fit within the state’s mold and purpose. In the case of the Sámi, the
Crown needed to diminish the number of Sámi practicing reindeer husbandry. To this
end, the continued differentiation between forest and mountain Sámi began a gradual
process of reduction and control. Forest Sámi were “encouraged” to become sedentary
farmers “through altered systems of taxation and regulations regarding the use of the
great northern forests,” while the livelihood of mountain Sámi were regulated through
specific policies and legislations.310
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Sweden’s great-power politics in the second half of the 1600s faced two
important, and related, problems. Firstly, the expansion needed raw material to supply the
army and navy with weapons and vessels. Secondly, the armed forces needed to be fed.311
In addition, the increase contention of the northern territories by Denmark-Norway and
Russia posed a security concern in Stockholm. As such, intensifying the infiltration and
exploitation of the northern territories provided the answer to all of the Crown’s
concerns. So, 1673 marked “the official starting point of the Swedish colonization of
Lapland.”312 Johan Graan, quoted in Arell, understood it as being vital for Lapland to be
“settled and populated” (kunna besättas och populeras). 313 This way Sweden could
promote farming and in turn increase the national output of consumables, while at the
same time having access to mineral deposits (mining) and vast forests (sawmills), and
protect its national interests in the north. Extra effort was therefore placed into mapping
out the territory and the various resources the Sámi would use and also to get an insight
and control of their obscure land divisions.314 With the Swedish expansion into Lapland
slowly came the Crown’s control of Sámi subsistence practices, such as reindeer herding,
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to fit the needs of the imperial enterprise. According to Nils Arell, Graan’s concerns
regarding Sámi nomadism were expressed in a Decree dated May 9 1671, which was
meant to regulate Sámi migration, especially into Denmark-Norway. According to Arell,
though, the Decree was not meant to prevent Sámi nomadism, although such ideas may
have been raised at times, but rather to prevent the Swedish tax-Sámi (skattlappar) to
settle in Norway.315 The Decree was most probably seen necessary to avoid the loss of
taxable subjects.

iii) The Colonization Period (1673 – 1749)
Within the mercantilist economic policies of the eighteenth century Sweden saw Lapland
as a means of accumulating wealth through the exploitation of its resources and
inhabitants. Beginning with the Settlement Decree of 1673 the Crown set forth a series of
reforms (1695 Lapp Tax Reform), decrees (1695 Lappmarks Decree), and regulations
(1749 Lappmarks Regulations) aimed at “stimulating the colonization of Lapland.”316
Prior to about 1670 the level of Swedish infiltration and colonization of Sápmi
was relatively minimal. Here, “assimilated” Sámi were often seen as taxable free peasants
where landownership was recognized through the payment of property taxes. This period
was also marked by the reign of Karl XI (r. 1660-1697) whose expansionistic endeavors
put pressure on resources and consumables. His reign marked the official Settlement
Decree (kolonisationsplakat) of the northern territories, which came in 1673 allowing
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settlement and farming within a set of specific conditions.317 Most importantly, the 1673
Decree, renewed in 1695, gave settlers a series of privileges such as fifteen years of tax
exemption, and the exemption from military service and conscription in perpetuum.318
The settlement policy was also supported by the local courts, which were prone to defend
the rights of settlers rather than the Sámi’s.319 Another step that dramatically shifted the
Crown’s expansion into Lapland was the 1683 proclamation making every unsettled land
the property of the crown.
Unofficial settlement of Sámi lands did occur prior to 1673 though. Non-Sámi
settlers oftentimes disregarded existing restrictions and settled in remote areas of Sápmi.
Gunnar Hoppe, for instance, found that one of the newer settlements in Lapland was a
Finnish village, Mårdsel, which had already been settled before 1671.320 He also adds
examples of farmers from the costal areas that moved into Lapland to benefit from the tax
exemption that the Lappamarks-privileges were granting. 321 According to Bylund, the
first settlers of Lapland were the Finns: “Finnish colonists … from Österbotten in Finland
… penetrated as the very first settlers [from] the north as well as from the south into the
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Swedish Lapponinan countries.”322 In 1683 King Karl XI asserted his right through an
Edict on all unclaimed, unsettled, and untilled lands in Lapland would belong to the
“Swedish Crown and no one else” (Alla land som “obygde ligga fierran från
Ägoskilnaden och Bygdelagerne, höra öfrigheten och Sveriges Chrono til och ingen
annan”).323
Land disputes between Sámi and Swedish settlers were not an exception. The
settlers were often “encouraged” and given monetary, land, and tax incentives to move
north. 324 Sámi attempts to oppose this encroachment were not successful. In some
instances, as in 1687, the Sámi took up the matter during a court hearing where they
opposed the redrawing of land borders and they argued that the imposed borders were
unknown to them and their forefathers never heard speaking of such border-points and
they put forward their understanding of the border line of Sápmi.325
Disputes were mostly settled in the courts or through official, or semi-official
means, at village meetings, or even by writing directly to the King. This situation shows
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that Swedish experience in Lapland was completely different than that in its North
American possessions. Whereas Swedish settlers in the New World were fearful of their
lives and had to contend with armed Native American raids and attacks, in Lapland the
situation with the Sámi was not so: “Swedish authorities did not try to limit the trade in
guns, apparently the Swedes did not fear Saami hostility. Saamis were not an alien group
as they had accepted status as royal subjects. There is no evidence that the Saamis ever
organized forceful resistance against Swedish encroachment and the Swedes may have
believed that they had sufficient military power to control them, encouraged by
contemporary accounts that derided the Saamis for being useless as soldiers.”326
For Bengtsson the 1683 Edict became the basis upon which the Swedish state has
been laying claim on the northern territories. As in the rest of Europe, fiscal reforms
reinforced class distinctions and through a system of direct and indirect taxation the
upper classes exploited the lower classes. Similarly, these reforms, influenced Sámi
property rights, which by the middle of the eighteenth century, they were slowly eroded
to a point where with the introduction of the 1886 Grazing Act the Sámi were left with a
usufructuary right to their former lands.327
Finally, during the colonization period, religion began to have its gravity. The
Swedish Church’s orthodoxy was brutal in its fight against foreign doctrines. Those
found guilty of religious crimes such as heresy or witchcraft were often executed. For
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instance, being a Catholic meant the death penalty. This turn of events became dire
“Especially after the Royal Edict of 1685 [where] conversions were forced upon the
pagan inhabitants of the northern wilderness, magic drums were burned and the seite
overthrown.”328 In this context, the Swedish Church condemned Sámi religious practices
as devil worshiping punishable by death. During the end of the 1600s and the beginning
of the 1700s, for instance, there were 49 cases of Sámi brought before the courts on
charges of witchcraft and superstition (trolldom och vidskepelse).329 Most were subjected
to pecuniary penalties, while others were whipped or sentenced to death; at least one of
these death sentences was carried out.330

iv) The Second Wave of Colonization (1749 – 1846)
By the mid 1700s things began to change. Mercantilism and imperialism were steering
nations in new directions. In Sweden a series of reforms intended to further the
colonization of the north began a process of transition in the status of the Sámi and a
process of delineation of Sámi and non-Sámi lands.
By 1749 the tax-exempt status on reindeer husbandry and the proceeds from that
economic activity, enjoyed by the Sámi for centuries, began to shift. New regulations
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were introduced intended to promote further settlement of Lapland that promised all new
settlers a tax-exemption similar to the one the Sámi were enjoying. Between 1750 and
1820, writes Gertrude Hanes, the promotion of settlement and of the farming industry,
coupled with the world economic crisis at the turn of the nineteenth century, shows a
decrease in Sámi right and an almost proportional increase in private ownership of nonSámi and new settlers.331
Up to 1750 the Sámi (in Torne and Kemi Lappmarks) were treated at par with tax
farmers (skattebönder); which, with the Act of Union and Security of 1789 (Föreningsoch säkerhetsakten), emancipated the peasantry and gave them property rights.332 Official
property records also show instances of Sámi selling Sámi-farmland (lappskatteland) to
non-Sámi farmers.333 By 1751, however, at the same time as the Treaty of Strömstad was
being ratified delineating Sweden’s official border, the border of the Sámi lands within
Sweden was also being redrawn. The purpose, according to Bäärnhielm, was to
differentiate between the peasant and Sámi’s worlds. 334 For Lennart Lundmark, also
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quoted in Bäärnhielm, the local courts and administrative authorities were to blame for
the loss of Sámi lands to the farmers after 1789.335
The borders between Denmark-Norway and Sweden in the northern territories
was largely unsettled. An agreement was reached at the Peace of Knäred in 1613, yet the
actual boundary between the two kingdoms was never drawn before 1751. At the Treaty
of Strömstad in 1751 the official national borders were drawn and an addendum to the
treaty, the Lapp Codicil, outlined the rights and duties of nomadic Sámi livelihood within
and in-between the two countries.
The Codicil, according to Kenneth Awebro, has been interpreted in several ways.
It has also been a source of legal controversy for decades, if not centuries. It represents,
for some, the Sámi Magna Carta, or a charter (fribrev) or grant by which the Sámi’s
rights and privileges are defined in Norway and Sweden, and it has also been seen as an
assurance of the conservation of the Sámi nation.336 It is doubtful, however, that these
interpretations bear any legal ground. In its simplest form, instead, the Codicil, writes Fae
L. Korsmo, “guaranteed the right of the Saami to cross the border on their seasonal
migrations, and each country agreed to refrain from double taxation. The determination
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of the northern border enabled the states to proceed with resource extraction and
colonization.”337
Calling the Lapp Codicil a Magna Carta is, thus, incorrect. For one thing a Carta,
or charter, is a contractual obligation between two parties where rights and privileges are
outlined. The Sámi were not a contracting party to the addendum. It is therefore plausible
to agree with the stand taken by the Norwegian government in 1997 with regards to the
Lapp Codicil. According to the Official Report, the Codicil needs to be understood as an
integral part of a treaty signed between two sovereign states, Sweden-Finland and
Denmark-Norway, and not between the state and the Sámi. Hence, it cannot be taken as
awarding any rights but simply as protecting an existing status quo. In addition, the
notion that the Codicil is often referred to as the Sámi Magna Carta, should not be taken
as proof of the existence of an official royal decree bestowing upon, or recognizing, any
territorial or other similar rights to the Sámi. As found in the Official Report, the notion
of a Sámi Magna Carta should be taken as a purely symbolic parlance (rent symbolsk
språkbruk).338
In other words, what the Codicil does is to simply codify an already existing
usufructuary right, while prescribing this right from “time immemorial.”339 Korpijaakko-
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Labba, quoted in Roger Kvist, doubts the validity of these claims too because the Codicil,
she writes, hinders rather than promote Sámi rights.340 From the language and purpose of
the Codicil, it was meant to regulate the Sámi and to bring them further under the control
of the state. The Codicil, in James C. Scott’s words, was intended to “making the
landscape legible for the state,” in this case was meant to make the Sámi more legible and
malleable to the state project.
The legal implications of the Codicil go beyond the rights and duties of the Sámi.
Nomadic Sámi owned taxable land in both Norway and in Sweden (for winter and
summer grazing). The Swedish delegation during the Treaty negotiations was concerned
that if the choice of belonging to either country was left to the Sámi (as the Danish
suggested), then some would take advantage of the situation and most importantly the
King’s revenue in the form of taxes would decrease. Swedish effort thus concentrated on
hindering the free movement of nomadic Sámi across the border; according to Awebro,
this effort is evident in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Codicil. Although these two paragraphs
assume that the Sámi have the right to choose to which side they want to belong, the right
was only superficial because the language was so formulated that precluded a real choice;
“Klinekowströms, the [Swedish] border commissioner, knew that all affected Sámi had
winter grazing lands in Sweden and as such they would make them automatically
Swedish citizens.”341
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The language, which dealt with ownership and usufructuary rights was also much
contested. Several attempts were made by the contracting parties that words such as
“own,” “have,” “private property,” or “private owner,” would not be used in the Codicil
because of fears of indirectly recognizing Sámi land rights in the northern territories. In
their stead, words that would induce a sense of usufructuary right should be used, such as
“possess the right to” or “have the right to” (“possidera” eller “innehava”). Awebro
adds, such changes to the language of the Codicil never took place and, as such, many see
the present language as indicating such property rights.342 On the other hand, what the
Codicil guarantees and afford the Sámi is nothing more than a usufructuary right to the
land for the movement of the reindeer herds, for hunting, and fishing as long as this right
does not violate someone else’s protected rights.343
The coming to the throne of Gustav III in 1771 (r. 1771-1792) marked the end of
Sweden’s so called “Age of Liberty” (slutet av frihetstiden). In 1772 Gustav III assumed
autocratic powers in a coup (mainly against the aristocracy) and with his enlightened
despotism the realm was transformed. Later in 1789 Union and Security Act (Föreningsoch säkerhetsakten) was appended to the 1772 Constitution further extending his powers.
At his death in 1792, Sweden maintained royal autocracy through the king regency of
Duke Karl until Gustav III’s son, Gustav IV Adolf (r. 1792 (1796)-1809), assumed the
throne in 1796. Gustav IV Adolf continued his father’s autocracy, which in the wake of
the American and French revolutions, created more and more antagonism in Sweden. The
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Finnish War of 1808-1809 marked the beginning of the end of Gustav IV Adolf’s reign.
His refusal to accept the Continental System (the blockade against Great Britain enforced
by Napoleon I during the Napoleonic Wars) brought him closer to Great Britain and
further away from Russia and Denmark-Norway. With the Russian ultimatum ignored in
February 1808 Russian forces crossed into Finland and in months the bulk of the Swedish
army was either defeated or capitulated. Within a year of the war Sweden lost Finland,
but Emperor Alexander I did not stop at Finland and pushed for an invasion of Sweden
proper. In March 1809, a Russian contingent was less than one hundred miles from
Stockholm, having crossed into Sweden proper from Åland islands (about 139.82 km, or
86.88 miles, equal to 75.45 nautical miles from Stockholm). Accused of gross
mismanagement of the war, which led to the loss of Finland, and possibly the realm, the
king was arrested in a military coup and deposed. The former regent, Duke Karl, was
proclaimed King Karl XIII.
From March through September 1809, the new king attempted to keep the realm
from falling, and with the assistance of the British Navy, Sweden managed to repel the
Russian Army and to avoid further losses. The conflict came to an end in September of
1809 at the Treaty of Fredrikshamn. The treaty stipulated Sweden’s ceding of Finland,
and part of Lapland.
A new border between Sweden, Norway, and Russia was redrawn to
accommodate the loss of Finland and this new geopolitical landscape entailed the
beginning of the forced relocations of Swedish Sámi from border areas to more southern
areas. In Norway too the living condition of the Norwegian, and Swedish, Sámi began to
change. In 1814 Denmark lost Norway following its defeat in the Napoleonic Wars and
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Norway joined a union with Sweden, the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway 18141905 (Förenade konungarikena Sverige och Norge - De forenede Kongeriger Norge og
Sverige). At this point, the Sámi in the northern territories were seen as a security risk and
a series of attempts to “Norwegize” the Sámi populations and to push for Norwegian
settlers to colonize the north of Norway meant the loss of rights and the dislocation of
many Norwegian Sámi too.344 According to Henry Minde, in Norway, we find a process
of fornorsking, or norwegianization, which stretched from about 1850 to the 1980s; the
establishment in 1851 of the Finnefondet (the Lapp fund) “was a special item in the
national budget established ... to bring about a change of the [Sámi] language and
culture.”345
While the Codicil formalized the Sámi’s traditional migratory reindeer herding
across the newly drawn border of 1751, it was short lived and by the 1800s national
economic interests forced the Sámi property rights to the margins and were replaced by
an increased amount of settlers and Sámi exclusions to land ownership. What further
affected the Sámi in the northern territories was that Russia, and now Finland, were not
signatories to the Lapp Codicil of 1751 and as such neither had any obligations toward
respecting the usufructuary rights set forth in the Codicil. 346 The 1809 Treaty of
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Fredrikshamn, according to Patrik Lantto, affected the Sámi across the entire Sápmi;347
namely the deterioration of their rights, the fragmentation of their identity, and
consequently the political mobilization of the Sámi at the turn of the twentieth century.
Political and territorial displacement becomes a reality by the late 1820s. Roger
Kvist, in fact writes, that “In 1827 the Saami right to inherit land was rejected in
Norrbotten as Saami land rights now were only regarded as a right of usufruct. In 1828,
provincial authorities even stated that they thought themselves empowered to remove a
tax-paying Saami from his land, if he lost his reindeer herd.”348

v) The Displacement and Assimilation Period (1846 – 1930)
In 1852 the border between Finland-Russia and Norway was closed and the Sámi in the
area were not allowed to cross during the grazing season. The situation between Sweden
and Finland was somewhat different as the border was relatively uncontrolled. Soon,
however, the situation between Sweden and Russia soured and in 1889 the border was
officially closed. At this point the Swedish Sámi were prevented to move their herds
across the national borders.
Relations between Norway and Sweden increasingly became more complex. First,
the Lapp Codicil of 1751, signed between Denmark-Norway and Sweden, was still in
effect. Second, the two countries entered into a union in 1814. Norway, however,
expressed concerns with regard to the uncontrolled movement of Sámi across the national
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border and as such pushed for further control, which in 1883 meant new restrictions were
imposed on the Sámi and their usufructuary rights of grazing lands.349
The 1883 agreement did not seem to be enough and Norway voiced further
concerns and demanded more restrictions. This turn of events, coupled with an increase
in tensions between Sámi and farmer-settlers on the Norwegian side, pushed the
governments of the two crowns to act. By the time the Union was dissolved in 1905
Norway was ready to abrogate the Codicil and the issues of Sámi nomadic practices
created serious friction between the two nations. This situation was eventually resolved at
the 1919 Reindeer Grazing Convention.350 The Convention also entailed more stringent
restrictions, such as loss of pastureland as some areas were being closed off, and a limit
on the number of allowed heads of reindeer was also imposed.
The period of the 1880s saw an increase in tensions between farmers and Sámi in
Sweden’s north most counties of Jämtland, Västerbotten, and Norrbotten. The difficulties
experienced by the Sámi in these counties, writes Lantto, differed based on where the
Sámi resided. For instance, in Jämtland and Västerbotten the issues were mostly
domestic, dealing with farmer-Sámi relations and rights to land and water use and about
hunting and fishing rights. While in Norrbotten, the northernmost county bordering
Norway and Finland, the issues dealt mostly with cross border relations and pasturelands
in Norway and Finland. The situation was apparently direr in Jämtland, especially around
the municipality of Härjedalen, the southernmost county with a relatively large Sámi
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population. Here the Sámi had weaker rights and a clearly delineated cultivation line
between land interests was missing, as such farmers were seen as intruding onto grazing
grounds. These conflicts began to ebb by the end of the 1880s and the introduction of the
Reindeer Grazing Act of 1886 (SFS 1886-38) saw the protection of grazing rights also on
private property. But the Act failed to take into consideration those settled Sámi,
especially in Västerbotten, whom they saw it as disparaging.351 The overall effect of the
Grazing Act began a process, continued by subsequent acts, meant to re-map what was to
constitute the Sámi identity and their status in Swedish society.
The legislations introduced by the state to define, regulate, and rearrange Sámi
lives and identity are pivotal here. There are four identifiable statues that concretely
change the status of the Sámi with regards to the state and to Swedish society in general:
The Reindeer Grazing Act of 1886 (SFS 1886-38 Lag angående de svenska lapparnes
rätt till renbete i Sverige); The Reindeer Grazing Act of 1898 (SFS 1898-66 Lag om de
svenska lapparnes rätt till renbete i Sverige); The Reindeer Grazing Act of 1928 (SFS
1928-309 Lag om de svenska lapparnes rätt till renbete i Sverige); and the Reindeer
Husbandry Act of 1971 (SFS 1971-437 Rennäringslag).
The 1886 Act, according to Mathias Åhrén, “abolished the Taxed Lapp Land
system, and declared the Saami people’s traditional land the property of the Crown. No
explanation was offered as to how the Saami people had lost their rights, other than that a
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people belonging to an inferior nomadic culture cannot acquire title to land.” 352
According to Lars-Anders Baer, the Act reflected Sweden’s new attitudes toward the
Sámi’s hunting, fishing, and usufructuary rights. With the Act the administration of these
rights were transferred from the Sámi to governmental authorities. The state’s argument
followed the existing “cultural hierarchy theories” of that time which assumed the Sámi
to be incapable of administering their own land. A similar argument justified the
confiscation of Sámi lands because the Sámi belonged to an “inferior culture, incapable
of knowing its own good, which could not be allowed to stand in the way of the
development of the superior Swedish society.”353 The Act also introduced a new nonSámi administrative system of Sámi land and all natural resources found therein; the
Lappfogde, or Sami-Bailiff: “a local Swedish administrative officer that was supposed to
‘represent’ the Saami population before administrative authorities, officially seeing to
their economical [sic] and social interests. Thus, the Saami people were basically placed
under custody, and lost the ability to represent themselves in issues relating to their
traditional land, waters, and natural resources.”354
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The 1898 Act introduced new requirements in which every Sámi village would
adopt a village charter, or community rules (byordning).355 These rules were to outline
the rights and duties of herders (such as the distribution of summer pastures, the required
number herders, and the moving of the herd to different pastures), and were meant to
mitigate the tension between settlers and Sámi herders. But the law was also meant to
control the Sámi land uses, especially with regard to farm land and other privately owned
land. Misappropriation of resources or of land use outside the legally allowed months
would entail a fine between 25 and 200 Kronor.356 In addition, the free movement of
herders from one village to another was now regulated and permission from the local
administrator had to be sought and approved before a herder could relocate with the
herd.357
The 1928 Act introduced important changes. First, it narrowly defined what
constituted an “authentic” reindeer herding Sámi. Second, individual Sámi could not
choose the category of belonging. Lastly, because of these restrictions, all those Sámi that
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fell outside the state’s definition of “Authentic Sámi” were forbidden to practice reindeer
husbandry.358
The 1928 Act, as mentioned above, introduces a blood quantum that determined
the “inheritance” of the legal ethnic belonging, and with it, the right to reindeer
husbandry. For instance, Article 1 §1, states that “the right to reindeer herding belongs to
he whose father or mother, or one of the parents, performed reindeer herding as
permanent occupation.”359 The second paragraph of the same article states “the right to
reindeer herding belongs to a woman who is married or has been married to a man whom
retains such right. This being said, if the woman goes into marriage with a man whom
misses such right, the woman shall forfeit the right to reindeer herding.”360 The 1928 Act
also regulated the size of the herd in a Sámi village: Article 39 states that if “the number
of reindeer exceeds a manageable number or the number can create hardship on resources
the local administrator can, following a consultation with the Sámi, take measures to
reduce the number of reindeers.”361
Finally, the 1971 Act represented a new and “modernized” version of the grazing
act. It was relabeled the Reindeer Husbandry Act (Rennäringslagen) and it replaced the
Grazing Act altogether. The 1971 Act introduced a language at par with the time.
Provisions dealing with adopted children (Article 1 §2) and divorce (Article 2 §2) were

358

Andrea Amft, “Att skapa en ‘autentisk’ minoritet,” 596, 600.

359

The Reindeer Grazing Act of 1928 (Lag om de svenska lapparnes rätt till renbete i Sverige). Svensk
författningssamling, SFS 1928-309, Article 1 §1.

360
361

The Reindeer Grazing Act of 1928, SFS 1928:309, Article 1 §2.
The Reindeer Grazing Act of 1928, SFS 1928:309, Article 39 §1.

159

included. Reindeer husbandry was also further regulated with stipulations about seasonal
pastureland and the like. In addition, the new law abolished the Lappfogde system
introduced in 1886. The right to pursue reindeer husbandry still presupposes membership
in a sameby (or Sámi village): “the term ‘sameby,’ substituting for the term ‘lappby,’
which at that time, had a derogatory undertone. However, the sameby system basically
equals the lappby system.”362 The Act thus retained the power to determine who was an
“Authentic Sámi,” and who could practiced reindeer husbandry, and consequently
excluded all those whom according to the state’s categorizations were no longer Sámi.
The 1800s, especially the second half of the nineteenth century, also brought race,
education, assimilation, and political rights to the fore. In England the question of race as
an indicator of superiority or inferiority led the way for the sort of biological racism that
was to dominate society, politics, colonial policies, and the academia from the 1870s
onward. Sweden, the United States, but also Belgium, Germany, and several other
nations found in race biology, and later in eugenics, a scientific justification for their
policies of segregation, sterilization, extermination, or exclusion. Social Darwinism
began to creep into Swedish academia and the scientific community too. By the 1920s
Sweden became a center for race biology and eugenics. In 1921 the Diet passed a bill for
the establishment of the first official institution, The State Institute for Race Biology
(Statens institut för rasbiologi), with its seat at the Dekanhuset at Uppsala University.
The segregationist and assimilationist policies laid out in the Reindeer Grazing
Acts of 1886, 1889, and 1924 found their beginning in committee investigations of 1883
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where the Social Darwinist doctrines of the time helped formulate a segregationist
discourse where the Sámi were objectified into subordinated concepts represented by
attitudes and language: “A Lapp Shall Always be a Lapp;” the Sámi are “either on their
way to extinction or to be assimilated into the civilized society;”363 or where nomadic
Sámi were tolerated, while those who settled “must die out or be assimilated.”364
As it was the case in Norway, and in the United Sates, education was seen as the
main engine through which the Swedish assimilation policies of the Sámi population
were to be put into motion. A specific Sámi Education System was established creating
the apparatus in which this re-education could take place. At the beginning of the 1800s
there were several established Lap-schools (lappskolor) in various geographic locations
in Sweden, such as in Karesuando, Jukkasjärvi, Gällivare, Jokkmokk, Arjeplog, Lycksele
and Föllinge. At this point the language of instruction was Sámi, Finnish, or Swedish
depending on the linguistic composition of the area. The Swedish parliament by 1877,
however, passed a bill making Swedish the mandatory instructional language if the child
understood Swedish. At the same time the catechetical teaching first introduced in the
1700s was revitalized (i.e., kateketundervisning, where nomadic Sámi were assigned a
traveling teacher whose job was to educate Sámi children). In 1895 and 1896 more
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reforms were introduced to increase the “Swedification” (försvenskning) of the Sámi. It
was not, however, until the 1900s that Sámi education was standardized towards five
possible educational avenues in the form of either specialized schools or local and church
schools.
The 1913 school reform established the so-called nomad-schools (nomadskolor).
These schools were obligatory for the children of reindeer-herding Sámi and were meant
to solve the problem of education for those children whose parents led a nomadic life.
The 1913 reforms also meant, however, a further differentiation between nomadic and
settled Sámi. The former’s curriculum was diluted to reflect the perceived low ambition
of nomadic Sámi, and these schools were meant to instill more practical skills within the
herding industry; similar trends existed in Indian American boarding schools and the like.
The latter were to be sent to local public schools. The point with this division was twofold. On the one hand, the “Authentic Sámi” was to be segregated and re-educated within
a nomadic lifestyle. On the other hand, the “non-authentic” Sámi were to be assimilated
into mainstream Swedish society. 365 By the 1940s school regulations called for the
establishment of boarding schools skolhus or elevhem. The latter were believed to be
necessary because it was thought that Sámi parents were detrimental in the upbringing of
their children.366
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In general the nomad-schools diluted Sámi identity by forcing children to learn
the “proper language;” that is, Swedish. In these schools the Sámi language was
discouraged and instead their new language was to be Swedish. Many former alumni,
interviewed in the late 1990s, complained of the “forced” loss of their language and
consequently of their Sámi identity. 367 Although the nomadskolor were eventually
replaced in 1981 with the Sámi-schools (sameskolor) and their mandate drastically
changed, from hindrance to promotion of Sámi language and culture, many people of
older generations have difficulties to talk about their experiences in these schools.368
The 1800s also brought major changes to the means of production, the economy,
and society. Together with the Industrial Revolution, and modernity, came the
modernization of the country. Industrialization brought the industrial society with its less
communalistic character and more individualistic needs. The courts, writes Aalto et al.,
played an important role in the modernization and domestication of social norms:
“gradually [the court] turned into an earthly sphere, into a social arena where the power
of definition has been secularized, institutionalized, and taken over by the state.”369 Phebe
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Fjellström writes that local norms were circumvented by new urban and centralized
judicial norms, which by the early 1900s greatly affected the Sámi judicial system.370
Modernity also affected the political system, which gradually became
incompatible with traditional socio-political systems. Rolf Sjölin, argues that the modern
political system was built on the idea that people did not live at great distances from each
other. A nomadic population living in sparsely populated rural areas was difficult to tie it
to the system.371 Things were further complicated when with the modernization of the
country the peasants were given property rights. In the 1860s a reformed local
government introduced voting rights based on taxes or land ownership. The problem that
arose was that based on existing regulations Lapland was exempt from taxation and as
such the Sámi were excluded from participating in the wider electoral process.372
Gertrude Hanes gives an insightful look into Sámi voting rights and their
evolution. From the mid eighteenth century onward we find that the amount of tax paid
by the Sámi (Lappskatten) was as low as the new settlers farmers, whom first enjoyed a
tax exemption and later paid a relatively low tax; both meant as an encouragement to
settlement. Low taxation, however, denied both groups the right to vote for the Diet’s
Second Chamber (Andra Kammaren).373 In 1850 the Diet redrew the map of the Crown’s
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lands with new enclosure decrees (avvittringsstadga) where the most sparsely populated
areas were allotted to the Crown. The new appropriation meant that previously unclaimed
lands or lands with spars settlements were now off limits. Those who had an exclusive
usufructuary right were allowed to continue within the new enclosures for the remainder
of their lifetime. After the summer of 1862, however, no new queries or disputes over
Lapland were being accepted; 374 meaning the right could not be transferred through
inheritance and new ownership claims were not considered.
Those tax exemptions, or privileges, only applied to the national taxes (statliga
skatten). Municipal and ecclesiastical taxes did not enjoy any exemption. With this in
mind, the gradual implementation of the municipal suffrage was hard to be achieved in
Lapland. This was because so many homesteads were not being municipally taxed. The
northern region still enjoyed the so called Lappmarks-privileges (lappmarksprivilegierna)
exempting it from the national taxation.375 Because of this exemption, local governments
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TABLE 2: SWEDISH SÁMI POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE
Infiltration Period
(1328 – 1635)

Exploitation Period
(1635 – 1673)

Colonization Period
(1673 – 1749)

1328 – Royal decree
extends jurisdiction over
northern territories. 1340 –
Lapland is officially
annexed to Sweden. Middle
Ages – Sámi are brought
into Swedish-Hanseatic
trade network to benefit
Sweden. 1526 – First
attempts at Christianize
Lapland under Gustav I
Vasa. 1548 – Gustav I Vasa
places the Sámi under direct
royal control. 1551 –
Gustav I Vasa considers the
Sámi as belonging to the
Crown. 1559 – Sámi
Lutheran priests first
attempt to Christianize the
Sámi. 1607 Karl IX decrees
the Sámi to pay taxes in
reindeer meat and dry fish
to support war effort. Karl
IX adds to his title “King of
the Lapps.” 1608 – Karl IX
introduces Mosaic law,
replacing Sámi legal
traditions. 1634 – Silver ore
found in Nasafjäll opens
mine in 1635 affecting
Sámi livelihood.

1635 onward – The search
for natural riches pushes
further colonization of the
northern territories. 1640s –
a system consisting of
bailiff, judge, and pastor,
labeled the triumvirate,
places further control on
Sámi. 1670 – Active policy
of colonization is
introduced. 1671 – Royal
Decree regulates/restricts
Sámi nomadism, preventing
uncontrolled settling in
Norway. 1673 – Settlement
Decree marking the
beginning of Swedish
colonization of Lapland.

1683 – King Karl XI asserts
his right through an Edict
on all unclaimed, unsettled,
and untilled lands in
Lapland are to belong to the
“Swedish Crown and no
one else.” 1685 – Royal
Edict forces conversions of
the pagan inhabitants of the
northern territories. 1695 –
Lapptax reforms and
Lappmarks decree to
stimulate further
colonization of Lapland.
1749 – Lappmarks
regulations begin to change
the tax-exempt status of the
Sámi.
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Second Wave of
Colonization
(1749 – 1846)

Displacement and
Assimilation
(1848 – 1930)

1751 – Treaty of Strömstad
delineates Sweden’s official
border. This treaty also
redraws the border of the
Sámi lands in Sweden.
Treaty adds Lapp Codicil
regulating Sámi nomadism
and usufructuary rights in
both Sweden and DenmarkNorway. 1789 – Act of
Union and Security
(Förenings- och
säkerhetsakten) allows for
what can be interpreted as
Sámi property rights. 1809
– Treaty of Fredrikshamn
cedes Finland and part of
Lapland to Russia marking
the beginning of
deterioration of Sámi
grazing, and land rights.
1814 – Creation of the
United Kingdoms of
Sweden and Norway
changes slowly changes
status of Sámi in the border
regions. 1827-1828 –
Political and territorial
displacement becomes more
evident in Sweden.

1852 - 1889 – Border
disputes between Russia,
Norway, and Sweden curbs
Sámi usufructuary rights
and starts a policy of
relocation. 1877 –
Parliament imposes
Swedish language on Sámi.
1860s –Tax reforms curbs
Sámi voting rights. 1886 –
Reindeer Grazing Act
redefines and controls
Sámi’s rights. 1898 –
Reindeer Grazing Act
introduces Sámi village
charter imposing new
restrictions on Sámi. 1913 –
Opening of nomad-schools
make schooling of reindeerherding children obligatory.
1919 – Reindeer
Convention between
Norway and Sweden places
new restrictions on Sámi.
1921 onward – RaceBiology influences Sámi
policy. 1928 – Reindeer
Grazing Act restricts
definition of reindeer Sámi
and limits adherence to this
category.

were unable to calculate the municipal taxes, which were in turn based on the fyrktal, a
tax formula. 376 The fact that in several municipalities the Sámi were not being taxed
prevented them to be part of the electoral process. To solve this conundrum several
municipalities found ways to tax the homesteads. When the King in 1873, however,
wanted to introduce a national income tax in Lapland to allow every eligible inhabitant to
vote, many resisted. In 1874 the government began rectify the problem, yet the taxation
system of pastoral Sámi did not change and as such the exclusion persisted.377
Resistance was not, according to Hanes, only a financial matter. Allowing the
income tax to be implemented meant the loss of the Lappmarks-privileges, which
entailed the exemption from military service and conscription.378 Yet, that same year the
Diet passed a bill introducing individual income taxes in Lapland, but the income from
reindeer husbandry was excluded. The exemption of income earned from the reindeer
husbandry, add Hanes, can be understood as a privilege, but it came at a price; the
exclusion of pastoral Sámi from both the municipal and the national electoral process.379
Hanes makes a valuable contribution here by outlining the real consequences for the
Sámi as a whole: “The main argument to set them apart was the lack of a fixed or
permanent habitation, which made them unfit to participate in political process. The
Sámi that settled and took up farming were taxed like the rest of the population and
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received through this the same municipal and national voting rights. However, they were
no longer regarded as Sámi but they formed part of the general population.”380
The Authentic Sámi
Andrea Amft’s analysis of these laws, beginning with the 1886 Act, show the initiation of
a process of differentiation among the Sámi population fracturing Sámi identity and sense
of belongingness and in the process creating, what Amft calls, an “Authentic Sámi
minority;” namely:
Soon enough the Sámi population was divided into categories with different rights. The
dominating Swedish society, because of its position of power, has had the possibility to
dictate the terms with which to define Sámi existence, it has affected the Sámi’s
livelihood, and has defined the condition of group belongingness. The state has also had
the power to formulate the structural conditions, based on its own stereotype, of what
constitutes an “authentic” Sámi and how this Sámi should live. These stereotypes
consequently constituted a Sámi ideal-type and the Sámi society, which did not reflect
reality. With these ideal-type images as a mold the state’s conditions were dictated on
what constituted “authentic” Sámi and which education was suitable for them.381

The legal “authentication” of the true Sámi also meant that mixed practices such as
farming and herding were discouraged in Sweden. Most probably in the economy of the
time intra-industry competition was an issue because of limited natural and labour
resources. The domestic market could not afford Sámi to engage in farming or “nonauthentic” Sámi to engage in herding, as that would have upset the balance of “Swedish
corporatism.” On the other hand, the official justification drifted toward a perhaps
fictitious reasoning where the practice needed to be discouraged to protect the Sámi from
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themselves: “a way of life approaching that of the settlers was considered to have a
strong negative impact both on the herding itself and the herding methods.”382
Similarly, the system of Sámi rights established by the Lapp-privileges also
created a system of exclusion, argue Partik Lantto and Ulf Mörkenstam, whereby “Sami
that did not live up to the shared standards, or shared a specific way of life, were from a
legal perspective legitimately excluded from the system of rights. And those included ran
a continuous risk of being excluded if they diverted from the homogeneous Sami identity
that prescribed what it was to be a Sami.” 383 Erik Hedbäck writes that the practical
application of these laws were such that “The right of reindeer-herding entitles the Lapp
to free use of the land and water resources for himself and his reindeer according to the
old customs and manner of livelihood. Should he take up another occupation, the Lapp
forfeits his right not only to the use of natural resources, but also his trapping, shooting
and fishing rights.”384 In other words, being a Sámi meant falling within and walking a
fine state-constructed line.
Only those Sámi defined by the state as “authentic” or “living up to the shared
standards” were considered part of the Sámi minority, and their rights were recognised
based on ancient tradition and time immemorial. The consequences of this legal doctrine,
continued Lantto and Mörkenstam, was a “constructed system of Sami rights [which]
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through legislation … institutionalized a homogenous Sami identity deviant from the
Swedish, maintaining a hierarchical order, at the same time as it explains and justifies an
exclusion of the majority of people of Sami origins.”385
Great-power politics, such as the 1809 Treaty of Fredrikshamn, and domestic
realities echoed across the Sápmi where a series of events sat in motion deeply altering
consequences for the Swedish Sámi. The closing of borders, the limited access to crossborder pastoralism, combined with a sense of economic undesirability and cultural
unease,386 and the need to control the increasing numbers of reindeers and of the Sámi
population within certain areas of the country,387 resulted, beginning in the mid-1800s, in
the forced relocation and expatriation of Sámi herders and families from their ancestral
lands and cultural roots. In several cases this turn of events also entailed the complete
loss of reindeer herding practices and thus of cultural traits and sense of ethnic belonging.
For instance, the 1919 Reindeer Grazing Convention between Sweden and Norway
limited the cross-border of Swedish Sámi with their herds into Norway.388 Although the
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Convention’s agreements came into effect in 1923 it had the effect of regulating the
amount of allowed reindeers in the northern territories, which could not surpass 39,000
heads per herder or family; violators were fined on a per-reindeer and per-day basis.389
Consequently, the 1919 Convention saw large areas of this region suddenly becoming
forbidden territories.390
There are doubts on whether all the Sámi that relocated did so free-willingly.
Although this situation cannot be completely excluded, it has been shown that several
were not given many alternatives to the relocation. They often faced limited options such
as to either move or have their livestock halved. 391 Johannes Marainen has found, in
official records, questionable voluntary requests from Sámi pointing to forgeries by local
authorities.392 The Sámi in a particular area would first be convinced to relocate with the
financial support of local and national authorities. If this “encouragement” did not work,
however, the relocation had to be forced through the confiscation of herds (which were
either slaughtered and/or sold) and the placement of steep fines on the “disobeying”
Sámi.393
Ingwar Åhrén adds, during the late 1800s and early 1900s, official records show
that the Sámi were to be forcibly relocated to other areas. For example, in 1870, 200-275
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Sámi were relocated with about 20,000 reindeers from Kautokeino to Karesuando. While
in the 1920s about 60 families consisting of 279 Sámi and some 16,500 reindeers were
relocated from Karesuando to more southerly pastures. 394 Financial compensation did
occur. What is not clear, however, is whether the real purpose of the compensation was
meant as a way to cover the expense of the relocation or as a way to make the relocation
more appealing for the Sámi.395 There are also instances were the promised financial help
never came and the Sámi had to absorb not only the cost of relocating but often the cost
of lost reindeers along the way.396 In this respect Marainen has found different accounts
where if the Sámi refused to pay for the relocation costs, then the local authorities would
sell as many reindeers as were necessary to pay for the relocation.397
These processes of eviction and relocation caused the dislocation of hundreds of
Sámi and thousands of reindeers with devastating consequences.398 These relocations also
resulted in personal tragedies and unforeseen conflicts. According to Karppi, “the results
of … resettlement were a loss of fertile lands, and they were forced to adapt to modern
livelihoods, and many were separated from family members residing on opposite sides of
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the border.” 399 For Johannes Marainen, many Sámi “were suddenly forced to leave
behind everything they had built in their entire life … they caused serious social and
economic problems and human tragedies.”400 While at the same time they also caused
conflicts between Sámi groups. For instance, the incoming Sámi from the northern
territories not only spoke a different dialect, and oftentimes they did not speak Swedish,
but they also practiced a different kind of reindeer herding, one that kept the herds free.
These differences conflicted with the herding practices of “southern” Sámi, whom keep
they herds within pens/enclosures.401
With time, the question of land-rights would deeply define state-Sámi relations,
and in this respect would create a sort of paternalistic approach where the Sámi would not
play a participating role but they were rather victimized in accepting a status quo based
on fictional definitions. In this mix of fragmented historical and political discourses the
relationship that materialized was based on three characterizations put forward by Scott
Forrest: i) Nordic kingdoms viewed the Sámi as nomadic, thus having no conception of
ownership, and thus implemented the doctrine of terra nullius; ii) traditional Sámi
economic activities, such as reindeer herding, were viewed as illegitimate or backwards,
resulting in the privileging of modern forms of land use such as fixed and exclusive
territoriality and exclusive agriculture; and finally, iii) through the “theory of the tragedy
of the commons” the state viewed nomadic pastoralism as economically non-viable,
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prompting systems of administration which increased state regulation of herding.” 402
Forrest adds, “In implementing rational herding policies, the states acted to serve their
own interests with an underlying bias towards modern forms of organisation. Flawed
initial assumptions based on incomplete knowledge meant state administrators had no
real way of knowing the effects their modifications would have in the real world.”403
The social, political, fiscal, and economic displacement of the Sámi in Sweden is
a multifaceted process. National sovereignty was redrawn at the expense of Sámi
ancestral pasturelands, which resulted in forced removal of entire families from unwanted
regions. The effects of the reindeer grazing acts were to recreate an “Authentic Sámi,” at
the expense of the remainder of the Sámi identity. In general, the fiscal, land, and
settlement policies, which have regulated the infiltration, exploitation, and colonization
of Lapland since the sixteenth century, coupled with these legislations, eventually eroded
Sámi rights and re-created Sámi identity.
The “White Man’s Indian” and the Making of the Indigenous Other
in the United States of America
The cultural landscape in what was to become the United States of America was a vast
and complex cultural mosaic where the lines of belongingness were at times blurry. There
were undeniable stark differences that existed between the English and the Natives
populations, writes James Axtell:

402

Scott Forrest, The Territorial Dimension of State-Saami Politics (In Eriksson, Johan, and Kristiina
Karppi (Ed.) Conflict and Cooperation in the North. Finland: Noorlands Universitetsforlag i Umea AB,
Bookshop TAJU, Univ. of Tampere, 2002), 252.
403

Scott Forrest, The Territorial Dimension of State-Saami Politics, 264.

174

While English society was divided into ‘divinely sanctioned’ strata of wealth, power, and
prestige, Indian society fostered an ‘unnatural’ sense of democratic individualism in the
people. And while English ethnocentrism was based on a new religion, technology, social
evolution, and ultimately race, the Indians’ own strong sense of superiority, color-blind
and religiously tolerant, could not be undermined except by inexplicable European
diseases.404

This particularity made Colonial America a land of contrasts and opposing realties. For
instance, colonial, British, and Indian realities were also coupled with settlers and
frontiersmen’s colonialism and were joined with an increasing hybrid American colonial
and post-colonial life. Joyce E. Chaplin talks about “syncretism [as] the term usually
applied to cultural mixture, until theories of language introduced the term hybridity as a
comparable concept [for example] those inhabiting Richard White’s middle ground,
James Merrell’s Shamokin, and James P. Ronda’s praying towns.”405
Lost Hybridity
Colonial life was not as clear as it was once thought to be, and cultural lines were often
not so clearly discerned. There are not any doubts that colonial America was “being
forced to confront the novel otherness of native culture and to cope with its
unpredictability, pride, and retaliatory violence.”406 Yet, this image is only part of the
story and one needs to also consider the existing multiple realties and interests that
changed the way we ought to look at White and Indian America.
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There are several historical instances depicting this multiplicity of America. As
with the Sámi, there was an anomalous juridical category, writes Berkhofer, whereby
“some tribes existed for a period neither independent nor socially assimilated. Either
through conquest or for other reasons, these tradespeople rendered homage to the
monarch, held their lands from the crown, acknowledged themselves to be English
subjects, and existed as communities and tribes under colonial protection.”407 Along with
these “anomalous tribes,” European western expansion into Indian country by the 1740s
reconfigured Indian communities in these “uncharted” territories: “Ancient communities
collapsed; new, multiethnic communities grew up out of the ruins of shattered societies
… their old identities often all but lost to history, amalgamated.”408 Further amalgamation
occurred as a result of decades of constant wars. By the end of the Revolution, writes
Colin Calloway, “Shawnees from Ohio were living in Missouri, New England Indians
were living among the Oneidas in New York,” 409 hence displacing and reconfiguring
entire Indian Nations.
These sorts of “desperate” blending were also accompanied by other kinds of
syncretic life shaping an unimaginable “landscape of cultural polyphony, or more
accurately perhaps, cultural cacophony, [meaning] a country of mixed and mixing
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people.” 410 New multiethnic lifestyles thus emerged by either choice or necessity,
creating more than one America. There was, in fact, the America of the Indian Nations,
of the British, of the Anglo colonists, of non-Anglo colonists, of the European
immigrants, of the African slaves and of the free slaves, of the settlers, of the
frontiersmen, and of those who did not fit in any of these ethno-cultural boundaries.
Indian country, writes Calloway, “was an arena in which a ‘kaleidoscope of
human encounters’ generated a web of cultural exchanges as Indians, Africans, and
Europeans made … ‘creative adaptations’ to new places and new peoples … European
lived in and around Indian communities … captives, traders, Indian agents, and even
occasional missionaries underwent similar ‘conversion’ to Indian ways.” 411 “White
Indians,” writes Calloway, became culture brokers and intermarriages created “new
people of mixed ancestry,” where cultural boundaries were often “fuzzy and porous.”412
By century’s end the spirit of this “poly-Americanism” began to wane and the
“kaleidoscope” was showing signs of monolithic nationalism. The optics were changing
focus and were being clouded by the increasing speed of transformation sparked by the
American Revolution, which “intensified familiar pressures on Indian lives and lands.”413
It was the need of expansion and enlargement, and of the frontier and a creed of manifest
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destiny, which marked in large part the making of the new nation. This attitude is well
presented in Fredrick J. Turner’s essay published in 1894, which encapsulated what was
to become the new American spirit; however, ushering “a new era and a new society from
which [Indians] were to be increasingly excluded.” 414 In contrast with the “European
system of scientific administration,” wrote Turner in the 1890s, the policy of the United
States seems to have been a conscious western expansion pushed by settlers’ demands for
land: “In 1789 the States were the creators of the Federal Government; in 1861 the
Federal Government was the creator of a large majority of the States.”415
Turner’s “seminal essay” does more than just advancing what came to be known
as the “frontier thesis” of American History “and its lingering influence on the
historiography of antebellum America.”416 It elucidates an attitude of the time towards
land and the importance of territorial expansion as manifestations of a destiny and as
means to an American national consciousness: “The growth of nationalism and the
evolution of American political institutions were dependent on the advance of the
frontier.”417 It is the vast amount of “free land” that provide the impetus to economic
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opportunity and in turn to political power.418 For Turner, America is a nation in constant
flux, in constant movement, “a perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life … will
continually demand a wider field for its existence.”419
The 1800s were drastic and formative years for the new republic.420 They were
also years marked by transitional anxiety. This uneasiness was not only the result of a
dramatic Civil War, or a “budding Populist revolt,” or the coming to terms with a “steady
purchase of urbanization and industrialization on the essentially agrarian republic of the
nineteenth century [where Tuner] feared that the Jeffersonian ideals of the family-farm
yeomanry were being sacrificed on the altar of industrial capitalism by Wall Street's high
priests of finance.”421 The end of the 1800s also marked the fading of Turner’s frontier,
which meant “the closing of a great historic movement [of] American development.”422
In other words, it meant the loss of a social “safety-valve” that transformed the
psychological state of mind of the nation.423
Most importantly, Turner’s essay shows the consolidation of the modern
industrial American state. Turner romanticizes the loss of the frontier, rather than calling
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for a reconstitution of the original American Spirit or the fulfillment of American
imperialist destiny. The old American Spirit, which marked American individualism and
peculiarity, denoted a nation devoid of the full reaches of the state.424 The frontier, and
the wilderness that lay beyond, almost hermetically kept the state from reaching. By
century’s end, however, that was to change and the modern industrial American republic
spread across the continent reaching all corners and absorbing all non-state autonomous
spaces in its wake. Frontiersmen were to be absorbed into the modern society and the
federal (and state) government was to regulate all aspects of American life. Turner was
perhaps lamenting that at this point the nation was losing its Exceptionalism and
becoming just like another European industrial nation. In fact, the frontier, once upon a
time, brought the European colonist back to the wilderness: “The wilderness masters the
colonist. It finds him a European in dress, industries, tools, modes of travel, and thought.
It takes him from the railroad car and puts him in the birch canoe.”425 Unfortunately,
however, the end of the frontier takes the American out of the wilderness and throws it
into a similar urban spiritless setting as its European cousin.
On the opposite side of the historical spectrum we find the Indian Americans
whom also experienced the effects of these transformative and transitional years coupled
with centuries of their own transitional anxiety. The two processes, however, represented
two very distinct dynamics with two very distinct closures; whereas the United States
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found unity, expansion, and growth the Indian Americans found division, compression,
and decline.426 Evidently, the birth of the United States of America altered the status of
Indian Americans within the confined of the new nation, and consequently their relation
vis-à-vis national and state governments. This “relation” needs, however, some
clarification. Whereas the Sámi dealt with one centralized or unitary system of
government, the relation of Indian Americans vis-à-vis the “state” was more complex.
The United States system of government is quite different and since its inception
it went through significant structural, political, and legislative changes; i.e., from a
confederal to a federal system. This originally peculiar system of government affected
state-indigenous relations differently. Tribal nations were, in fact, recognised by the
federal and state governments either mutually or differently and at times were also
subjected to multiple jurisdictions, especially during transitional times; such as the 1830s
or the 1870s, and even from the 1960s through the 1980s during the time of Native
awakening and self-determination.427
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At the federal level the recognition of Indian American tribes, writes Wilkins, has
two distinct meanings whereby before the 1870s the recognition meant the
acknowledgment of the tribes usually through treaties. After the 1870s the recognition of
a tribe was understood in term of acknowledging the tribal entity in relation to the federal
government in political and jurisdictional terms: “It affirms a tribe’s sovereign status.
Simultaneously, it outlines the federal government’s responsibilities to the tribe
[meaning] that a tribe is not only entitled to the immunities and privileges … but is also
subject to the same federal powers, limitations, and other obligations.”428 At the time of
writing, the number of Federally-recognized Tribes stood at 566.429
The recognition of Indian tribes at the state level varies and does not include all
the fifty states. The National Conference of State Legislatures lists, on its web site
(updated April 2014), a total of fifteen states (Alabama, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia) in which sixty-seven Staterecognized Tribes are listed.430 Recognition of Indian tribes by state governments, writes
Wilkins, varies. Some have been recognized since colonial times, while other have
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achieved recognition through state decrees.431 State recognition, however, “may or may
not depend on prior federal recognition [and] state recognition is not a prerequisite for
federal recognition.”432
While both levels of government are important in understanding the complex
relation between Indian Americans and the state, for the purpose of this research, it is the
federal government the focus of state-indigenous relations. The latter was chosen for both
practical and analytical reasons. On the one hand, dealing with state government one is
forced to deal with multiple realities, which may clog the analytical purpose of the study.
On the other hand, constitutional supremacy of federal policies (or Supremacy clause)
over Indian affairs makes state policies a subordinate matter.
United States Indian Policy
The (re)making of the Indian American plays out on a stage where the Indian Americans
were no longer protagonist of their futures and where the needs of the New Republic
reshaped the spatiotemporal cultural dynamics of the nation and of society. Being an
American changed with it and also with these transformative developments being an
Indian American changed too. In tracing these processes I have divided this section into
four periods: i) the confederal years (1775 – 1789); ii) the new federal republic (1789 –
1812); iii) assertive American nationalism (1812 – 1870); and finally iv) reservization
and assimilation period (1870 – 1920).
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i) The Confederal Years (1775 – 1789)
The July 1775 meeting of the Second Continental Congress is characteristic of the
ambiguous relation that existed between white and Indian Americans a year preceding the
Declaration of Independence. The speech to the Six Confederate Nations, the Mohawks,
Oneidas, Tuscaroras, Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas, from the Twelve United
Colonies, convened in Council in Philadelphia on July 13, 1775 reads:
We desire you will hear and receive what we have now told you, and that you will open a
good ear and listen to what we are now going to say. This is a family quarrel between us
and Old England. You Indians are not concerned in it. We don’t wish you to take up the
hatchet against the king’s troops. We desire you to remain at home, and not join on either
side, but keep the hatchet buried deep. In the name and in behalf of all our people, we ask
and desire you to love peace and maintain it, and to love and sympathise with us in our
troubles; that the path may be kept open with all our people and yours, to pass and repass,
without molestation. Brothers! we live upon the same ground with you. The same island
is our common birth-place. We desire to sit down under the same tree of peace with you:
let us water its roots and cherish its growth, till the large leaves and flourishing branches
shall extend to the setting sun, and reach the skies … What is it we have asked of you?
Nothing but peace, notwithstanding our present disturbed situation-and if application
should be made to you by any of the king’s unwise and wicked ministers to join on their
side, we only advise you to deliberate, with great caution, and in your wisdom look
forward to the consequences of a compliance. For, if the king’s troops take away our
property, and destroy us who are of the same blood with themselves, what can you, who
are Indians, expect from them afterwards?433

One can only assume that the real desire of the speech was to secure Indian American
neutrality and to avoid fighting a war on multiple fronts. The speech’s brotherly message
partially materialized the intended goal however with the Declaration of Independence an
ambivalent process of “repositioning” the Indian American within the North American
continent was set in motion; from a foe to a brother and back to being a foe. The place of
Indian Americans in the new American nation was an ambivalent one: “the new republic
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was still very much a revolutionary world in which their struggles continued with little
abatement. For many Indian people, the Revolution was one phase of a ‘Twenty Years’
War’ that continued at least until the Treaty of Greenville in 1795.”434 A revolutionary
war, continues Colin G. Calloway, fought on multiple fronts: “economic, cultural,
political, and military.” 435 David E. Wilkins affords us a sequence of key documents
showing the uncertain position of Indian Americans in the new American nation.
In the 1776 Declaration of Independence Indian Americans were “the merciless
Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all
ages, sexes and conditions.”436 The Treaty of the Delaware Tribe of 1778, on the other
hand, opens the door to a possible Indian state joining the confederation where Article 6
states:
And it is further agreed on between the contracting parties, should it for the future be
found conducive for the mutual interest of both parties, to invite any other tribes who
have been friends to the interest of the United States, to join the present confederation,
and to form a State, whereof the De1aware nation shall be the head, and have a
representation in Congress.437

With the advent of the Articles of Confederation of 1781 the character of the
confederation was changing and with it the locus of power was slowly moving from the
periphery to the center. Under Article IX Congress was assuming “the sole and exclusive
right and power of … regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not
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members of any of the states.” 438 During the Constitutional Convention of 1787,
however, Alexander Hamilton Federalist No. 24 reiterated the savage nature of Indian
tribes as “The savage tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as our natural
enemies, [Britain’s] natural allies, because they have most to fear from us, and most to
hope from them.” 439 While, in the midst of the Federal Debate, the enactment of the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 reminded the American public and reassured the Indian
Americans that:
utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians, their lands and property
shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, rights and
liberty, they never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized
by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity, shall from time to time be made,
for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with
them.440

The newly ratified United States Constitution of 1789 and the Trade and Intercourse Act
of 1790 both established the exclusive powers and rights of the federal government in
dealing with Indian American Nations, tribes, or individuals. In the Constitution, Article
1 (Section 8, Clause 3), establishes the sole power of Congress “To regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes,”441 while
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the Trade and Intercourse Act is an example of federal exclusivity over affairs related to
Indian Americans where:
Section 1 … That no person shall be permitted to carry on any trade or intercourse with
the Indian tribes, without a license for that purpose under the hand and seal of the
superintendent of the department, or of such other person as the President of the United
States shall appoint for that purpose … Sec. 4. That no sale of lands made by any Indians,
or any nation or tribe of Indians the United States, shall be valid to any person or persons,
or to any state, whether having the right of pre-emption to such lands or not, unless the
same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of
the United States.”442

Post-revolutionary America was characterized by land disputes and thus saw the Indian
Americans through a new lens, writes Calloway: the Revolution “reduced the experiences
of the Indian peoples to a single role,” that of being an Indian.443 At this juncture the
Indian American could no longer blend in nature’s landscape. While the United States,
with its sense of survival and need of space, could not longer afford an Indian American
“lurking in the woods” and competing for the same sovereignty and legitimacy.
At the end of the Revolutionary War the intertwined history of Indian Americans
and Americans took distinct paths. On the one hand, the Indian Revolution ended and it
marked the beginning of the end for the Indian American. Dependency became a reality,
and where once the “native and European economies intersected [and] were drawn into
the larger Atlantic economy” at the turn of the nineteenth century they were severed and
turned into “souvenir-shops items.”444 Wars, displacements, dislocations, were followed
by decades of land speculations and other destabilizing practices of Indian socio-cultural
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fabric by the hands of rum traders and missionaries. For instance, already in the colonial
ante-bellum, Indian leaders were complaining, “the Rum we get from the English hath
drowned the Memory of all antient [sic] Customs & the Method of treating on public
affairs.” 445 On the other hand, the American Revolution bore more than it asked for.
Independence was followed by “new policies, new ideologies of republicanism, and new
social experiments,” catapulting the new nation into decades of prosperous colonization,
expansion, and growth.446
The Treaty of Paris of 1783 settled the claims of the Revolution and transferred to
the Americans all British lands “east of the Mississippi, south of the Great Lakes, and
north of the Floridas.”447 Soon after, the old tensions and claims in the Ohio country
resurfaced. This time a more fervent desire for land set in motion a new sway of land
speculation. This time, however, the Americans were firm on finishing what the
Virginians had begun in the Ohio country in 1748.
The position of the majority of the Indian American Nations at the dawn of the
Revolution, their siding with the British, and the success of the Revolutionaries, reshaped
the rules of engagement between the Indian American Nations and the new established
government of the United States of America; whether under the Articles of Confederation
or the Federal Constitution. At the center of what was soon to become troublesome
Indian-United States relations lie land, the issue of territoriality, and the question of
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sovereignty. Calloway adds “The end of the Revolution marked the beginning of years of
turmoil as the region became an arena of competing national, state, and tribal interests,
international intrigues, land speculation, and personal ambitions.”448 Times had changed,
writes Calloway, and the attitude and demeanor of the Americans towards the Indian
Americans changed with it. For instance:
In 1775, Congress had instructed its treaty commissioners to ‘speak and act in such a
manner as they shall think most likely to obtain the friendship or at least the neutrality of
the Indians.’ Times had changed. James Duane, chairman of the Committee on Indian
Affairs in the Continental Congress and mayor of New York City from 1784 to 1789,
urged the United States not to continue the British practice of cultivating relations with
the Indians as if they were nations of equal standing. The Six Nations should be treated as
dependents of the State of New York. They should adopt American diplomatic protocol,
not vice versa. Unless the United States seized the opportunity to implement this new
hard-line approach, said Duane, ‘this Revolution in my Eyes will have lost more than half
its’ [sic] Value.’ American treaty commissioners followed Duane’s advice and dispensed
with wampum belts and elaborate speeches. ‘In their place,’ writes James Merrell, they
‘substituted blunt talk and a habit of driving each article home by pointing a finger at the
assembled natives.’ Moreover, the federal government was just one player in the
competition, as individual states land companies, and speculators scrambled for Indian
lands.449

As the eighteenth century was drawing Indian Americans was slowing transforming into
“domestic dependent nations.” In this general atmosphere Indian American lands were
also slowly transforming into American territories. Treaty negotiations were often
diplomatic rubber-stamps gradually loosing their importance and validity. Richard White
encapsulates the American attitude in the 1780s towards Indian Americans:
In May 1783, George Rogers Clark had distilled his judgments about how the Americans
should treat the Indians. He recognized Indians’ independence (“They have no notion of
being dependant [sic] on Either the brittish [sic] or americans [sic], But would make war
on both if Equally Insulted”), but he thought their notion of their superiority to the
Americans must be immediately crushed … ‘Reduce them to the necessity of convincing
them that we are always able to crush them at pleasure, and determined to do it when

448
449

Colin G. Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country, 283.
Colin G. Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country, 282.

189

Even they misbehave … A greater Opportunity can never offer to Reduce them to
Obedience than the present moment.450

ii) The New Federal Republic (1789 – 1812)
The year 1789 marks the birth of the New Republic. The introduction of federalism as a
new form of government not only changed the quality and extent of the federal
government, but it also entailed a shift of the locus of power from the periphery (or the
states), to the center. In this context the new federal republic began formulating a more
uniform Indian policy that would eventually preempt or trump any state jurisdiction over
Indian affairs.451
The political changes that swept across the nation would eventually, severely and
forever, change the relation between the federal government and the Indian populations
residing within the same contested territories. Most importantly, the federal constitution
of 1789 gave the United States a renewed determination of endurance and a resolve to
survive. Unfortunately, for the Indian Americans this also meant the beginning of the end
and the vanishing of nature’s landscape that up to this point provided a sort of undesired
and intolerable shelter. The growth of the nation would mean the expansion of the
frontier and the overpowering of the native lands, livelihood, and lives.
George Washington’s presidency took the reins of the republic under the vestiges
of the newly adopted federal constitution with some “soul searching” with regards to
previous Congressional Indian policies. Based on a report submitted to President
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Washington by the Secretary of War Henry Knox, write Stanley M. Elkins and Eric L.
McKitrick, “A basic theme in it was that the Continental Congress had stirred up
unnecessary turmoil among the Indians following the Revolution by insisting on
American ownership in fee simple of all territory east of the Mississippi in accordance
with the Treaty of Paris, and by taking the position that the Indians, in siding with the
British in the war, had forfeited all claim to it.”452 For instance, Calloway points out that
“Acting on the assumption of Indian war guilt and eager for the spoils of victory,
American commissioners demanded lands from the Iroquois at Fort Stanwix in 1784;
from the Delawares, Wyandots, and their neighbors at Fort McIntosh in 1785; and from
the Shawnees at Fort Finney in 1786. They brushed aside Indian objections in arrogant
confidence that Indian lands were theirs for the taking by right of conquest.”453
The new federal Indian policy, according to Knox, was to recognize the
“legitimacy of the Indians’ claims, restraining the settlers, and permitting occupation only
of those lands the Indians were prepare to sell voluntarily.”454 Conditions on the ground,
however, seemed to have spelled another reality, which according to Elkins and
McKitrick, pushed Washington and Knox to respond to Native incursions on Ohio
settlers with a strong military presence: “In June 1790 Washington under great pressure
agreed to allow Generals Josiah Harmar and Arthur St. Clair to organize a limited
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punitive expedition.”455 This course of events redefined the new federal republic’s Indian
policy for decades to come and the defeat of Native forces at Fallen Timber in August of
1794 marked the loss of Native sovereign independence and symbolizes the resolute and
strength of the United States on the western frontier.
At the closing of the century the attitude of the United States toward the Indian
Americans in the Ohio Country, and beyond, began to shift. Arm-length coexistence,
interactions based on treaties, and the respect of Native sovereignty were not producing
the wanted results on neither side. Frontiersmen and settlers’ colonialism, and
nationalism further heightened the already tense relations. Living peacefully despite the
fundamental animosity and distrust was waning and the United States began looking into
ways of solving the Indian question, short of total extermination of the Natives. The
1800s, writes Michael P. Rogin, were characterized by “Jackson, Indian, and westward
expansion, not slavery and Negroes, [which] structured American politics for the next
generation.”456
Solutions to this situation were sought, but the results one hoped for hardly
materialized: “Both Washington and Jefferson expressed confidence in the Indian powers
of improvement: Jefferson in particular favored a policy of complete assimilation. Racial
amalgamation seemed the perfect solution.”457 As with the forest Sámi in Sweden, the
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“Indian could be transformed into an American farmer, and transformed willingly.”458 In
the spirit of Jefferson’s yeoman republic, or a republic made up of freeholders, where his
ideals “may best be understood as the moral, ideological, and literary construct of a
humane and cultivated Virginian gentleman,” we find his assimilationist ethics,
proposing the absorption of the Natives into mainstream American society, through a
program of gradual civilization and, writes Daniel W. Howe, he saw intermarriage as
being part of the solution. In fact, for Jefferson, the Indian question was to be resolved
with the dilution of Indian blood through marriage: “Jefferson had welcomed
intermarriage, hoping it would lead to the assimilation of the Natives into the dominant
culture.” 459 In a letter to the Miamis, Powtewatamies, Delawares and Chippeways on
December 21, 1808, Jefferson writes “The course they advise has worn you down to your
present numbers, but temperance, peace and agriculture will raise you up to be what your
forefathers were, will prepare you to possess property, to wish to live under regular laws,
to join us in our government, to mix with us in society, and your blood and ours united
will spread again over the great island.”460 Another example of Jefferson’s beliefs on
assimilation is also found a month later in a letter to Chiefs of the Wyandots, Ottawas,
Chippewas, Powtewatamies and Shawanese, dated January 10, 1809: “In time, you will
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be as we are; you will become one people with us. Your blood will mix with ours; and
will spread, with ours, over this great island.”461 On the question of relocation Jefferson
saw it as relocating Indian tribes for their own protection, where forced relocation did not
seem to be an option. Although Jefferson’s methods and approach were much different
from his successors, the final goals remained the same: the freeing of land for white
settlers.
Jefferson’s optimism, writes Brian W. Dippie, “of racial harmony” was
unfortunately short lived and the Indian Americans were not to be convinced as easily as
the Americans had hoped for.462 President James Madison’s optimism in 1809, seeing
“our Indian neighbors had remained at peace and were rapidly advancing toward
civilization,”463 was soon put to the test. The challenge came during renewed hostilities
between the United States and Great Britain; the first since the end of the Revolutionary
War. The War of 1812 was many things. For the Natives it symbolizes internal strife, as
factions sided with either the British or the Americans, but for many an opportunity to
halt the United States’ western expansion and to push back its frontier to pre Treaty of
Paris status. Unfortunately, the conflict came to an unglamorous end and once again the
British proved to be more pragmatic than honorable. Most importantly, for the Americans
the Indian “turn-coat” was seen as a sign of betrayal threatening not only the precepts of
the Revolution but also the very existence of the United States. On the frontier,
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“Americans … could still see a Redcoat behind every redskin,” and as such the War “had
permanently altered Indian-white relations in North America.” 464

iii) Assertive American Nationalism (1812 – 1870)
At the conclusion of the War of 1812, and following the Treaty of Ghent in 1814
officially ending the War, “U.S. hegemony over the Old Northwest stood
unchallenged.”465 At this juncture the United States was preoccupied with the economy
and its position on the world stage and saw the need to leave behind traditional forms of
subsistence and embrace the market and industrial changes of the old country if it was to
survive as a nation and as a country.
The United States embarked on a series of assertive economic policies, and
ambitious infrastructural developments, “all displayed in one form or another the
American nationalism … of the period.”466 In 1800 the country was still a predominantly
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agricultural and proto-industrial nation. The transition began, writes Wilma A. Dunaway,
in 1815 where:
What energized the American transition to capitalism was a far-reaching market
revolution between 1815 and 1848, during which capitalist forms of industry, agriculture,
and labor were established in the North and a slave-based order was entrenched in the
South. Thus, the post-Revolutionary transition to domestic capitalism was a product of
several historical developments: (1) European demand for agricultural products; (2) rapid
American population growth; (3) the structuring of political systems that became
increasingly responsive to the interests of capitalists; (4) the increased mobility of capital
effected through new credit, currency, and investment opportunities; (5) and
technological and transportation advances. Increasing involvement in the market fueled a
gradual accretion toward capitalism, culminating in two significant transformations in
American rural society: a shift from local self-sufficiency toward increased dependence
on outside markets and the replacement of household manufacturing by centralized
workshop factories.467

Consequently the 1800s saw the United States entering the industrial market economy by
ripping the effects of the Industrial Revolution in Europe. The United States became an
important supplier of raw materials in the global market such as timber, cotton, and even
silver well into the end of the century. With this repositioning of the country in the global
economy, according to Michael P. Rogin, “America transformed itself from a household
to a market society.”468 This evolution affected not only the economy of the nation. On
the contrary, continues Rogin, it changed society and its values to the core. For instance:
The extension of the market broke down family-based household structures – subsistence
agriculture, household manufacture, the master apprentice system, family welfare. The
market undermined or transformed the stable old families which had dominated
American society. It undermined the chartered monopolies, traditional churches, and
other deferential corporate forms of eighteenth-century life. It set men, goods, and money
in motion. The tensions … ‘were largely due to an agonizing and finally unsuccessful
attempt to retain the spirit of a sacred society, a family brotherhood, within a framework
of conceptual and institutional constructs based upon freedom of contract.’469
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Another issue occupying the minds and souls of Americans was the Indian Question. The
latter, and the solutions sought through various Indian policies, would consume most of
this century. Overall, the only acceptable conclusion was the erasure of the Indians from
the American landscape. The question thus was not “whether” but “how:” removal,
assimilation, reservization, total annihilation, or a mixture thereof.
Under President Monroe the betrayal of 1812 was still vivid. Secretary of War
John C. Calhoun supported a dual policy of “gradual resettlement of the southern tribes
across the Mississippi, while simultaneously promoting the assimilation of some of their
members into white society.” 470 His attitude toward the Indian Americans, however,
epitomized an increasing general feeling in America. He proposed a new direction: “They
neither are, in fact, nor ought to be, considered as independent nations. Our views of their
interest, and not their own, ought to govern them.” 471 In other words, writes Dippie,
“Whatever rights the Indians enjoyed in the future would be at the discretion of the
government.”472
Another general attitude was that where Christian and secular education would
fail in civilizing the Natives, destiny would run its course and the Indian race would
simply vanish: “the Vanishing American won public acceptance after 1814. By its logic,
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Indians were doomed to ‘utter extinction’ because they belonged to ‘an inferior race of
men … neither qualified to rise higher in the scale of being, nor to enjoy the benefits and
blessings of the civilized and Christian state.”473 In this seemingly national emotional
state the once noble savage, became the fallen savage, and at this point in American
history and for almost the remainder of the century, the Indian was nothing more than a
vanishing savage.474
There was also another side of the Vanishing American theorem according to
Dippie. Indian American population was seemingly decreasing not so much due to a
“government’s ‘genocidal’ Indian policy,” but rather due to a variety of ancillary causes.
For instance:
Warfare, either interracial or intraracial, was ranked high as a cause of Indian
depopulation … figures overlook the disruption and destruction of tribal life itself,
however, and the attendant, depressing effects on Indian population cause by persistence
military pressure [numbers were also lost] through capture, enslavement, famine,
exposure, and permanent removals consequent to defeat … White injustice, not inevitable
destiny, made the red man droop ‘like the fading flower before the moon day sun. The
belief in the Vanishing Indian was the ultimate cause of the Indian’s vanishing.475

The obvious ambivalence toward Indian Americans made for an Indian policy that was
multifaceted and at times also contradictory and impractical. Isolation and segregation of
white and Indian populations was thought as a viable solution, ironically to save the
Indian from “the white man’s vices.” Side-by-side to isolating the Natives was, however,
a constant attempt to “civilize” them through policies of assimilation. After all “the
cherished object of federal Indian policy remained constant: the civilization and ‘ultimate
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incorporation’ of the Indians into the body politics.”476 The contradictory nature of the
federal Indian policy was often criticized in both public and private fora. For instance,
writes Dippie, “Henry Schoolcraft, who had wide experience among the northwestern
tribes, complained in 1828 that Indian legislation ‘is only taken up a pinch. It is a mere
expedient to get along with the subject … Nobody knows really what to do.’” 477
Nonetheless, one of these proponents of assimilation and citizenship was President John
Quincy Adams whom “resisted … a high-handed method of dispossession [pushing for a]
process to respect law and order and federal supremacy” and through his Secretary of
War James Barbour, supported a policy of “assimilation and U.S. citizenship [as] the only
just long-term policy toward the Indians.”478
In the meantime, while America was trying to come to terms with its Indian
question, the midway between segregation and assimilation was found in various Trade
and Intercourse Acts and in the factory system. Although the factory system was
relatively short lived, both were believed to mitigate the issue of land and to “provide an
acceptable area for experimentation in governmental efforts at benevolent control.”479
Yet, segregation would not only remain “the key note of federal policy,” but it would also
lay the moral justification for the removal policies that were to come in the 1830s.
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The history of the Indian Removal Act of 1830 and the final removal of the Five
Civilized Tribes between 1836 and 1839, and subsequent Native tribes, is a long and
complex mix of competition for land, cultural survival, and racial supremacy. The idea of
relocating Indian tribes to make room for the expanding American nation was not new in
the 1820s or 1830s. Meriwether Lewis, writes Dippie, assigned by Thomas Jefferson to
test a possible policy of removal in the Louisiana territory believed it to be a policy “‘of
primary importance to the future prosperity of the Union.’”480
It was, however, President Andrew Jackson who would see the full
implementation of Indian removal through the Indian Removal Act of 1830. Jackson, and
the supporters of removal, thought it to be “an act of enlarged philanthropy [providing]
the policy’s … a humanitarian rationale [as] its cornerstone.”481
During his presidency “tribes were compelled to sign a number of removal
treaties in which they ceded virtually all their aboriginal territory in the east in exchange
for new lands west of the Mississippi.”482 A case in point is found in the Kickapoo Treaty
signed on October 24, 1832 where Article 1 states: “The Kickapoo tribe of Indians, in
consideration of the stipulations hereinafter made, do hereby cede to the United Sates, the
lands assigned to them by the treaty of Edwardsville … and all other claims to lands
within the State of Missouri.” 483
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Jackson’s convictions had deep ideological motives and represented the general
standing of many Americans. Geopolitics and race were often at the fore of the political
debate and Jackson was not an exception. In fact, for Jackson “the tribes not only
occupied rich land, they threatened American sovereignty as the British and Spanish had
done and, like the free black maroon communities of Florida, challenged white
supremacy.”484 For these reasons, writes Howe, Jacksonian removal “set a pattern and
precedent for geographical expansion and white supremacy that would be invoked in
years to come by advocates of America’s imperial ‘manifest destiny’ … a prerequisite to
the westward expansion of white settlement.”485 On the other hand, white supremacy also
characterized Jacksonian democracy in general and the “Democratic Party” in particular:
“Jackson’s administrations witnessed racial confrontation not only between whites and
Native Americans, but also between whites and blacks [and] In the first place it was
about the extension of white supremacy across the North American continent.”486 The
“extension of white supremacy” was to be achieved through an increase in white male
suffrage; for instance, between 1824 and 1828 “adult white males voting soared to 56.3
per cent.”487
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The 1830s saw, in fact, the “triumph of American democracy,” and “with the
emergence of Jackson the political pulse of the nation quickened.”488 This “pulse” was
fueled by an increase in electoral participation, which in turn was facilitated by a change
in electoral laws in 1811 removing the property requirement and replaced it with taxation.
This change was especially important for western territories, which were desperate to
attract settlers. 489 With the 1828 elections it seems that the United States was finally
entering modernity and this newly enfranchised mass of voters was proof of it. There is,
however, another side to this white male suffrage. Namely, it guaranteed that America
was to stay a white nation.
In some corners of American society Indian removal was, however, rejected as
inhumane and opposed on Christian and moral grounds. There were, in fact, several
groups opposing the dispossession and deportation of Indian Americans. The antiremoval lobby came predominantly from religious and women groups, which saw the Act
as “a cruel betrayal … undercutting efforts to ‘enlighten and christianize’ [sic] the
Indians [and] as a moral issue.”490
Jackson’s presidency is of particular interest for the histories of Indian Americans.
This period is often taken as a key turning point, not only because of the Removal Act,
rather because it is during his presidency that the United States experience key
transformations. Namely, as seen above, the United States was being transformed by a
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market revolution, modernization, and a paternal expansionistic nationalism expressed in
a “manifest destiny.”491
In the 1830s the United States was experiencing the height of modernity and with
that the modernization of the country and society followed and demanded the breaking
away with tradition. The Jacksonian period, together with the changes occurring to the
body of the electorate, had all the characteristics of a modernizing nation. From Rogin we
see that Jackson was the first presidential candidate to campaign for office riding on a
party organization that broke “politics from family social status and populated it with
anonymous men.” As such, “Jackson was the first modern president” pushing for a
reformed and impersonal bureaucracy “presided over a strong executive.” Jackson often
stood for “centralization and control against local, parochial loyalties.”492
As with Sweden, these changes also meant that indigenous people could no longer
be left at the fringes of society and they had to be brought within the national discourse.
In the United Sates, however, the process was more complex. For one thing, during
Jackson’s presidency the United States still had a western frontier that lay outside its
sovereign claims. While in the case of Sweden, by the 1600s, the crown had stretched its
sovereign claim to include the northern Sámi territories. As such, those Indian Americans
living within white society were to be assimilated, while those living parallel to white
society, and therefore contesting U.S. sovereignty, had to be removed and isolated;
apparently, once again, for their own protection. Protection meant that whatever
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isolationist action the United States took against the Indian Americans was to be seen as
an attempt to protect the traditional livelihood of the Indians; a similar discourse was also
found in the Trade and Intercourse Act of July 22, 1790.
Finally, those found outside America proper had to be kept confined in the west to
protect America’s territorial sovereignty. This latter need was, however, contested by a
pressing conundrum, how to keep the frontier as a safety buffer while the need for growth
and to feed the emerging market economy demanded a western expansion. The answers
were found in ambiguous and ambivalent Indian, domestic, and foreign policies which
attempted to strike a balance between the cautious realities of the nation, the ambitious
goals of the government, the avid greed of land speculators, and rebellious attitude of the
frontiersmen.
Jackson “identified expansion with American nationalism.” 493 Unfortunately,
however, Indian Americans, and as found in Rogin quoting William Gilpin, were seen as
the obstacle in achieving the “untransacted destiny of the American people.” For Jackson,
one way of achieving this “destiny” in the East was to assault and to weaken Indian clan
ties and in the process turning “Indian into children, dependent on an omnipotent
father.” 494 In the West, on the other hand, western expansion was to be fueled by
instilling “negative projections” of Indians into the white man’s mentality, because,
writes Rogin, most likely reflecting Jackson’s attitude, “Indians functioned better as
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negative projections; America expanded not with them, but against their boundary
invasions.”495
Western expansion was at the fore of American politics in the 1830s and 1840s.
Territorial contentions with Mexico, the question of Texas, the looming threat of Great
Britain (mostly perceived), and the still existing Indian threat made the west a Manifest
Destiny or “An organic natural right, dressed in legal clothes.”496 Manifest destiny has
been conceptualized in a variety of ways and for a myriad of reasons. From John
Winthrop’s sermon in 1630 as an early example of American Exceptionalism, or John L.
O’Sullivan’s “manifest destiny”, or William Gilpin’s 1846 address to the United States
Senate on the “untransacted destiny of the American people” are seen as “narratives to
render nationalist mapping understandable.”497 In the case of the United States manifest
destiny ought to be understood as a hybrid of civic nationalism, mixed with waves of
ethnic essentialism, characterized by capitalist goals, and conceptualized in the religious
rhetoric of the time.498 Most significantly, writes Anders Stephanson, manifest destiny
“has to do with space, not time … is about a certain destination [in this case] the outer
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edges of the North American continent.”499 Richard White expresses another interesting
point with regards to manifest destiny. American expansionism, or self-aggrandizement,
happened at the expense of Indian Americans where they were the only group that “had
to contract as the United States expanded.”500 Finally, American expansionism, and by
extension manifest destiny, needs to be understood, in the words of White and others, not
as a mere “domestic development,” but as a conscious prelude of an American empire in
the making. For instance:
In the larger context of American expansionism and its place in world affairs, the
expansion across the western United States and the subordination of Indian peoples is not
a parochial story. Western expansion was about empire, as much as the American people
and many historians would like to treat it as a purely domestic development … the
creation of an overseas empire in 1898 was not ‘unthinking or accidental’. It had
precedents in continental expansion, which was just as conscious … expansion into the
West was a state activity and ‘not wholly the work of private actors … a complicated
hybrid of government, private, and corporate agents.501

The 1820s and 1830s brought innovations in transportation and communication that gave
the United States a new momentum of rapid expansion and growth. Over the course of a
century the expansionism of the 1700s was replaced by a full-fledged “imperial thrust.”
According to Daniel W. Howe, the establishment of what was to be labeled the Monroe
Doctrine of 1823, provided the psychological mind-set for the Americans to look
westward: “In terms of national psychology, the Monroe Doctrine marked the moment
when Americans no longer faced eastward across the Atlantic and turned to face
499

Anders Stephanson, An American Story? Second Thoughts on Manifest Destiny (In Maybury-Lewis,
David, Theodore Macdonald, and Biorn Maybury-Lewis (Ed.). Manifest Destinies and Indigenous Peoples.
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, 2009), 36.
500

Richard White, The American West and American Empire (In Maybury-Lewis, David, Theodore
Macdonald, and Biorn Maybury-Lewis (Ed.). Manifest Destinies and Indigenous Peoples. Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, 2009), 203-204.
501

Richard White, The American West and American Empire, 218-219.

206

westward across the continent.”502 In fact, by the mid nineteenth century, writes Howe,
“The imposition of U.S. authority all the way to the Pacific, so clear by 1848, represented
an astounding transformation when one considers the state of North America in 1815.”503
The years between 1848 and 1850 were a turning point for both the United States
and for white-Indian relations. First, California became a U.S. possession in 1848, and
later the thirty-first state in 1850. The creation, in 1849, of the Department of the Interior
transferred the authority of Indian Affairs from the War Department to a civilian entity.
The importance of this move marked the beginning of a “guardian and ward” relationship
between America and Native tribes. 504 By mid-century Americans were finally aware
“that western expansion had fatally compromised the isolationist policy [and that].
‘whites can no longer be kept out of the Indian country.’”505
Western expansion was now seen as an inevitable destiny of America. The belief
that the United States was destined, some said by God, to expand its territory and to
extend and enhance its political, social, and economic influences over the whole of North
America was epitomized in the idea of a “manifest destiny.” This provided the moral
justification (if not the absolution from sins and punishment) for the extent of land
sequestration and appropriation, through treaties, forced removal, or otherwise. The
support and pursuit of this destiny, writes Howe, “came from a number of groups in
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American society. Western land speculators, railroad promoters, and small farmers eager
for a chance to start over had obvious interests in westward expansion.” 506 Overall,
Indian opposition to the white American expansion was seen with scorn and as proof of
hindering the manifest destiny of the new nation, and “furthered the conviction that
Indians must be savages [and] The United States looked forward to a future without
Indians.” 507 Total annihilation or racial disappearance was not, however, something
preferred or happening. Consequently, western expansion had to deal with Indian
Americans on a vast scale. The solution was found in the reservationalization of Native
tribes across the west.
The attitude towards Indian Americans began changing also across popular
culture. For one thing, writes Dippie, the Indians were widely elevated above the blacks:
“The Indian … was recognized as a dignified human being, with a legitimate life of his
own, to a far greater extent than was the Negro. Above all he was taken seriously.”508 By
mid-century onward, although the Indian question was still unanswered, adds Dippie,
“Indians, in contrast to blacks, were invariably described as ferociously independent and
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proud – ‘perfect republicans,’ one early admirer put it.”509 By 1854 “plumed profiles
graced United States coinage.”510
In this climate of disorientation and bewilderment white America was unsure of
what to make of the Indian Americans. Their spirit and pride made them worthy of being
part of the “body politics,” and yet their “lack of civilization” made it difficult to sell it to
the nation. In the 1850s the question of citizenship was still far. The courts also saw
Indian Americans as not belonging to the citizenry. In Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) this
was made perfectly clear: “Indian tribes were … ‘yet a free and independent people,
associated together in nations or tribes and governed by their own laws.’”511 Although
this reality was soon to change, at this juncture, Indian tribes were still considered
“foreign nations” and “were regarded and treated as foreign governments, as much so as
if an ocean had separated the red man from the white.”512
This spirited affirmation needs to be seen in the climax of antebellum America.
The struggle between federal and state rights, the question of slavery, and the extent of
American “manifest destiny” all played a role in the perception and administration of
Indian affairs. These conditions all changed in the postbellum years. For Dippie, the
mood began to change, although it was short-lived, in the 1870s where, as prominent
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historian Benson J. Lossing, quoted in Dippie, argued, “Make the Indian a citizen of the
republic, wherever he may be, and treat him as a man and a brother.”513
Unfortunately, the 1870s saw economic recession reaching almost postrevolutionary levels and “the atmosphere of goodwill and humanitarian optimism …
dissipated.”514 At the horizons, loomed a paternalistic approach to the Indian question.
Answers were sought by confining Indian Americans to “reserved” lands, either through
treaty or statute, through forced reeducation, and in policies meant to civilize the “red
man.” In this tumultuous period Indian Americans were more and more vacuumed into a
legal and political limbo, which resulted in socio-economic marginalization and
exclusion. An example of this period is found in the Senate Judiciary Committee’s final
report of an investigation into “whether the Fourteenth Amendment had … enfranchised
Indians.”515 The committee “reported … that … Indians who remained bound to their
tribal nations were not and could not be subject to the Constitution’s Fourteenth
Amendment including its citizenship clause … The committee did state that individual
Indians who had ‘merged in the mass of our people’ became subject to federal
jurisdiction, but stopped short of declaring even detribalized Indians American
citizens.” 516 These new realities set in motion a series of changes that remapped the
meaning of being Indian American in the United States.
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iv) Reservization and Assimilation (1870 – 1930)
A change in policy toward Indian Americans came around the mid-1850s with the
introduction of a reservation policy. The United States, in the wake of new territorial
acquisitions in the west and southwest, saw reservations as necessary to control the
Indian American population.517 In later years, however, reservations were seen as one of
the primary tools in the assimilation of Indian Americans into the larger white American
society.
In postbellum United States the country was facing multifaceted challenges and
serious financial constrictions. In addition, there was the question of the reintegration of
the southern states back into the Union. A policy of Reconstruction, imposed by
Congress (1865-1877), dealt with the latter problem. Unfortunately, the reconstruction of
the national economy, the mending of the social scars, the Emancipation question and the
amendment of the Constitution (the Civil War Amendments), the imposition of federal
jurisdiction across the “re-unified” nation, and the atonement with southern brethren had
to come to terms with the global economy. In fact, the already precarious domestic
conditions were further exacerbated by global financial realities, which starting in the
early 1870s triggered a series of global financial and economic crises. The Panic of 1873,
with the financial collapse of Jay Cooke & Company, and the Long Depression from
1873 to 1896, all produced a protracted downturn in economic activity in the United
States, and in Europe too.
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At the time of America’s “Gilded Age,” a period marked by national uncertainties
and anxieties, the Indian question was still unresolved, and now exogenous pressures and
national difficulties further exacerbated the relations between the federal government and
the Native tribes. To inflame the situation further, during the Civil War, some Native
nations, writes Wilkins, were pulled into the conflict, for example: “some segments of the
[Cherokee] nation actually signed a treaty with the Confederacy.” 518 The Cherokee
served in the Confederate Army of the Trans-Mississippi under Cherokee leader and
Brigadier General Stand Waite, but they were not the only nation caught in the middle of
the conflict.519 Other nations and tribes were also affected, and many were cornered into
taking sides. Among those that fought for the Confederacy were the Chickasaw,
Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole nations.520 Indian Americans were once again perceived
with suspicion, bringing back feeling of betrayal from the War of 1812. In addition,
“once the war ended the federal government forced the Cherokee leadership, in the
Treaty of 1866, to cede additional lands and to allow right of way through their territory
to the railroads.”521
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The 1870s therefore began with what Dippie calls a “venerable byword in
American Indian affairs: ‘Civilize or die’.”522 A “hard-line paternalism that interpreted
the phrase ‘wards of the government’ [where] As barbarism was to civilization, so the
barbarian was to the civilized man: child to parent, or more precisely guardian. The
essence of paternal authority was firmness tempered with justice.”523 With this in mind
the tone was set and at all costs the Indian had to be brought within the realm of white
society; even if this meant that “the tribes would have to perish so that the individual
Indian might survive.”524 One of the first steps in this direction is seen in the Indian
Appropriation Act of March 3, 1871.
During the debate over the allocation of funds for Indian Affairs Congress added
a provision declaring “That hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or
power with whom the United States may contract by treaty.”525 This provision is often
seen as marking the end of Indian American sovereignty and, as found in Wilkins, the
end of Indian claims on the national government: “Indians as a subject of congressional
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debate were moved from national agenda to an item on a committee agenda, and they
were never again seen as having an important claim on the national government.”526
The Indian Appropriation Act thus changed the way white America perceived
Indian America. The Act rearranged the legal standing of Indian Americans, as sovereign
peoples, vis-à-vis the United States. As a non-sovereign entity Indian Americans were no
longer contracting parties and no claims or demands could be enforced upon the
sovereign United States. The Act’s provisions were put into force a few months later
when in May 1871 the Supreme Court in Cherokee Tobacco 78 U.S. 616 (1870) declared
that “any federal law enacted after March 3, 1871, could be interpreted as having
overridden any prior treaty.” 527 This change in direction further weakened Indian
American resistance to assimilation; something that the Dawes Act perfected in 1887.
The Indian American was to be placed in a controlled environment, that of the
reservation. The reservation would in turn provide the right conditions where the Indian
American would be exposed to white American civilization and “reprogrammed” to fit
into the body politics of the nation. Reservations, writes Wilkins, were eventually seen as
the “social laboratories for ‘civilizing’ the Indians [where the government] ‘shall place all
the members of this race under strict reformatory control’.” 528 Behind this school of
thought lies the contention that “the Indian mind was a tabula rasa, and Indian culture a
compendium of erroneous ideas, superstitions, and practices to be willingly thrust aside
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under the light of civilization.”529 In line with the America credo of the time, agriculture
was the answer for this metamorphosis, as it had been in Sweden with the Sámi a century
or more earlier, and education was the vehicle to achieve it. Another similarity of
compatible conceptualizations of indigenous people across national boundaries and
realities is the need to reform the indigenous “in line with White goals,” which can be
found in both the United States and Sweden, as well as in other national contexts. For
Berkhofer the “Native Americans must be reformed according to White criteria and their
labor, lands, and souls put to ‘higher uses’ in line with White goals. The similarity of
these goals over the centuries attests to the continuity of basic White values as well as the
endurance of native cultures.”530
From Jefferson’s convictions of transforming the Indian into an American farmer,
Indian Americans were to go from “Yesterday’s savage, today’s farmers, tomorrow’s
citizens.” 531 What followed was a series of programs through government actions or
missionary work to achieve just that. Most importantly, Dippie points out “the
agricultural solution to the Indian problem was adopted precisely because it would break
up existing tribal units. By the mere act of grasping the handles of the plow, the Indians
would become civilized men and useful citizens.” 532 After all, writes Dippie citing J.
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Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur in 1782, “the American farmer is the American.”533 More
than a century had passed since Crèvecoeur and Jefferson, and other early “pioneers,”
and yet the answer was sought in old predicaments. As for education, in 1886
congressman Byron M. Cutcheon from Michigan suggested a three-step solution where
education was key: “First, self-support; secondly ownership of property and citizenship,
and third, education; and now abide these three … and the greatest of these is
education.”534
There were several race educators experimenting with race-education following
the Civil War. Some of the most noteworthy were: General Oliver O. Howard of Howard
University in Washington, D.C. (1867); General Samuel C. Armstrong of Hampton
Normal and Agricultural Institute in Hampton, Virginia (1868); and Captain Richard H.
Pratt of Carlisle Indian Industrial School in Carlisle, Pennsylvania (1879). The latter is of
most importance, as he became known as “Red Man’s Moses.” Pratt was, according to
Dippie, a “true environmentalist in the Lockean sense,” who believed in Locke’s tabula
rasa and saw segregation as the problem, and education the solution: “Education would
be their salvation, and the success he achieved in a three-year span only confirmed him in
the opinion that the final solution to America’s Indian problem was simple. Since
assimilation was the government’s ultimate goal, all efforts should be directed toward
preparing the Indians for civilization through education.”535
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Important to remember is that these theories of Lockean environmentalism and
claims of reeducating and civilizing the Indian American were paralleled by theories of
Social Darwinism and scientific racism, or “the biologization of history,” which, as it was
happening in Sweden, equated “the cultural hierarchy … under the idea of progress with
the physical and mental difference popularly believed to exist among human groups
[where] Polygenic … explanation of human origins … not from slow modifications
wrought by varying rates of culture change or from contrasting environmental conditions
but from innate differences among human beings existing from their original creation.”536
With this in mind the 1800s were also filled by a certain level of racism that determined
the cognitive understanding of the indigenous and saw the Indian American as a type of
savage that “can neither be civilized or domesticated. The Barbarous races of America
(excluding the Toltecs) although nearly as low in intellect as the Negro races, are
essentially untameable.”537
Reservation and reeducation were the last push of the century. The 1800s were
coming to an end, the Continental United States was now a fait accompli, and the nation
was preparing to enter the twentieth century. The federal government spearheaded a
policy through which the Indian Americans were to assimilate into the larger society and

“outings Indian students were boarded with white families during the summer months, earning a small
allowance and getting an introduction to civilization on a personal, workday basis. Such outings were, Pratt
liked to say, ‘a way out’ – out of savagery and into civilization, since they ‘enforced participation, the
supreme Americanizer.” (Ibid., 117).
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by doing so the government was convinced to solve the “Indian question.” The goal of
assimilation was to:
replacing the traditional communal economic base with a system of private property;
intensified education, primarily through boarding schools; the regulation of every aspect
of Indian social life, including marriage, dispute settlement, and religious practice; the
granting of citizenship, thus further eroding any claim of a relationship between tribal
membership and political affiliation; and finally allowing the Indian tribes to become
self-governing by adopting constitutions ultimately subject to the approval of the U.S.
government.538

This goal was to be achieved through the Dawes Allotment Act of 1887. Prior to this Act,
however, Congress in 1875 extended the benefits of the Homestead Act of 1862 to “those
adult Indians who had or willing to abandon their “tribal relations” and to take up life as a
homesteader on the public domain.”539
Both acts were generally seen as a way to break tribal unity and tribal communal
tradition: “The Indian will never be reclaimed till he ceases to be a communist … He will
be a vagabond and a pauper so long as he is not an individual proprietor and possessor,
with a piece of land held by him in fee, with tokens of his own interest and
ownership.” 540 For Franke Wilmer, the Allotment Act “not only allotted lands to

538

Franke Wilmer, The Indigenous Voice in World Politics: Since Time Immemorial (Newbury Park, Calif:
Sage, 1993), 82.
539

David E. Wilkins, American Indian Politics, 54. The Act came to be known as the Indian Homestead
Act.
540

Brian W. Dippie, The Vanishing American, 109. Amidst the scientific debates on the origins of the
human race which were becoming popular in the 1820s – 1840s we find, writes Berkhofer, traces of
Lockean environmentalism, where “the psychology of that era presumed mental processes a function of the
environment [reinforcing] the tendency to an environmental interpretation of human diversity … Indians
therefore were products both of their social and physical environment in the confused mixture of character
and circumstance that constituted environmental theory at the time, and their variation from other races
must be explained by environmental factors and not by some inherently different nature due to separate
creation as [Samuel Stanhope] Smith [stated].” (Robert F. Berkhofer, The White Man’s Indian, 40-41).

218

individual Indians but opened up “surplus” lands to white homesteaders.”541 Similarly,
the Act worked as an assimilation tool where allotted Indian Americans were no longer
seen as Indian, but as Americans, as later discussed in Supreme Court in Matter of Heff,
197 U.S. 488 (1905).
If reservation and reeducation were seen as the last push of the nineteenth century,
allotment and assimilation would bring the United States into the twentieth century.
These policies were seen as the “one true answer” to the Indian question, catapulting the
country into the a true “Great and United American Nation;” or as expressed by President
Monroe in his inaugural speech in 1817 “one great family with a common interest
[where] Discord does not belong to our system.”542 Unfortunately, this utopian sense of
national unity was ill-placed and well into the 1890s the United States was still
contending with warring tribes in the west.
The final stroke of red tempera on the white canvas came with the Wounded Knee
Massacre of December 29, 1890, near Wounded Knee Creek on the Lakota Pine Ridge
Indian Reservation in South Dakota: “with Wounded Knee serving as a pathetic closing
act, America’s Indian wars were over. They had provided the background to policy
debate through the years, lending urgency to the humanitarian interest in the Indian by
making extermination a frightening prospect … At last the Indian everywhere was a ward
in fact and in theory.”543
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In the course of nearly fifty years of allotment many criticized it as been
unsustainable, a pretext to land usurpation, and resulting in the displacement of Native
tribes. In addition, many felt that allotment would be unsuccessful unless the “Indian
character was to change first.”544 So, once again, the search for the “one and true” answer
to the American dilemma was still a puzzle, but the effects of allotment reverberated
across the entire nation. The allotment policy writes Wilkins, was, in fact, “a mighty
pulverizing engine to break up the tribal mass. By 1934, when it was finally stopped, 118
out of the 213 reservations had been allotted, resulting in the loss of nearly ninety million
acres of tribal lands.”545
In the first decade of the twentieth century Indian policy was still far from
reaching a permanent settlement of the Indian population. Allotment was not
Americanizing the Indian as it was thought it would and as a result assimilation was
generally a failure: “why we cannot absorb two hundred and fifty thousands Indians into
our millions and never know where they are.” 546 Yet, by 1913, writes Dippie, the
“supervisor of school for the United States Indian Service report that 78.3 percent of all
Indian children were in school – 5,109 in mission schools, 26,028 in public schools, and
27,584 in the government’s 216 day schools, 74 reservation boarding schools, and 37 offreservation boarding schools.”547
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The question of Indian citizenship had been widely debated for almost a century
when in the early decades of twentieth century the question resurfaced. In some circles
extending citizenship rights to Indian Americans was seen as a final and true solution to
the Indian Question: “The issue of Indian citizenship [which] was as old as the
Republic.” 548 In 1905, the Supreme Court in Matter of Heff, 197 U.S. 488 (1905),
declared that:
The contention of petitioner is that the act of January 30, 1897, is unconstitutional as
applied to the sales of liquor to an Indian who has received an allotment and patent of
land under the provisions of the act of February 8, 1887, because it is provided in said act
that each and every Indian to whom allotments have been made shall be subject to the
laws, both civil and criminal, of the State in which they may reside, and further that John
Butler, having, as is admitted, received an allotment of land in severalty and his patent
therefor under the provisions of the act of Congress of February 8, 1887, is no longer a
ward of the Government, but a citizen of the United States and of the State of Kansas,
and subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of said State.549

In other words, this decision meant that “allotted” Indian Americans were automatically
considered United States citizens. Congress was not convinced of this interpretation,
however, and in 1906 the Burke Act “withheld federal citizenship from allotted Indians
until the end of the twenty-five year trust period or until the allottees had received a fee
patent to their lands from the secretary of interior.” 550 A decade later, in 1916, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Nice further redefined the notions of Indian
citizenship, if not further complicating the issue, and “enshrined in law the ambivalent
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TABLE 3: UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE.
Confederal Years
(1775 – 1789)

New Federal Republic
(1789 – 1812)

Assertive American Nationalism
(1812 – 1870)

Reservization and Assimilation
(1870 – 1920)

1775 – Continental Congress calls
on Indian tribes’ neutrality in future
conflict with Britain. 1776 –
Declaration of Independence labels
Indian Americans as “Merciless
Indian Savage.” 1778 – Treaty of
Delaware Tribe opens the doors to
Indian statehood. 1781 – Article of
Confederation gives Congress
jurisdiction over Indian affairs.
1783 – Treaty of Paris cedes all
lands East of the Mississippi and
South of the Great Lakes to the
United States. 1784-1786 – United
States Commissioners demand
ceding of Indian lands from a
number of tribes to the United
States. 1787 – North West
Ordinance regulates Indian-white
trade and attempts to protect
Natives from white’s
encroachment. 1787 – Federalist
No. 24 reminds of the “savage
nature of Indian tribes.” 1789 –
Federal Constitution grants the
federal government exclusive
powers over Indian Affairs.

1790 – Trade and Interaction Act
reiterates federal exclusivity over
Indian Affairs. 1794 – Fallen
Timber marks defeat of Indian
American forces and marks the end
of native sovereignty. 1801-1809 –
During Jefferson’s presidency the
Indian question is to be resolved
with the “dilution” of Indian blood
(i.e., intermarriage) and by turning
the Indian into an American
yeoman farmer. 1812 – War with
Britain permanently alters Indianwhite relations; Indian Americans
seen as “turn-coats.”

1815-1848 – Market capitalist
reforms alter Indian American role
in the economy. 1817-1825 –
President Monroe Indian policy
calls for a mixed approach of
resettlement and assimilation. 1830
– Indian Removal Act sets in
motion the removal of Indian
Nations from United States
territories. Under president Jackson,
whom spearheaded Indian removal
between 1836 and 1839, the
removal of the Five Civilized
Tribes took place. 1831 – Chief
Justice Marshall, in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, coins the term
“Domestic Dependent Nation,”
forever altering the status of Native
nations. 1849 – Congress transfers
Bureau of Indian Affairs to the
Department of Interior. 1857 – In
Dread Scott v. Sandford Indian
Americans are still free and
independent peoples belonging to
foreign governments. 1870 – Senate
Judiciary Committee finds that the
14th Amend. does not apply to tribal
Indian, while detribalized Indians
fell under federal jurisdiction. The
Committee stopped short of
declaring the latter citizens of the
United States.

1871 – Indian Appropriation Act
ends treaty making with Indian
Americans. 1871 – Supreme Court
Cherokee Tobacco Case declares
that federal law could explicitly
override Indian treaty rights. 1875 –
“Indian Homestead Act” extends
the benefits to Indians willing to
abandon their tribal relations and to
settle on the public domain. 1879 –
Richard H. Pratt opens the Carlisle
Indian Industrial School. Pratt sees
segregation as the problem and
education as the solution. 1887 –
Dawes Allotment Act breaks tribal
unity to traditions and land and lays
the groundwork for assimilation.
1890 – Wounded Knee Massacre
marks the end of Indian American
wars against the United States.
1913 – Supervisor of Schools
reports that 78.3% of all Indian
children were in school. 1916 –
United States v. Nice declares that
Indian Americans are still citizens
or their own nations and
subjects/citizens of the United
States. 1924 – Indian Citizenship
Act grants citizenship status to
Indian Americans born within the
United States.
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status that Indians still have: they are citizens of their own nation and subjects/citizens of
the United State.”551
A false sense of achievement came in 1924 when President Calvin Coolidge
signed into law the Indian Citizenship Act “That all noncitizen Indians born within the
territorial limits of the United States be, and they are hereby, declared to be citizens of the
United States: Provided, That the granting of such citizenship shall not in any manner
impair or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal or other property.” 552
Unfortunately, however, the real question still remained an unresolved problem and the
displacement of Indian Americans is still an unfinished puzzle.
The White Man’s Indian
Understanding the white conceptualization of the original inhabitants of the Western
Hemisphere, argues Berkhofer, is to look at the “changing uses of the idea and imagery
of the Indian.”553 As mentioned above, “Native Americans were and are real, but the
Indian was a White invention and still remains largely a White image.”554
We are all familiar with Christopher Columbus’ ambiguation of the name given to
the autochthonous inhabitants of the “New World” where thinking he had reached Asia
and not being aware of the encounter of new lands and new peoples: “India stood as a
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synonym for all of Asia east of the river Indus at the time and Indies was the broadest
designation available for all of the area he claimed under royal patent … the Spanish
continued to employ Indios for all peoples of the New World.” 555 The Spanish
nomenclature was later incorporated into other languages and the word Indian became
the standardization of a collectivity inhabiting the western hemisphere. Not surprisingly
then it is often a quoted conundrum of an Indian American, possibly a Nipmuc Native,
when he asked John Eliot, one of the first English Christian missionaries in the New
World “Why do you call us Indian?”556
There is much more to a name than its labeling properties. I agree with Berkhofer
when he argues that through this centuries-long uncertainty of meaning, Natives have
been perceived, interpreted, and understood as: “(1) generalizing from one tribe’s society
and culture to all Indians, (2) conceiving of Indians in terms of their deficiencies
according to White ideals rather than in terms of their own various cultures, and (3) using
moral evaluation as description of Indians [where] Another persistent theme in White
imagery is the tendency to describe Indian life in terms of its lack of White ways rather
than being described positively from within the framework of the specific culture under
consideration.”557
As found in Amft, with the case of the Sámi, the centuries long state dynamics
and socio-cultural, political, and economic processes created what we now can call the
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“Authentic Sámi,” so the “White Man’s Indian” is a re-creation based not only on
colonial experience, but also on the coming into being of the new republic with its needs,
goals, and aspirations as a nation. Race biology and the idealization, if not the
ideologizing, of the noble and ignoble savage were “used to rationalize White American
policies toward Indians.”558
The White Man’s Indian was also a product of a century-long policy to solve the
perceived dilemma of the Indian question: “from the founding of the nation … United
States policy makers placed two considerations above all others in the nation’s relation
with Native Americans as Indians: the extinction of native title in favor of White
exploitation of native lands and resources and the transformation of native lifestyles into
copies of approved White models.”

559

War, dispossessions, abuses, atrocities,

enslavement, exclusions and reclusions, reservization, re-education, assimilation, and
whitening all meant to re-create the Natives in a way or another to suits the needs of the
greater American nation.
In his “natural state” the Indian was widely excluded from the American nation,
because he was perceived as an alien and un-American. 560 This perception led to
substituting the Indian for an American: “Therefore the principles of morality as well as
expediency dictated, nay demanded, the ‘Americanization’ of the Indian and his lands,
either through transforming the Native American into an approved White American
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model or by placing White Americans upon former Indian lands. Either method
substituted an ‘American’ for an ‘Indian,’ and eliminated the latter in favor for the
former, on the territory claimed by the United States in international law.”561
James A. Clifton’s work has been categorized as a pseudo-scholarship “promoting
a new and covert type of racism hiding under the academic regalia of American
universities.”562 Yet, let’s forbear for a moment the underlying nonsensical racist rhetoric
of Clifton’s beliefs in an Indian conspiracy characterized by the production of an
“influential network of information producers, image promoters, and opinion shakers” all
responsible for the “embellishment and promulgation” of an Indian manufactured
“dominant narrative structure” meant to inculcate a fictitious and “preferred image” of
what an Indian ought to be, or “The Invented Indian” that creates “subplots and themes”
to fit the ultimate goals of the “narrative’s protagonist, the Indian;”563 in other words,
something often found in Holocaust deniers’ propaganda. As such, taking Clifton’s work
for what it is and for what it is not, one can still find a certain use especially if taken in
piecemeal and used as a non-conformist approach to indigenous and Native identity
formation.
Consequently, Clifton poses nonetheless interesting questions with regards to
Indian identity. Since the 1830s, writes Clifton, the federal government has been
responsible, through various policies, for the “termination” and the “determination” or
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“retribalization” of Native community across the nation (e.g., the Potawatomi, the
Klamath, and the Menominee), followed by other policies meant to deal with the Indian
question of the moment. In this context, Clifton believes, “termination” was meant as
“political decolonization and social integration,” while policies of “sovereignty and selfdetermination” were meant as “political-social segregation and the perpetuation of
economic-cultural dependency.”564
The importance of Clifton’s writing, however, is not found in his claims of Indian
opportunism and convenience, rather if one reads passed this scenic simplicity, then it is
possible to see the extent of what Clifton calls “the nature of Indian psychosocial identity
and dependency.”565 Whether taken from Clifton, or from another scholarly work, there is
no denial that Indian American identity has been deeply influenced and affected by “their
adapting to the American state’s civilization, removal, reservation, allotment,
reorganization, claims payment, urban relocation, and termination.”566 For instance:
The setting was always a rally, during the course of which someone would rise and give
a, short speech. The words ran like this: “It’s, like yesterday I looked in the mirror and I
was an Indian. Now I look in the mirror and I do not know what I am. That’s what
termination did to me.” These were not simply the idiosyncratic sentiments of a few
individuals: the audiences always seconded such declarations by acclamation. The facts
of a powerful sense of identity dissolution were plain. To be really content with a
legitimate sense of ethnic self, these individuals proclaimed, they had to have federal I.D.
cards. I knew of no other ethnic group where social and personal identity was so hugely
dependent on external governmental certification.567
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Is it plausible then to believe that Indians’ sense of identity was, by and large, dependent
on “external government certification?” Well, perhaps the objectification of identity in a
government-issued identity card were just the desperate words of a people facing the
tangible loss of their history, possessions, and sense of self; in other others, who they
were, or their identity. Yet, this example is not unique and goes to show variations in
indigenous identity and the way reflective and reflexive dynamics work in tandem to
shape who we are.
Scholarly research into the individual and social identity construction from a
psychosocial perspective is, nonetheless, a widely explored field of study. For instance,
according to Joseph E. Trimble, and Robin A. LaDue, the implications of the 2009
termination of the Duwamish tribe as a federally recognized tribe meant: “How can youth
develop any sense of stability and positive identity if the world is so unstable as to ignore
both history and contemporary facts?”568 Here, the psychosocial effects of termination are
clear and so is the extent of the state in defining and determining the identity of Indian
Americans; and hence, the sense of self.
The creation of a “white man’s Indian” in the United States materialized with the
re-creation of the indigenous into an indigenous Other. This final stage was achieved by
remapping the indigenous into a white man’s mold meant to incorporate him within the
larger American nation. The several failed attempts through countless Indian policies
attest to the repositioning of Indian American identity with respect to white culture.
* * *
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In conclusion, the transformation of indigenous communities in Sweden and the United
States varied in both degree and scope. Roger Kvist’s article, paraphrased here below,
show how these countries diverge and converge in the regulation, administration, and
control of the native populations.
In the case of the United States, Kvist outlines two fundamental approaches to the
“Indian question.” First, writes Kvist, Indians were seen racially different, and, as such,
the same laws could not be applied to Indian Americans as they were with other
Europeans settlers. Second, the issue of whether native populations had the right to or
owned land and water, created political and juridical problems for the United States.
Consequently, by mid-1800s following the push west of the Mississippi, the state could
not carry on similar policies toward the Natives as toward other Europeans and it was
forced to shape and enforce a different set of Indian policies and set up a specific
infrastructure to administer these policies.
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A reservationist policy eventually

spearheaded the handling of the “Indian question” and Indian reservations began to
appear across the United States. 570 In the short-term this policy was intended as a
relocation tool of Native populations and to limit the conflict between the expanding
American nation and the Natives. The long-term belief was, however, that the Native
populations would eventually be assimilated into the larger society. 571 Following the
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Civil War, according to Kvist, in 1869 president Grant set out to reform the Office of
Indian Affairs (created as a division in 1824 within the War Department), through his so
called Peace Policy by fighting corruption, by creating the Board of Indian
Commissioners, and by involving various religious organizations in the managing of
reservations. Churches and schools were to be set up and used in “civilizing,” meaning
acculturating, the Indians and to pave the way for their full assimilation into the white
society.572
In Sweden the situation was much different. The indigenous Sámi and other
Scandinavian populations inhabited the same lands for millennia and interaction and
possibly genetic hybridity was not uncommon. The Sámi, writes Kvist, were therefore
not seen as aliens or exotic as the Indian Americans were perceived in the New World.573
I have my reservations to Kvist’s interpretations, though. Although the Sámi show
phenotypical and linguistic differences from their Nordic neighbors and are categorized
as belonging to the North Eurasia Finno-Ugric populations, they do fall within the
Europoid, and in some cases, Caucasian races. It would therefore be more accurate to say
that the Sámi were perhaps seen as less alien and less exotic than their North American
counterparts; but alien and exotic nonetheless.
State-Sámi relations began to shift in Sweden too by the 1800s. It is at this point
that convergence in the perception and treatment of indigenous population occur in both
Sweden and the United States. In fact, in line with the social, scientific, and philosophical
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changes brought by modernity, race biology began to surface, and in Sweden and the
status of the Sámi began to change with it. Sweden’s Sámi policy in the 1800s adjusted to
the economic realities of the industrial revolution. The state turned highly patriarchal and
began seen the Sámi as a weak minority in need of the state protection. By the 1870s,
writes Kvist, the timber industry became a new source of economic wealth in the north
resulting in an increase in the number of mills and an influx of non-Sámi workers. In a
relatively short time, special regulations protecting the rights of Sámi and the settling of
Lapland were slowly replaced by new taxation laws, eroding the Sámi special status. The
census was introduced in 1866, in 1873 the general appropriation charter (den allmänna
bevillningsstadgan), and by 1897 prohibition. In 1877 it was decided that Sámi schools
had to accept non-Sámi children forcing Swedish on local communities. At the same
time, church services in Sámi were curbed. According to Kvist, the Sámi were to be
assimilated primarily through language. By the late 1800s further pressure was placed on
the Sámi. The differentiation that began in the 1600s between forest and mountain Sámi
came to a conclusion with the Reindeer Act of 1886 and 1898 where Sámi ownership
rights to land and water were circumvented. The new law defined who was to be
considered Sámi (only those directly involved in reindeer husbandry), excluding forest
and settled Sámi. In addition, private ownership was turned into a collective right. Kvist,
quoting Magnus Mörner, argues that at this point the state was no longer prepared to
recognize any Sámi right that would hinder the interests of the farming and timber
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industries. Consequently, Sámi’s political rights worsened, temporarily losing voting
rights, which were eventually regained well into the early twentieth century.574
Sweden in the second half of the nineteenth century saw the increase need for
natural resources, which fed directly into an emerging capitalist industrial economy. The
Sámi were, thus, seen as a hindrance to national needs, resulting in the deterioration of
customary policies meant to protect their rights and their pastoral livelihoods. Ultimately,
Sámi indigenous identity was largely lost, blending with the larger society, or withered
away through generational dilutions, or it simply retreated into the private and personal
spheres.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINAL ANALYSIS
When looking at indigenous peoples we do not see autochthons with their multiple
identities and subsistence methods, their sense of sparse territoriality and space, and of
multiple territories and places. Instead, what we see are products of exogenous forces
characterized by white man’s conquests and colonizations. We see them through
imagined communities, invented names, created identities, myths of magical and
supernatural powers, of devil worshiping, of feathered savages, and of teepee-dwellers.575
These constructions helped the Europeans come to terms with a previously unknown
antithetical other. It also helped to redefine the visual, mental, and physical place of both
the autochthon and the white, and consequently, they re-mapped each entity’s identity,
territoriality, and space.
The emergence of the modern territorial and industrial state, however, takes the
construction further and extracts the autochthon from “nature’s landscape.” At this point,
existing autonomous non-state space is erased and with it the ability of the indigenous
peoples “to force whites onto the middle ground.” 576 The state re-codifies, thus reclassifies, indigeneity and belongingness transforming the exotic Other into an
indigenous Other. Consequently, the indigenous is trapped in a limbo between tradition
and modernity.
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The Concept of the Exotic Other
To help clarify the systematic series of processes that led to the re-creation of the exotic
into an indigenous Other it is important to begin this analysis with a characterization of
what may constitute the exotic Other.
The exotic Other becomes nothing more than a colonizer’s construction, an entity
created first through the fantastic imaginary of European contact with the unknown, and
later through the institutionalization of cultural, economic, and political discourses.577
The creation of the Other is, however, not new to Europeans at the dawn of their “oceanic
discoveries.” The first-hand experiences of early European travels to the East gave a
glimpse into what were seen as exotic travels or travels to exotic places. It is, in fact,
travel that first exposes Europeans to the exotic. It is through the experiences of the travel
writer that Europeans first bear witness to the existence of the unknown or the Other.
According to Mary B. Campbell, the difference between travels in antiquity (for
instance Greek and Roman traders to India) and those undertaken in the middle ages was
that the former exposed the reader to the Other in a “second person” narrative, hence,
lacking the agency of taking the reader into the traveling, consequently the creation of the
Other in the reader’s mind was not immediate. It is the first-person writings of later
periods that plunge the reader into the unknown and therefore the Other materializes as a
first-hand experience. First-person writings open a window into what could not otherwise
be physically experienced. In this way the reader assimilates a notion of the unknown as
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seen through the eyes of the writer.578 The writer, in other words, catapults the reader into
the same journey traveled by the writer.
The unknown, writes Campbell, is identified as a contrast between the
experienced, or known, and the unknown or the other.579 This experience, directly or
indirectly, thus provides “the ground for dynamic struggles between the powers of
language and the facts of life.” 580 Power discourses, defined from both factual and
fictional knowledge, eventually determine the relations between the Europeans and the
Other.
The conquest of the Americas, on the other hand, exposes the Europeans not only
to an Other, but to an unknown and a different exotic Other: “Spanish conquest of
Mesoamerica … is … doubly exemplary, at once the most spectacular encounter in
European history between self and exotic other, and … the great transformation of the
European world order, from medieval hierarchy to modern individualism, is manifested,
even consummated.”581
The encounter between Europeans and the inhabitants of the Americas becomes
an extraordinary event: “in that two continental groups, who had had no prior existence
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of each other, came into sudden and violent contact.”582 For Todorov, what makes this
event more distinctive than any other history of discoveries, conquests, defeats, and
colonization is its novelty and transforming effects: “it is in fact the conquest of America
that heralds and establishes our present identity … none is more suitable in order to mark
the beginning of the modern era, than the year 1492, the year Columbus crosses the
Atlantic Ocean. We are all the direct descendants of Columbus it is with him that our
genealogy begins, insofar as the word beginning has a meaning.”583 At this intersection,
the “metaphysical” and affective state of consciousness in which Europe finds itself
suddenly changes and Europe confront its existence in the face of difference: “the spatial
and temporal copresence of subjects previously separated by geographic and historical
disjunctures, and whose trajectories now intersect.”584
Difference becomes thus a central theme in the West’s experience with the new
world. At the center of this experience we find a dissonant apprehension induced by an
inability to fully comprehend what lied outside the cognitive realms of normality; treating
difference “as a kind of degeneration of God’s original perfection [and] as a dangerous
aberration from the norms of stability, safety, and order.”585 Inayatullah and Blaney argue
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that at the beginning of the “cultural experience” Europeans thought that a moral
seclusion into Christian ethics would indefinitely secure their sanity and restore balance.
The cognitive and conscious vacuum in which the first encounters and exposures
played out was soon replaced by discursive narratives characterized not only by the
mundane and habitual experiences of conquistadors, clergy, and settlers, but also in the
narratives that materialized in the intellectual circles of Europe: “Theory and practice
[was] aimed to contain, domesticate, or destroy difference – to establish an empire of
uniformity.”586 The new world brought new sets of ethical questions that needed answers.
These answers were sought and found in the discourse of normative ethics of the time:
“moral and ethical self-characterizations are central to human existence, human beings
live inescapably in a space of ethical questions.”587 Here, the role of the theorist became
instrumental not only in theory production but was also a product of those same
mundane, habitual, and customary practices, and mores, of the time.588 This “empire of
uniformity” thus developed through the conditioning of historical realities. Knowledge
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production became an important tool in the making, or creation, of the new exotic Other
and the ensuing inception of an indigenous within these discursive narratives.
The psychological dichotomization between “domestic selves” and “exotic
Others,” or “us versus them” becomes thus a mental state through which whiteindigenous relations are framed. For Michael J. Shapiro, the way that individuals
perceive reality and shape facts is defined as “constructed illusory practices where, on the
one hand, facts do not necessarily speak for themselves, while on the other hand the real
remains … illusory.” 589 In this context, the dimensions of power and authority, or
alternatively of superiority and inferiority, define a particular established system of
customs. This system is based upon a sort of cognitive perception and understanding of
what constitutes, the so called, “domestic selves” and the “exotic Others.” This mental
imagery of reality is in turn used to justify the power relations defined as a preconstructed notion of what is real or material existence (i.e., the “domestic selves” or
power-holders) and the others’ non-material existence (i.e., the “exotic Others” or inferior
group). These notions and actions receive firm legitimization through “a variety of
“grammatical/rhetorical gestures.” 590 Thus, the construction of the exotic others helps
their placement in a lesser moral space in contrast to the domestic self. Resulting in
practices of authority and power where public opinion is then convinced of the
righteousness of colonization through strategically constructed differentiations of what
constitutes “us” (having a civil morality) and “them” (having an uncivil lesser morality).
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If language and discursive narratives give us conceptual understanding of the
exotic Other, image formation provides us the perceptual depth of the Other. Castano et
al. believe that “images of the Other are not a collection of unrelated traits, but rather a
constellation of features that cluster together in meaningful ways [where] the image
provides the key to interpreting the action.” 591 At this point, a mixture of language,
imagery, and experience, shaped our perception of the exotic Other and formulated its
function and conformity within what we consider modern and actual, opposed to
traditional and passed.
In conclusion, the exotic Other is a creation of the mind. It is a product of
experience, of dialogical and discursive narratives, and of fictitious or fictional
knowledge and imagery. The indigenous becomes therefore an amalgamation of
exoticism: relegated to the outside, the exogenous, the foreign, outside of society proper
(to cannibalism, to the sub-human, to the unchristian, and to the untamed); of indigenism:
relegated to the periphery, away from the urban and into nature, to landscapes, and to the
wild; and of otherness: to the mystical world of the unknown (of unicorns, dragons, and
spirits), of difference, outside the cognitive realms of normality and of western norms and
mores. It is, in other words, the mirror image of what the civilized and the western are
not.
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The Re-creation of the Exotic into an Indigenous Other
Since the start of European Exploration and Colonization both the autochthon and the
white colonizer had to come to terms with their “alien Other.” In this “new world”
autochthons became Natives, Indigenous, Indians, Lapps, or simply savages, while the
sparse white explorer became the treacherous colonizer. The visual and mental imagery,
that transformed these spatial representations, however, developed unevenly: “only
whites changed. Indians disappeared. Whites conquered Indians and made them a
sacrifice in a … ‘regeneration through violence.”592 How did this “regeneration” or “recreation” occur? Which processes and dynamics were capable of such transmutation?
The answers, I believe, are to be found in the advent of the modern territorial and
industrial state.
In British America, writes Calloway, pockets of “syncretic colonial life” emerged,
showing cases of poly-Americanism and hybridity. This Indian-European creation, as in
the case of the pays d’en haut, is a “middle ground,” or “the place in between: in between
cultures, people and in between empire and the nonstate world of villages. It is a place
where many North American subjects and allies of empires lived. It is the area between
the historical foreground of European invasion and occupation and the background of
Indian defeat and retreat.”593 This place represents Yashar’s autonomous space where a
weak colonial power prevented the monopolization, centralization, and standardization of
their “sovereign possessions;” where its existence “‘depended on the inability of both
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sides to gain their ends through force’, and thus it ‘involved a process of mutual
invention’ through which each side tried to make sense of a radically alien Other.”594

i) The End of “Double Movement”
By the nineteenth century this poly-Americanism or “middle ground”, as explained
through Karl Polanyi’s “double movement,” was slowly waning and was being replaced
by rigid homogenizations and standardizations.
In Sweden, for instance, the Sámi were often able to steer Stockholm in preferred
directions. For instance, the Sámi consented to fall under the jurisdiction of the king in
exchange for protection “since time immemorial.” The establishment of this special
relationship with the Crown granted the Sámi royal protection and a special status
allowing them to directly address the king in dispute cases and hence compelling the king
to take action on their behalf; for instance, the replacement of the bailiff in 1576 in Torne
Lapland, or the removal of the Nasafjäll mine’s governor because of complaints and
desertions caused by exploitation and harsh working conditions of the Sámi laborers.
Other examples of reciprocity and indigenous agency is found in Lapland where Sámi
slowly replaced commoners in local councils,595 or in court proceedings where “the jury
came to consist almost exclusively of Saamis in nearly all of the lappmarks [sic] [and
where] In matters concerning land conflicts between villages, as when borders had been
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violated through illegal hunting, the courts invariably ruled according to traditional Saami
law.”596
In the case of North America, Indian Americans were being Europeanized, while
Europeans were being Indianized through the adoption of Native-style lives. 597 For
instance, “‘White Indians’ … found a place in Indian country and exercised considerable
influence as culture brokers.”598 In French North America, “the region around the Great
Lakes … called the pays d’en haut [was a world where] the older worlds of the
Algonquians and of various Europeans overlapped.”599
Another example of reciprocity and interdependence in North America is found in
George Hardwood Phillips’ study of California since Spanish colonial times. Here, the
integration of indigenous populations within white society and economy was a doubleedged sword. On the one hand, integration meant the social disintegration of indigenous
communities. On the other hand, these “disintegrated” communities were reintegrated
into local economies, making the indigenous both a “social victim and economic
contributor.”
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reconstruction where the social units and economic activities of indigenous communities
changed, and with them, the make-up of being an Indian. In this socio-economic context
converted Indian laborers (or neophytes) “acquired the skills of planning, tending, and
harvesting grapes and manufacturing wine and distilled spirits. They also became
masons, carpenters, plasterers, soapmakers, tanners, shoemakers, blacksmith, millers,
bakers, cooks, brickmakers, cartmakers, weavers, spinners, saddlers, shepherds, and
vaqueros. In short [they] became the skilled labour force.”601 The Spanish, eventually,
became dependent on this skilled labour force.
The erosion of these negotiated spaces and the disappearance of that intersecting
“middle ground” or “syncretic life,” at the beginning of the nineteenth century, initiated a
process of re-creation that turned the exotic into an indigenous Other. It is the breakdown
of “accommodation and common meanings [that was responsible for] the re-creation of
the Indians … as other.”602
The re-creation of the indigenous Other, writes Richard White, begins when
“Indians ceased to have the power to force whites onto the middle ground.” 603 This
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statement entails that the end of hybridity and syncretism begins when indigenous people
lose the power of mediating and coopting state’s actions.
In Sweden, for instance, the judicial reforms of the early 1700s removed the Sámi,
and their traditions, from the judicial process. Furthermore, the Sámi special status was
slowly waning, especially following the Treaty of Strömstad in 1751 and because of the
new geopolitical and economic realities dictated by early nineteenth century; such as, the
Finnish War of 1808-1809, the Treaty of Fredrikshamn of 1809, the Union of Sweden
and Norway in 1814, and the various border disputes between Norway, Sweden, and
Russia from 1852 onward.
In the case of the United States, as in Hardwood Phillips’ California example, the
disappearance of the “middle ground” resulted in the displacement of indigenous
populations. For instance, one of the consequences of the failed land reforms, writes
Hardwood Phillips, introduced by the Mexican government in 1833 was the
misappropriation of land redistribution, which coupled with the secularization of various
missions, resulted in a displacement of neophytes and
in the decade after secularization began, ex-neophytes replaced the gentiles as the town’s
Indian majority and the total number of Indian residents tripled. Because the [towns’]
economic structure could not absorb such a dramatic increase in the work force, a large
number of Indians remained perpetually unemployed … Incidents of Indian drunkenness
increased [councilmen authorized] to arrest all drunken Indians and assign them to work
… the authorization initiated a system of labor recruitment that steadily integrated
Indians by force into the pueblo’s economic structure.604
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most volatile and lawless towns in the Far West … Throughout the 1850s seldom a week
went by without the local newspapers reporting incidents of Indian violence and crime …
In 1855 a local physician estimated that nine tenth of the town’s Indians were infected
with syphilis.” 605 The increase in American migration further accelerated this sociodisintegration, which coupled with economic disenfranchisement, often resulted in fierce
job competition among Natives and in vagrancy and public intoxication; two often
criminalized activities or conditions. It is interesting, though, to see how local and state
authorities dealt with this “public nuisance,” which according to Hardwood Phillips, was
to forcibly integrate “Indian residents into the pueblo’s economic structure” by
authorizing the arrest “on the complaint of any citizen, Indians caught begging, loitering,
or ‘leading an immoral or profligate course of life’.” In turn, this system would supply
free labor to local governments, or “when the city has no work in which to employ [the
Natives] a number of prisoners will be auctioned off to the highest bidder for private
service.”606
Spatial positioning, whether in colonial or post-colonial contexts, is crucial for
determining the level of inclusion and exclusions of Otherness. Using Lorenzo Veracini’s
work on settler colonialism, which situates the Indigenous, Exogenous, and Abject Other
in relation to the dominant population, one can imagine the dynamics that took the
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indigenous into a limbo of exclusion and marginalization. In the case of indigenous
peoples, writes Veracini, “they are ambiguously located: they can be represented as
‘virtuous’ and dignified, or ‘debased’ and savage.”607 This categorization is determined
by the level of integration into settler’s society through assimilation or transformation.608
Exogenous others, on the other hand, can “reside within the bounds of the settler entity
… They … can be represented either as ‘virtuous’ or potentially so, or ‘debased’ and
hopelessly so.”609 The process of selection and level of inclusion of exogenous others,
following a probationary period, dictates their positioning. Exogenous others go also
through a process of assimilation into settler society; for instance, the whitening of Irish
Catholics. Exogenous others can also be expelled or segregated from the settler entity if
seen socially or politically undesirable. 610 Finally, abject others are “permanently
excluded from the settler body politics and have lost their indigenous or exogenous
status. These peoples are disconnected from their land and communities, are subject to
segregative practices that are construed as enduring, and are principally characterised by
restrained mobility … Ongoing repression, of course, is one crucial element in the
production of abject Otherness.”611
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Using Vecarini’s approach, the Sámi and Indian Americans prior to the end of
double movement were, to varying degrees, situated along the indigenous line. With the
end of hybridity, the indigenous first becomes an abject other (e.g., reservization and
dispossession) and was later accommodated through assimilation policies into an
exogenous other in order to fit in the modern industrial state-project.

ii) Industrialism and Modernity
The nineteenth century becomes pivotal in the re-creation of the indigenous Other. One
of the causal relationships is found in the Industrial Revolution, which transformed the
modern state into an industrial state. Industrialism brings along modernity, which in turn
redefines the state into a nation-state with a modern society composed by the modern free
individual, stirred by a capitalist economy and a bureaucratized surveillance state where
all social activities are controlled and homogenized in accordance to a mechanized
rationality.612
Modernity, according to Giddens, is part of the paradigmatic transformations
occurring in the nineteenth century. It brought a dynamism that changed social relations
and transformed human activity.613 This is a restless dynamism, writes O’Brien, with “its
ruthless undermining of tradition [seen as a] paradigmatically modern shift away from
localised, face-to-face, forms of organisation of social life.”614 Modernity alters all that it
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was, from a socially ordered tradition, to a socially ordered condition where “the senses
of inwardness, freedom, and individuality define the modern West.” 615 Custom and
tradition were things of the past, relegated to natural landscapes and to the unscientific,
non-schematic, and unpredictable and thus unsuited to state cohesion and uniformity.616
The monopolization of sovereignty, an already vital component of the modern
state, becomes now a critical and intrinsic instrument for the modern industrial state. As
sovereignty was redefining the monopoly of power, jurisdiction was also being relocated
to the center, dislocating and eventually eliminating other actors claiming authority and
power.617 Traditional foci and loci of power and authority were vanishing and were being
eliminated. In both Sweden and the United States any degree of sovereignty claimed by
either Sámi or Indian Americans could no longer be tolerated. These sorts of tangential
power-struggles in fact posed a heavier strain on state sovereignty as the contested space
was not a matter of power sharing, but rather a matter of power dislocation and power
holding and acquisition.
The modern industrial state becomes more than just the epitome of power; it
comes to signify the expression of the nation as a whole: “mobilizing deeper and more
demanding feelings and emotions to the extent that it serves a more inclusive and less
artificial reality.”618 The survival of the state now becomes paramount for the common
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good: “To weaken or to destroy the state was to threaten the future of the human race.
Therefore a state was entitled to take any steps to ensure its own survival, even if those
steps seems unjust or cruel.”619 The nation becomes the focus of the modern industrial
state. At times the nation is expressed in terms of nationalism seen as the aspiration of the
modern industrial age symbolizing “an emotional attachment to one’s people;”620 and not
to be equated “with loyalty to the state.”621
In the case of the United States, nationalism needs to be interpreted as “a cultural
claim rather than a political one where the primary objective of national movements is a
desire to assure the existence and flourishing of a particular community to preserve its
culture, tradition and language,”622 or as found in Smith “sentiments and aspirations for
its security and prosperity.” 623 The American nation thus becomes the focus, and the
survival of the country hinged on the prosperity of the nation. Nationalism was thus
powerfully displayed through expressions of “manifest destiny” and a rapid national
expansion and growth, displacing not only other European powers, but also Indian
American nations within and without its expanding frontier.624
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Nationalism, in Sweden, on the other hand, is virtually absent. The evolution of
the Swedish state and the consolidation of Sweden as a unitary kingdom, and its
territorial expansion into the northern territories, was the result of internal rivalry and
competition (the nobility) and external pressures (Denmark-Norway and Russia). As such
by the time of industrialization, the irredentism and fervor of the modern industrial age
had no consequential impact and Sweden did not experience an American “manifest
destiny,” an Argentinean “Conquest of the Desert,” or a Chilean “southern destiny.”625
With industrialization and modernity we find the consolidation of capitalism as a
new political, social and economic system. Capitalism, in contrast to feudalism, is a
socio-economic system of production that uses roundabout methods of production; it is
based on the private ownership of property and the means of production; and it is steered
by market forces with minimum government intervention. 626 The early capitalism, or
merchant capitalism, of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries represented by markets,
joint-stock companies, new banking practices and stock exchanges was slowly being
replaced by the industrial capitalism of the nineteenth century.627
The amalgamation of capitalism and industrialism created the impetus of change
that finally transformed traditional society into a modern industrial society. Thorsten
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Nybom and Rolf Torstendahl differentiate between classical industrial capitalism
(klassisk

industrikapitalism)

of

pre-1870

and

organized

industrial

capitalism

(organiserade industrikapitalism) of post-1870. Torstendahl defines organized capitalism
as “an interaction between technology, division of labor, market structuring, and social
conflict.”628 Organized capitalism thus refers to what Chandler, Alfred D. and Takashi
Hikino call modern industrial capitalism, which “played the most fundamental role in the
transformation of Western economies. They had been rural, agrarian, and commercial;
they became industrial and urban … At the center of the transformation were the United
States, Great Britain, and Germany, which accounted for just over two-thirds of the
world’s industrial output in the 1870s.”629
The coming of the “second industrial revolution,” namely the Technological
Revolution brought innovations in the steel (Bessemer steel), chemical (synthetic dye),
petroleum (naphtha and lubricating oils, such as paraffin) and rubber industries
(vulcanization of rubber, such as rubber tires), as well as in applied sciences (chemistry,
thermodynamics, and electrification, such as fertilizers), transportations (steam engines
and turbines, such as train and modern ship), and telecommunications (such as telegraph
and telephone). Modern industrial capitalism, in the late nineteenth century, thus,
cemented modernity and the modern industrial nation. With the social, political, and
cultural displacement of Sámi and Indian American already underway, modern industrial
capitalism landed the final blow to indigenous peoples making them into superfluous
628
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peoples impeding the bursting forth of the new era. Solutions were found in the
“marketization of indigenous identity.” Namely:
identifying indigenous tribal organizations and communities of bands as corporate
groups, they are better able to deliberately affect the legal and social transformation of
indigenous organizations into actual corporate organizations, thus opening otherwise
inalienable lands to market forces [Consequently,] self-government becomes selfmanagement and consanguinity and affinity may devalue indigenous claims to kin
relations with animals and places, as animism and totemism have not been dislodged, in
our ‘modern’ perception, from their places at the lower, primitive end of an evolutionary
scale.630

The adaptation, or “reformation,” of indigenous means of subsistence, commerce, and
economies to fit into the state-project is well documented. In the cases of Sweden and the
United States, the Sámi and Indian Americans, were largely amalgamated into existing
domestic, regional, or global economic systems and networks. In Sweden, for instance, in
the sixteenth century, the Sámi were incorporated into the Swedish-Hanseatic trade
network by selling Sámi products onto Baltic markets. 631 Domestically too the Sámi
economic activities and subsistence practices were changing with the changing economic
needs of the kingdom and its imperial enterprise.
Consequently, the full incorporation of the Sámi into the Swedish economy
essentially solved the “Sámi question” for the modern Swedish state. Furthermore, by
differentiating between forest and mountain Sámi (where the Crown turned the former
into an homesteaded farmer and the latter into a reindeer herder) aided in the gradual
process of reduction and control of the Sámi populations. The introduction of the first
Reindeer Grazing Act of 1886 (SFS 1886-38 Lag angående de svenska lapparnes rätt till
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renbete i Sverige) began the legal “authentication” of the true Sámi. By the end of the
century the Swedish modern industrial state had managed, borrowing from James C.
Scott, to “scientifically” reinvent, regulate, administer, and control Sámi identity and the
sense of self.
In the case of the British colonies, and subsequently, of the United States of
America, we find a more complex environment that resulted in more haphazard attempts
to place the Indian American into the greater American nation. The nature of the
American system of government (colonial, confederal, and federal systems) did pose
difficulties in the administration, regulation, and control of indigenous populations.
Hence, the “scientific” ease with which Sweden dealt with the Sámi could not materialize
on this side of the Atlantic.
The great-power politics of European colonial powers in the North America
shifted traditional means of subsistence and trade of autochthonous populations. For
instance, prior to European incorporation, writes Wilma A. Dunaway, “Cherokee
settlements engaged in a communal-subsistence mode of production, organized around
mixed hunting, fishing, gathering, and agricultural functions. Before guns were
introduced, hunting and gathering were secondary to agriculture; and communal hunts
were conducted only during the winter season. Articulation of the Cherokees with the
European world system triggered far-reaching transformations in that traditional
economy.”632 In addition, “the commodification of land that accompanied dependency
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upon capitalist trading,” was, according to Dunaway “the most dooming articulation.”633
This was “dooming” because the commodification of land, necessary for a capitalist
expansion, required the displacement of indigenous populations. In turn, once the land
was cleared, land speculations became the corner stone of American (settler) capitalism.
Without the restructuring of existing European feudalistic land tenures, however, market
trading could not expand. 634 The agrarian settler capitalism of the early nineteenth
century was gradually replaced by financial capitalism;635 laying the bases for the modern
industrial capitalism of the post-Civil War period. Consequently, the restructuring of
Indian American economies that began in colonial America came to full maturation with
their indirect incorporation, through land displacement, into the capitalist American
economy of the nineteenth century. Dependency became a reality, and where once the
“native and European economies intersected;” at the end of the century, only the latter
survived.636

iii) Exploitation, Race Biology, and Eugenics
As we have seen in chapter one, the development of nineteenth century biological racism
was a complex interplay of scientific and social approaches to race, where “Nurture and
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nature intertwined.”637 England was at the centers of this scientific or pseudo-scientific
research on race where pioneers like Francis Galton, named the father of eugenics, laid
the ground for Social Darwinism.
Thus modernity brought more than just changes to society. Innovations in the
natural sciences remapped race and racism, which were now scientifically justified and
were gradually becoming embedded variables of policy-making. What this meant was
that by the late nineteenth century race biology redefined race and consequently
constructed a socially and historically defined notion of race that was to reclassify what it
meant to be Sámi, or Indian American.638
The political discourse of the time meant to scientifically justify policies of
dispossession, forced assimilation, and genocides. Discrimination based on views of
indigenous people being savages and racially inferior contributed greatly to their
displacement and annihilation. In the United States, for instance, the general attitude
towards Indian Americans widely trivialized their existence, knowledge, and worth. For
Teddy Roosevelt Indians were nothing more than squalid savages “and they could be
severely treated by the bearers of civilization who came to take their lands, and if
necessary, their lives too … Such attitudes naturally bred others that were summed up in
General Sheridan’s notorious comment that ‘The only good Indian is a dead Indian’.”639
In Argentina, similar attitudes and policies of extermination provide yet another example:
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Argentina had its own southward push in the nineteenth century, similar to the westward
push in the United States. It was launched by General Roca’s famous campaign in 187980, known in Argentina as the Conquest of the Desert, which was expressly intended to
annihilate the Indians of the pampas and to seize and redistribute their lands and their
large herds of cattle. Roca justified his genocidal strategy when he wrote: ‘Our self
respect as a virile people obliges us to put down this handful of savages as soon as
possible either by reason or by force, for they destroy our principle wealth and prevent us
from occupying, definitively in the name of law, progress and our own security the
richest and most fertile lands of the Republic’.640

Indigenous peoples were generally seen as obstacles in the achievement of nation’s
“manifest destiny” and the realization of the modern state. This ideological euphemism,
that glorified the modern and scorned the traditional, was seen as a “mandate of heaven”
justifying expansion and military aggression against indigenous peoples.
In the 1840s Anders Adolf Retzius, a Swedish anatomist, anthropologist, and
professor at the prestigious medical university Karolinska Institutet, developed a method
for measuring the human skull. Retzius “introduced an entirely new point of view to …
anthropology. He based his classification on the physical characteristics of the various
races. The feature which he most emphasized and which he established as the
fundamental basis of his classification is the cranial or cephalic index.”641
With this method Retzius classified “crania in two groups: Those having an index
of 75 or less he called dolichocephalic or long-headed, those whose index is above 75 he
considered brachycephalic or round-headed.”642 Eventually, a value of positive (long),
meaning superiority, and of negative (short), meaning inferiority, was attached to
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Retzius’ classification. In this context, Scandinavians and Germans were seen as having
long cranial structures while others, such as Finns, Sámi, and Slavs had short cranial
structures.643 Although Retzius died in 1860, his work laid the grounds for a field of
research that became known as craniology or craniometry.644 Many continued in Retzius’
footsteps and, according to Lennart Lundmark, Gustaf von Düben, professor of anatomy
and physiology at the same institute as Retzius, continued researching Sámi skulls,
measuring and cataloging them.645 The reverberations of von Düben’s research, writes
Lundmark, were not felt until the early twentieth century in the midst of race-biology and
eugenics’ great debate of racial purity.
By the 1910s, for instance, Herman Lundborg, a physician at the Karolinska
Institutet, appeared on the scientific scene and with him race-biology and eugenics, in
Sweden, appeared too.646 In 1911 he disputed that only those who had certain qualities
such as the best physical, moral and intellectual properties should reproduce or regenerate
the national race. To achieve this racial purity, Lundborg argued, it was important to
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study the best and the worst suitable racial properties. This search led to race-biology and
to the study of genetic purity that would produce the best quality of Swedes. To this end,
Lundborg, in 1913 began a three-year long research project to study the racial
characteristics of Sámi and Finns in the northern territories. Following this initial study,
Lundborg secured funding from the Diet to study the effects of miscegenation, while
collecting images and measurements of Sámi and Finns. In 1918 he wrote that race
mixing resulted in devastating effects such as a weaker immune system, increased
egoism, and an uncontrolled lifestyle and criminality. Eventually, eugenics became the
accepted scientific method to handle racial relations. In Sweden, as we have seen earlier,
in 1921 the Diet approved the establishment of The State Institute for Race Biology. A
decade later, eugenics gradually led to the introduction of sterilization policies affecting a
variety of minority groups.647 The sterilization laws of 1935 and 1941 were meant to
prevent the reproduction of certain members of society. In addition, both laws allowed, in
varying degrees, for compulsory or forced sterilization. These sterilization laws affected
weak social groups such as vagrants (tattare), Sámi, Gypsies, and a variety of the
mentally and physically ill. Sterilization law, according to the Swedish Government
Official Report (SOU 2000:20), were performed in the following cases or categories: i)
eugenics (race/race-hygiene); ii) social; and iii) medical.648
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The 1920s saw an escalation in race research in Sweden. The Sámi were among
one of the studied groups and, in the process, they were at times exposed to public
humiliation when forced to pose nude for photographs and public scientific hearing
where they were compared against more “pure Scandinavian” examples. For instance,
writes Lundmark, from 1922 to 1935 Lundborg undertook a series of expeditions to
Lapland and the Jämtland and Härjedalen provinces, in the north. The research,
apparently, consisted in photographing and measuring Sámi exemplars.649
The racial ranking of Sámi as being physically and morally inferior meant that
Sámi culture and values were perceived paternalistically, while Sámi in general were
seen as being “lazy and dumb,” and needed to be to told what to do.650
Race-biology, eugenics, and sterilization legislations were not circumscribed to
Sweden. On the contrary, several nations around the world introduced similar institutes,
policies, and laws. The United States, Japan, Germany, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway,
England, and Canada, are just a few examples. The United States, in fact, seems to have
been one of the leaders in the field of eugenics in the 1920s. Consequently, and
interestingly enough, many of these countries based their eugenic and public health
programs on the United States model.
What differences were there between Sweden and the United States? In general
race-biology and later eugenics had similar effects of precluding a certain portion of the
population from entering the larger society because of their racial, social, or
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physical/mental inferiority. In the United States, however, eugenics and public health
programs had a quite different impact, not only on Blacks and Asians, but also on Indian
Americans.651 In fact, in the United States several states had in place anti-miscegenation
laws prohibiting interracial marriages (several of them up to 1967), but most importantly,
these laws redefined people’s racial make-up and consequently redefined their identity.
According to Peggy Pascoe, in the United States, “miscegenation law is an ideal
place to study both the legacy of nineteenth-century racialism and the emergence of
modern racial ideologies. Miscegenation laws, in force from the 1660s through the 1960s,
were among the longest lasting of American racial restriction.”652
The complexity of race in the American social, political, and legal cultural came
to determine American race relations. In particular, race-biology was used to
scientifically promote and defend eugenics, by claiming public health concerns, and in
the case of the United States in particular, anti-miscegenation laws were seen as one of
the tools to protect racial purity. On the other hand, where race was not the issue,
sterilizations laws prevented the socially, mentally, and physically undesirable from
contaminating the race.
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It is difficult to discern any sort of direct effects of American eugenics on Indian
Americans. Angela Gonzales, Judy Kertész, and Gabrielle Tayac have argued that the
impact of eugenics on Native Americans is still an under-researched field. On the other
hand, the authors have examined “how eugenics-informed public policy and social
attitudes during the first quarter of the twentieth century served to remove or [erase
Native identity] from official records … throughout the Southeast.” 653 What they
uncovered is that in several states, such as Virginia, “American Indians were already
genetically “tainted” by previous intermarriage with blacks, helped promulgate …
policies which made it illegal for people to identify officially as American Indians.”654
Race codes, write Gonzales et al., essentially “quantified identity based upon a
percentage of blood.”655
Blood quantum policies seemed to have played an important role in the
“managing” of the Indian Question. In fact, we can assume that where other policies
failed, the legal recalculation of Indianness provided the perfect tool to diminish and to
control those that could claim Indian status. Consequently, modernity did not only bring
innovation to the means of production. Modern science, as we have seen in Scott, also
brought the mathematical tools allowing the modern state to scientifically re-map politics,
economics, society (e.g., statistics), but also race and identity. For Gonzales et al., the
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“racialization of identity … was a powerful and pervasive force that facilitated the
dispossession and displacement of Native identity.”656
In both the Sámi and Indian American case, modernity re-mapped the respective
identity of these indigenous groups primarily through the reclassification of what
constituted belongingness. This reclassification was achieved through a legal redefinition
or codification of Sáminess and Indianness either by reclassifying the means of livelihood
or through the fractionalization of Indian blood. In both cases, whomever fell outside of
these parameters was stripped of his/her indigenous identity and was forced to assimilate
into the larger modern society.
I would like to add one final remark regarding the racialization of Sámi identity.
In chapter three, Kvist is quoted saying that the Sámi were not seen as aliens or exotic as
the Indian Americans were perceived in the New World.657 As I mentioned, I do not agree
with that assumption. My argument hinges on the fact that despite obvious phenotypical
and linguistic differences between the Sámi and other Nordic populations (being often
categorized as belonging to the North Eurasia Finno-Ugric races), some Sámi also fall
within the Europoid, and in some cases, Caucasian races. What this racial similarity
implies is that in some cases racial differences between Sámi and Swedes was absent.
Yet, despite the existence of racial similarities, the modern reclassification of Sámi
identity based on generalized racial markers made the Sámi perhaps less alien and less
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exotic than their North American counterparts; but alien, exotic, and most importantly,
not white nonetheless.

iv) Exclusion, Marginalization, and Intra Limbus Patrum
The capitalist industrial economy also transformed the politics of geography, which
translates the environment into a state-space. The territorial integrity is redrawn and
“internal and external borders” clearly delineate what is within and what is without;
meaning, the level of inclusion and exclusion of groups or individuals within the stateproject. For Agnew and Muscarà, the politics of geography delineate “the spaces of
domination … determines the centers and peripheries and articulates the spaces of
production and consumption.” 658 For instance, the Lapp Codicil of 1751, the Indian
Removal Act of 1830, or even The Cherokee Nation vs. The State of Georgia, (30 US 1 Supreme Court 1831), all show, to varying degrees, this processes of politicizing territory
and territoriality.
Territory and territoriality are no longer viewed as just containers of nations.659
They assume a role of providing the fuel and markets for industrialism, and to delineate
belongingness, and the centers of power. Clearly delineated boundaries (whether abstract
or physical) become fundamental for the survival of the state and of the nation. So, the
territorial nation-state is also the epicenter of extensive socio-political, economic,
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cultural, and geographic transformations, which recreate entire populations; indigenous
or otherwise.
Inclusion, exclusion, and marginalization is redefined by the place white and
indigenous populations occupy within a social context, or habitus660: “Habitus is thus a
sense of one’s (and others’) place and role in the world of one’s lived environment.”661
Spatial restructuring brought the contentions of state and indigenous peoples to
the fore and problematized the existing spatial parameters of those relations. 662 The
permeability of pre-modern, traditional, or even colonial territory with a more static sense
of territoriality and space is replaced with an impermeable territory with a dynamic sense
of territoriality and space. This dynamism is characterized by sets of “constitutive social
dimensions, continually constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed through an [sic]
historically specific, multi-scalar dialectic.”663 This characterization implied that human
collectivity was being redefined in terms of “spatial markers, regardless of kin, tribal
affiliation, or religious beliefs. Individuals are … amorphous and undifferentiated entities
who are given an identity simply by their location in a particular area.”664
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In this “artificial” landscape the sense of self and of identity re-develops in an
unchartered social cosmos. In fact, in traditional societies, writes Gauntlett, roles are
preset from which identity is based. In post-traditional, however, societies “we have to
work out our roles for ourselves.”665 For Giddens, also quoted in Gauntlett, the shift from
traditional to modern modes of the self and identity entail: “What to do? How to act?
Who to be? These are focal questions for everyone living in circumstances of late
modernity – and ones which, on some level or another, all of us answer, either
discursively or through day-to-day social behaviour.”666
It is this unfamiliar impermeable and complex dynamism that is antithetical to
Sámi or Indian American realities, because it requires the abandonment of being
traditional. The magnitude of these events triggers the spatial dislocation of indigenous
peoples in an Intra Limbus patrum,667 or limbo. Rudolph Rÿser calls this stasis. For Rÿser
this dislocation manifest itself in the exclusion of indigenous peoples from the larger
social context and he found, in the case of Indian Americans, that “Indian nations and
their territories remain politically outside the political structure of the United States of
America.”668 According to Rÿser, in Canada, in Australia, in Mexico and in several other
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countries a similar condition existed. Rÿser concluded that indigenous peoples “had
fallen into a kind of political stasis resulting from the colonial globalization that had
begun in the early 15th century.”669 I believe we are facing much more than just a “stasis”
as expressed by Rÿser. For instance, the Indian Appropriations Act of 1871 largely
spelled out American perception of Indian Americans and its Indian policy for the future:
“Indian peoples are neither foreign nations nor independent nations nor entities
possessing a sovereign form of government capable of entering into treaties with the
United States.”670 In this context, Indian Americans had fallen into a political limbo, not a
mere stasis.671
Displacement, however, is the result of two primary conjunctures. On the one
hand, the territory once occupied by indigenous people becomes inaccessible, while the
static space that once characterized indigenous identity and belongingness is now
“amorphous and undifferentiated.” Hence, indigenous people are “unable” to enter the
realm of the modern state, while they cannot go back to their state of belonging as that is
gradually disappearing. On the other hand, the emergence of the modern state understood
also as a product of exogenous forces pushes alternative contenders of power on the side.
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Some of these contenders were more readily absorbed in the wake of its advancement, as
in the case of cultural minorities, while in the case of indigenous peoples the ethnic,
racial, and historical dissimilitude made them illegible to the modern state and therefore
un-absorbable.
Exclusion was therefore based on difference. Modern constitutionalism, in all its
forms, was framed in the very spirit of a single domestic cultural reality, or a community
of like-minded. Similarity and uniformity, and not difference and diversity, were the
norms and the exclusion of the Other was a necessity. Liberalism too was unsuited to
accommodate the indigenous Other. As we can deduce from Razeen, liberalism’s
cardinal value of individual freedom understood as individual liberty was incompatible
with the personalized individuality of, for instance, Indian individualism.672 The reason
being “aboriginal rights … are often in conflict with the individualistic and universal
values embedded within liberal-democratic societies.” 673 Stephanson too shows the
liberal democracy that spurred at the conclusion of the colonial period in America was
incompatible with indigenous peoples: “The conceptual cleanliness of liberal,
subsequently democratic, contractualism proved much worse for the indigenous peoples
than the diversity of royal subjection.”674
Difference and stratification of the Sámi or the Indian American is somehow
associated with what Anthias calls normal and abnormal, civilized and savage, cultured
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and uncultured: “the ‘Other’ becomes pathologised … individuals who do not perform
the ascribed roles in a satisfactory way also become pathologised.” 675 In this context,
Sámi or Indian Americans were being categorized as “dislike unit of actors.” For
instance, the Sámi were seen as uncivilized nomadic savages, while Indian Americans
were simply un-American; 676 in other words they were both too exotic to fit into the
larger society. Performance in this new socio-political, economic, and cultural setting
becomes difficult and is often prejudicated by the dissonance between tradition and
modernity. Indigenous peoples find themselves more and more at odds within the
emerging modern social landscape. A landscape, that is eradicating tradition and
replacing it with synthetic, or compounded, social webs processed by a mechanized
human agency.
Identity and the self can no longer remain in the vacuum of history and Sámi and
Indian American self-identification can no longer be the only viable form of identity. In
the case of Sweden and United States, those who can claim indigenous belongingness is
now regulated by the state and legislation redefine indigeneity. At least in the case of
Sweden the re-codification of Sámi identity allowed the state to regulate the number of
Sámi and as such solving, so to speak, the “Sámi question” by diminishing their numbers
and by controlling and regulating their identity and livelihoods. In the case of the United
the fractionalization of Indian blood may have provided similar results.

675

Floya Anthias, Theorising identity, difference, and social divisions, 167.

676

For Deloria “There is, in fact, something un-American about Indians for most whites.” (Vine Deloria,
Custer Died for Your Sins, 4).

268

Furthermore, in Sweden there were two distinct processes of assimilation. On the
one hand, the re-codified Sáminess involved a partial assimilation into a state-constructed
meaning of what constituted an “Authentic Sámi.” On the other hand, those excluded
Sámi went through the full force of Swedish assimilationist ideology reforming them into
settlers and farmers, and in the process creating what Veracini called the “exogenous
other.” In the case of the United States, the creation of these “exogenous others” was
achieved with less success when compared to Sweden.
Finally, within the vortex of these transformative changes the identity of the
indigenous adapts and transforms vis-à-vis the modern territorial and industrial state. The
indigenous individual sense of self becomes an amalgam of kinship, self-identification,
reflexivity, and reflectivity all within the larger modern non-indigenous society.
* * *
In conclusion, the modern state becomes not only a symbol of integrity and uniformity; it
becomes a kinless entity transcending traditional notions of power and autonomy. It
replaces family and kinship and as such becomes the new plane upon which human life
rests. The new state can no longer afford exogenous forces, tangential or axial
contentions of power, to influence internal structures. At this junction indigenous
populations had to be conceptually and materially integrated within the state to guarantee
integrity and uniformity. 677 In this new milieu indigenous peoples were simply
incompatible. Within this modern, statist, amorphous, territorially sovereign, and
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In Tully we find support for this contention where “Sir Isaiah Berlin assembles reminder after reminder
of how uniformity and unity dominate modern European political philosophy so thoroughly that diversity is
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industrial organization their primordial claims to tradition and their persisting claims of
authority and sovereignty placed them in a collision course with modernity and the
modern state. Contrary to other national minorities, which were claiming cultural or
territorial-traditional ties, indigenous peoples were contending for the same sovereignty,
powers, and authority as the modern state, thus making them unmalleable.678
The solution, conscious or not, came with the re-creation of the indigenous Other.
Like in Genesis 1:27 “The White Man re-created the indigenous Other in His own image,
in the image of White Man he created him; noble and ignoble, civilized and uncivilized,
assimilated and segregated He created him.” This re-creation, or “regeneration through
violence,” was expressed in terms of reservationization, assimilation, blancamento (or
whitening),

forsvenskning

(or

Swedization),

Americanization,

Europeanization,

emancipation, etc.679 These policies largely failed in their track and did not solve any of
the indigenous questions experienced by white societies anywhere. In its stead, the
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outcome was the accommodation, or dislocation, of the indigenous Other into a sociopolitical and economic limbo.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation set out to investigate the processes and mechanisms first responsible for
the creation of an indigenous identity, and second for the re-creation of that identity into
what has, herein, been labeled the indigenous Other. The previous chapter has provided
the theoretical answers to these inquiries and it has also outlined the analytical
conclusions of this study. In the process, ample evidence has been given to support the
proposition that European colonization and modern state’s actions have played in the
creation and re-creation of indigenous peoples and the indigenous Other. This final
chapter, on the other hand, will be used to consider briefly the process of devolution,
decentralization, and progress in future research.
Devolution, or the “rolling-back,” of the state in indigenous affairs needs to be
looked at in light of the achievements that indigenous communities, in general, and the
Sámi and Indian Americans in particular, attained in the past sixty years. The road has
been arduous and the journey difficult, and yet, indigenous peoples seem to be better off
today than they were a century ago. In general terms, although exceptions do exist, the
various policies of extermination and assimilation have failed and indigenous peoples are
not only still here, in the United States, Indian Americans are “the fastest growing
segments of the population.”680 In Latin American, instead, since the 1990s indigenous
movements have turned into political parties solidifying not only their position within the
political landscape, but also winning the popular vote in countries such as Bolivia and
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Ecuador: “ethnopopulist parties have won significant legislative or presidential victories
in the Andean nations.”681
In the case of Sweden, although the lack of current demographics on the Sámi
makes it difficult to identify any particular trend, in the past sixty years the Lapp was
transformed back into a Sámi and as a group they have advanced culturally,
economically, and also with limited political success.682
Fleras and Elliot have shown how indigenous peoples have been resilient and
have been agents and not mere receivers of history:
Aboriginal peoples confront psychological disorientation and spiritual destruction as a
result of sustained assimilation pressures that have in some cases involved relocation.
Loss of culture and control over life have in some instances led to chronic problems over
personal identity, group integrity, and social solidarity. To overcome the disabling effects
of cultural, social, and psychological abuse, aboriginal peoples have taken steps towards
radical reassessment of the past and progressive reappraisal of the present.683

Consequently, indigenous peoples have survived, with varying degrees have strived, and
they are overall better represented, protected, and self-determined today than a century
ago. Examples of this upward trend are many and here are just a few representative
instances of it. Typically, changes began in the 1950s, with the 1960s and 1970s being
years of particular impetus.684 During these decades, indigenous peoples began a gradual
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process of reclaiming their indigeneity, and for some these were times of rediscovering or
renewing their sense of belongingness. The transformative events of post-World War II,
such as, social movements, decolonization, and protection of human rights fueled a sense
of autonomy and self-reliance that ultimately led to significant changes in the status of
indigenous peoples and to the politicization of indigeneity. For instance, changes were
seen in the emergence of national organizations, such as the National Association of
Swedish Sami in 1950 (Svenska Samernas Riksförbund, SSR), and the National Congress
of American Indians in 1944; of activism and militancy, such as the American Indian
Movement in 1968; of ethnonationalism, such as the Confederation of Indigenous
Nationalities of Ecuador in 1986 (La Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del
Ecuador, CONAIE); of parties and political representation, such as the Australia's
Indigenous Peoples Party in 1993, Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement in 1996 and
represented in the Ecuadorian parliament; of political self-determination, such as the
Sámi Parliament; and of economic independence, such as Hard Rock Café founded in
1971 and sold in 2007 to the Seminole Tribe of Florida.
Since the 1990s several countries began a process of decentralization and
devolution; rolling back state-dependency and returning control (partial or otherwise) of
indigenous lands. Countries like Ecuador, Nicaragua, Mexico, Canada, New Zealand,
Norway, and Sweden have all implemented a variety of legislative changes either
granting administrative control over cultural issues, or administrative control over
indigenous lands, while some have gone further and granted both. Looking at New
Zealand and Canada, however, Fleras and Elliot warn us “Devolution is suspected as a
smokescreen that has nothing to do with aboriginal empowerment and everything to do
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with denying aboriginal people the opportunity to exercise their rights as ‘nations
within’.”685
The existence of a “smokescreen” is an interesting point, and Sweden’s Sámi
Parliament seems to be a good example of such a “smokescreen.” From the Parliament’s
web site one gathers that the organizational structure and work of the Sámi Parliament is
nothing more than a state agency, with state oversight. Namely:
The Sami Parliament is both a publically-elected parliament and a State agency. The
tasks of the Parliament are regulated by the Swedish Sami Parliament Act. The
organization can be compared to the municipal organization. The Sami Parliament does
not have power of taxation and cannot make laws. The main task of the Sami Parliament
is to act for a living Sami culture. Sami culture includes even activities pertaining to Sami
livelihoods. This means that the Sami Parliament can freely bring up and present
proposals concerning all of the different questions that are of particular interest when it
comes to a living Sami culture.686

The Sámi Parliament may be indicative of a still chronic state system that does not see
indigenous rights, for what they are, rights, but as privileges granted to the Sámi by a
benevolent state. This myopic attitude consequently defines the position of the Sámi in
Sweden: i) the lack of Sámi representation in the Riksdag; ii) the still persistent status of
the Sámi as “dependent peoples” regulated through a state agencies (for instance, first the
Ministry of Agriculture (Jordbruksdepartement), which in 2011 was renamed the
Ministry of Rural Affairs, but was dismantled in January 2015, and since then the Sámi
now fall under the Ministry of Culture (Kulturdepartementet), while Reindeer Husbandry
is now under the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation (Näringsdepartementet)). This
hint of deregulation seems more like over-regulation whereas the Sámi now need to
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contend with two ministries instead of one; iii) the refusal of Sweden to ratify ILO 169
(“a legally binding international instrument, which deals specifically with the rights of
indigenous and tribal peoples”); and iv) the enactment of a “true” devolution granting
Sámi control, or co-management, of their ancestral lands.
At the present time, the Sámi Parliament is nothing more that a “municipal
organization” dressed-up in Sámi traditional clothing, which, on the one hand, is meant to
attenuate indigenous claims without making any substantial concessions, and on the other
hand, is meant to satisfying international demands by showing that actions towards its
treaty obligations have been taken and that aboriginal rights are being respected,
protected, and promoted.
Another area of concern is the protection of indigenous rights in the national
courts. In countries, such as Canada, Norway, and Ecuador, and to a certain degree in the
United States, courts have opened up to indigenous claims, hence, “reinforcing the legal
ground for redefining aboriginal relations with the state.” 687 In Sweden, on the other
hand, much work still needs to be done in this regard. The problem is not so much the
issue of indigeneity. The problem is Sweden’s clinging to homogeneity and uniformity,
hence, thwarting trends and social pressures that are pushing for heterogeneity and
diversity. Swedish legal culture is also problematic and myopic where its animosity
towards the use of courts in redressing tort is preventing the full protection of indigenous
rights. Indicative of this condition is found in Sweden’s insistence that the burden of
proof in matters of property and usufructuary rights disputes fall on the Sámi, while in
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Norway, having achieved a more suited legal protection of indigenous land claims, the
burden of proof falls on the non-indigenous party.688
A change of attitude must also occur in the academia and although the overall
language of victimization and commiseration, typical of the 1990s, is gradually changing
it is still a recurring theme. 689 The dichotomization of indigenous-white relations into
victim-culprit presents us, in fact, with a problem. I believe that this characterization runs
the risk of waning the analytical power of research, while hindering the possibility of
deeper analysis and understanding.
Victimization is per se debilitating and demoralizing. There is no doubt about it,
and indigenous peoples have been, and some still are, victims of terror, violence,
genocide, dispossession, injustice, and other atrocious crimes. The constant victimization
of indigenous peoples in academic writing, however, has the risk of leading to mental and
visual commiseration that also indirectly leads to debilitating and demoralizing effects; as
well as obfuscating and suffocating research. For instance, constant commiseration may
preclude alternative approaches and may reinforce a sense of helplessness that negates
the individual the capacity to act. In the case of indigenous peoples, intellectual, and
“idiomatic,” commiseration creates an image of the incapable native lacking moral and
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social agency, hence, the capacity to perform as a productive individual. For example,
this inadequacy has often reinforced an image of the helpless, and poor savage, such as
Tonto, the traveling companion of the Lone Ranger: “Tonto was everything that the white
man had always wanted the Indian to be … Like the Negro butler and the Oriental
gardener, Tonto represented a silent subservient subspecies of Anglo-Saxon.”690
Indigenous research, thus, needs to break from its monolithic past, and cast away
mono-disciplinary and myopic approaches that still dominate the field, and embark on an
adventurous exploration of uncharted analytical boundaries. Hopefully, in the course of
these new explorations new analytical road maps may be drawn showing how, for
instance, “dependent domestic nations” can be turned into “independent domestic
nations,” or how the Question is no longer Indian or Sámi, but rather a “State Question.”
So, what is the state to do? Neither entity can be withered away. The answer must, thus,
be sought elsewhere, away from commiseration and into new examinations.
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